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Abstract
Motivated by recent evidence pointing at an increase in the TFP following higher
government spending, we explore how technology affects sectoral fiscal multipliers in
open economy. Our estimates for eighteen OECD countries over 1970-2015 reveal that
a government spending shock increases significantly the non-traded-goods-sector share
of total hours worked while the response of the value added share of non-tradables (at
constant prices) is muted at all horizon. The latter finding is puzzling as government
spending shocks are strongly biased toward non-tradables. Our empirical findings show
that the solution to this puzzle lies in technology which responds endogenously to the
government spending shock. By offsetting the effect of the biasedness of the demand
shock toward non-tradables, the rise in traded relative to non-traded TFP ensures that
real GDP growth is uniformly distributed across sectors (i.e., in accordance with their
value added share). Because a government spending shock also leads non-traded firms
to bias technological change toward labor and traded firms to bias technological change
toward capital, factor-augmenting technological change rationalizes the concentration
of the rise in labor in the non-traded sector. Our quantitative analysis shows that a
semi-small open economy model with tradables and non-tradables can reproduce the
sectoral fiscal multipliers we document empirically once we let the decision on technol-
ogy improvement vary across sectors and allow firms to change the mix of labor- and
capital-augmenting efficiency over time.
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France. Phone: +33 03 54 50 43 72. Fax: +33 03 54 50 43 51. E-mail: romain.restout@univ-lorraine.fr.
1 Introduction
In an environment of low interest rates, the limitations of monetary policy have sparked a
renewed interest in the role of government spending. In their article, Delong and Summers
[2012] lays out the possibility of a persistent increase in productivity following a rise in
government spending. The evidence recently documented by D’Alessandro, Fella and Melosi
[2019] and Jørgensen and Ravn [2019] on quarterly U.S. data reveals that an exogenous and
temporary shock to government consumption leads to an increase in aggregate total factor
productivity (TFP) which lends credence to Delong and Summers’s hypothesis. If TFP
increases, the aggregate fiscal multiplier is higher than initially thought. Because the ability
of firms to increase the efficiency in the use of capital and labor may vary across sectors, we
address the following questions: Are aggregate TFP gains caused by a rise in government
consumption uniformly distributed across sectors? If not, how large is the discrepancy in
sectoral fiscal multipliers caused by sector differences in technology improvement? We find
that shocks to government consumption increase traded TFP relative to non-traded TFP
significantly, thus pushing up the government spending multiplier on traded relative to
non-traded value added. While efficiency gains are concentrated in the traded sector, non-
traded industries bias technological change toward labor which increases the government
spending multiplier on non-traded relative to traded hours worked.
Investigating the link between technology and fiscal policy at a sectoral level is impor-
tant since during downturns, recent evidence suggests that non-traded firms experience the
largest drop in labor, see e.g., Mian and Sufi [2014] for the U.S. (2007-2009) and De Ferra
[2018] for Italy (2011-2013). Fig. 1(a) plots the cyclical components of (logged) real GDP
(displayed by the red line) and the (logged) ratio of traded to non-traded hours worked
(displayed by the blue line) for (the private sector of) the United States. Over 1970-2015,
the two series are uncorrelated, thus suggesting that the traded and the non-traded sec-
tor are symmetrically affected during expansions and recessions. According to the evidence
documented by Gar̀ın et al. [2018] on U.S. data, the responses of sectors display more asym-
metry along the business cycle in the post-1984 period, i.e., during the great moderation.
When we split the whole period into two sub-samples, we find that the correlation between
the cyclical components of real GDP and traded relative to non-traded hours worked moves
from positive in 1970-1984 to negative (at -0.43) in the post-1984 period.1 The negative
correlation suggests that during recessions, non-traded industries have experienced a larger
decline in hours worked than traded industries the last thirty years.
Non-traded firms are more vulnerable to downturns because non-traded labor relies
heavily on local demand while traded labor relies on national and foreign demand. This
1Using U.S. data, the correlation between the cyclical components of logged real GDP and the logged
ratio of traded to non-traded hours worked stands at -0.08 over 1970-2015, 0.41 over 1970-1984 and -0.43
over 1985-2015.
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Figure 1: Real GDP and Traded relative to Non-Traded Hours Worked. Notes: Detrended
(logged) real GDP and the detrended ratio of traded to non-traded hours worked are calculated as the difference
between the actual series and the trend of time series. The trend is obtained by applying a Hodrick-Prescott filter
with a smoothing parameter of λ = 100 (as we use annual data) to the (logged) time series. Since we seek to
investigate how market sectors are relatively affected by the stage of the business cycle, we abstract from the public
sector and thus removed value added at constant prices of ’Community social and personal services’ (which includes
public services, health and education) from real GDP and non-traded hours worked. While we take the unweighted
sum of time series in Fig. 1, we have alternatively used the working age population weighted sum of the eighteen
OECD countries and it gives similar results. Sample: 18 OECD countries, 1970-2015, annual data.
finding is not limited to the United States. Fig. 1(b) plots the cyclical components of real
GDP and the ratio of traded to non-traded hours worked for the eighteen OECD countries
of our sample. When we split the whole period into two sub-periods, we find a correlation
of 0.11 over 1970-1992 and a correlation of -0.44 in the post-1992 period.2 Data on OECD
countries thus further corroborates that sectors have not been symmetrically affected by
recessions over the last thirty years as non-traded labor falls more than traded labor which
raises the question of the capacity of fiscal policy to mitigate such a differential response of
non-tradable versus tradable hours worked. To guide our quantitative analysis, we estimate
the sectoral value added and sectoral labor effects of a shock to government consumption
for eighteen OECD countries over the period running from 1970 to 2015. To conduct
our empirical analysis, we adopt a two-step approach. We first estimate a VAR model
in panel format. Following Blanchard and Perotti [2002], we identify exogenous shocks
to government consumption by assuming that decision and implementation lags prevent
government spending from responding to current output developments. In a second step,
we trace out the dynamic effects of key aggregate and sectoral variables by using Jordà’s
[2005] projection method.
We find empirically that the aggregate fiscal multiplier is 1.2 on impact and averages
1.4 during the first six years after the shock. The rise in aggregate TFP contributes 39% of
real GDP growth on average. While shocks to government consumption are strongly biased
toward non-tradables, our estimates reveal that real GDP growth is uniformly distributed
across sectors, i.e., in accordance with their value added share. Therefore, the value added
share of non-tradables is unresponsive to the government spending shock. This finding is
puzzling since according to the data taken from the World Input-Output Database, non-
2By adopting a SVAR approach, Bertinelli et al. [2019] documents evidence which reveals that the
asymmetry in the sector responses along the business cycle has increased dramatically in OECD countries
after 1992.
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traded industries receive a share of the rise in government spending which is higher than
their share in GDP. The rationale for this finding is that traded TFP rises significantly
relative to non-traded TFP which neutralizes the impact of the biasedness of government
spending shock on the value added share of non-tradables which thereby remains unaffected
at any horizon. When we adjust TFP with capital-utilization by adapting the methodology
proposed by Imbs [1999] to a sector level, our estimates confirm that technology improves
in the traded sector while technology is essentially unchanged in the non-traded sector.
The allocation of labor across sectors is quite distinct from the sectoral distribution
of value added. The government spending multiplier on total hours worked averages 1.15
during the first six years after the shock. A sufficient statistic to capture the distribution of
the government spending multiplier on total hours worked across sectors is the change in the
non-traded-goods-share of total hours worked. When the labor share of non-tradables rises,
the contribution of the non-traded sector to the change in total hours worked exceeds its
labor compensation share of 63%. We find empirically that the non-traded sector accounts
for 88% of the rise in total hours worked at a six year-horizon. The concentration of labor
growth in the non-traded sector is the result of the combined effect of the biasedness of
the demand shock toward non-tradables and the biasedness of technological change toward
labor in non-traded industries. More specifically, our estimates reveal that the government
spending shock increases gradually non-traded relative to traded labor income share (LIS
henceforth). These shifts in LISs are caused by capital-utilization-adjusted factor biased
technological change (FBTC henceforth). We find empirically that non-traded firms bias
(utilization adjusted-) technological change toward labor while traded firms bias (utilization
adjusted-) technological change toward capital, thus increasing the government spending
multiplier on non-traded labor.
We further investigate the role of technology in determining the distribution of govern-
ment spending multipliers across sectors by taking advantage of the panel data dimension of
our sample. We detect a negative cross-country relationship between the change in traded
relative to non-traded TFP and the response of the value added share of non-tradables
following a government spending shock. Cross-country data also confirms that the decision
of one sector to increase the efficiency in the use of inputs is based on factor prices as
technology improvements are performed in sectors/countries where the government spend-
ing shock puts upward pressure on the unit cost for producing. We also find empirically
that the a government spending shock further increases the labor share of non-tradables in
countries where the non-traded LIS increases relative to the traded LIS, the responses of
LISs being strongly and positively correlated with utilization adjusted-FBTC within each
sector.
Adapting the Sims and Zha [2006] methodology to our case allows us to answer one
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key question: what would the sectoral government spending multiplier be if the technol-
ogy channel were shut down? If traded relative to non-traded TFP were kept fixed, our
estimates reveal that the biasedness of the government spending shock would dispropor-
tionately benefit the non-traded sector. This channel is neutralized by the adjustment of
sectoral TFPs which keeps unchanged the value added share of non-tradables. When we
turn to the labor share of non-tradables, we find empirically that labor reallocation almost
doubles when we let the ratio of the non-traded to the traded LIS respond to the gov-
ernment spending shock. When we shut down capital-utilization-adjusted-FBTC, sectoral
LISs remain unresponsive to the government spending shock.
To quantify the role of technology in determining the magnitude of government spending
multipliers and their differences across sectors, we put forward a two-sector semi-small
open economy model with tradables and non-tradables which contains specific elements
detailed below. Given that government spending shocks are biased toward non-tradables
and thus provide strong incentives to shift resources toward the non-traded sector, the first
set of factors determining the magnitude of sectoral fiscal multipliers are barriers to factor
mobility. To account for the frictions into the movement of capital and labor between the
traded sector and the non-traded sector, we allow for capital adjustment costs, imperfect
substitutability between sectoral hours worked and endogenous terms of trade. Likewise
Kehoe and Ruhl [2009], we assume that the economy is small in world capital markets so
that the world interest rate is given, but large enough in the world goods market to influence
the relative price of its export good so that terms of trade are endogenous. Following a
shock to government consumption biased towards non-tradables, the relative price of home-
produced traded goods appreciates. By raising the marginal revenue product of inputs, the
appreciation in the terms of trade stimulates the demand for labor and capital in the
traded sector which in turn mitigates the reallocation of productive resources toward the
non-traded sector.
The second set of factors which influence the size of sectoral fiscal multipliers is related
to technology. In line with our evidence, our model features endogenous technological
progress at a sectoral level. To be consistent with our measure of technological change we
use in the empirical analysis, we allow for endogenous capital utilization. In the lines of
Bianchi, Kung and Morales [2019], we endogenize technological change at a sectoral level
by allowing for endogenous utilization of existing technologies. While we assume that the
stock of knowledge is constant over time since we are interested in fiscal policy effects at
business cycle frequencies and find empirically that sectoral TFPs remain unaffected in the
long-run, the change in the utilization of existing technologies will move the technology
frontier upward because the technology utilization rate is pro-cyclical. The extent of the
rise in technology utilization depends on the cost of adjusting technology. To account for
the dynamic adjustment of sectoral LISs we estimate empirically, we assume that sectoral
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goods are produced from CES production functions and within each sector, the mix of
labor- and capital-augmenting efficiency varies along the technology frontier, in the lines of
Caselli and Coleman [2006].
To assess quantitatively the contribution of technology in determining the magnitude
of sectoral fiscal multipliers, we start with a simplified version of our open economy with
tradables and non-tradables model which collapses to the semi-small open model developed
by Kehoe and Ruhl [2009] with capital adjustment costs and imperfect mobility of labor
across sectors. In this restricted version, we shut down endogenous capital and technology
utilization in both sectors and assume that sectoral goods are produced from Cobb-Douglas
production functions. Under these assumptions, the restricted model considerably under-
states the government spending multipliers on real GDP and total hours worked we estimate
empirically. By assuming fixed sectoral TFPs, the model also predicts a fall in traded value
added and a disproportionate increase in non-traded value added in contradiction with our
evidence. Because LISs are fixed, the model cannot generate the government spending
multiplier on non-traded labor we find in the data.
Once we let capital-utilization-adjusted-technology respond endogenously to the rise in
government spending and allow firms to change the mix of labor- and capital-augmenting
efficiency over time, the model can account for both aggregate and sectoral effects we
estimate empirically. By increasing real GDP directly and through higher wages that
provide more incentives to increase labor supply, the rise in aggregate TFP allows the
model to generate government spending multipliers on real GDP and total hours worked
in line with our evidence. Although the government spending shock is biased toward non-
tradables and technology utilization rates are pro-cyclical, traded TFP increases relative
to non-traded TFP because the cost of adjusting technology is lower in the traded than in
the non-traded sector. The TFP differential leads the government spending multiplier on
real GDP to be symmetrically distributed across sectors. Conversely, the bulk of the rise
in total hours worked is concentrated in the non-traded sector which biases technological
change toward labor.
One additional key contribution of our work is to explore about the role of technology
in driving international differences in sectoral government spending multipliers. When we
calibrate the model to country-specific data and assume that the biasedness of the demand
shock toward non-tradables is symmetric across countries, we find that the technology chan-
nel increases the government spending multiplier on real GDP by 0.64 percentage point on
average. This finding masks a wide cross-country dispersion however. In two-third of OECD
countries where traded relative to non-traded TFP rises, the technology channel amplifies
real GDP growth by 1.5 percentage point while in the remaining economies where traded
relative to non-traded TFP declines, real GDP growth is lowered by 1 percentage point.3
3We find that in countries where technological change is concentrated in traded industries, aggregate TFP
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Interestingly, technological change amplifies the magnitude of the government spending
multiplier on non-traded value added by 0.18 percentage point of GDP on average and this
amplification is symmetric between the two groups of countries. While on average, tech-
nological change increases the government spending multiplier on traded value added by
0.46 percentage point of GDP, international differences in the responses of sectoral TFPs
generate a wide cross-country dispersion in traded value added growth.
In contrast to government spending multipliers on sectoral value added which depend
on the TFP differential, the response of hours worked is driven by FBTC. We find that
for half of OECD countries, technological change is biased toward labor in the non-traded
sector which increases the government spending multiplier on non-traded hours worked by
0.36 percentage point of total hours worked while technological change is biased toward
capital in the traded sector which lowers the government spending multiplier on traded
hours worked by 0.12 percentage point. The rise in total hours worked is thus amplified
by 0.24 percentage point for these OECD economies. Conversely, in the remaining nine
OECD countries where technological change is biased toward capital in the non-traded
sector and toward labor in the traded sector, the rise in total hours worked is reduced by
0.19 percentage point because the traded sector accounts for only one-third of labor. The
combined effect of the reduction in the government spending multiplier on hours worked and
technological change biased toward capital in the non-traded sector leads to a reduction in
the government spending multiplier on non-traded hours worked by 0.27 percentage point
of total hours worked.
The article is structured as follows. In section 2, we document a set of evidence which
sheds some light on the role of technology in determining the size of sectoral government
spending multipliers. In section 3, we develop a semi-small open economy model with
tradables and non-tradables, endogenous technology choices and factor-biased technological
change. In section 4, we compare the performance of the baseline model with endogenous
technological change with the predictions of the same model shutting down the technology
channel. Next, we calibrate the model to country-specific data to quantity the role of
technology in driving international differences in government spending multipliers. The
Online Appendix shows more empirical results, conducts robustness checks, and details the
solution method.
Related Literature. Our paper fits into several different literature strands as we bring
several distinct threads in the existing literature together.
First, we estimate the effects of government spending shocks on technological progress
and our setup allows for endogenous technology choices. The literature investigating fiscal
as well as monetary policy transmission has recently documented evidence pointing at the
increases while in the remaining economies, aggregate TFP declines, thus explaining why the government
spending multiplier is reduced by 1 percentage point relative to a model keeping sectoral TFPs fixed.
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presence of supply side effects of stabilization policies. Jordà, Singh and Taylor [2020] find
empirically that a temporary contractionary monetary policy shock leads to a decline in
TFP, thus amplifying the fall in economic activity. While the authors rationalize their evi-
dence by assuming that the endogenous response of TFP growth depends on deviations of
output from its flexible-price counterpart, Baqaee, Farhi and Sangani [2021] show that the
shifts in the allocation of resources across firms can generate a rise in aggregate TFP fol-
lowing an expansionary monetary policy. In contrast to the authors, in our paper, changes
in TFP come from changes in endogenous utilization of existing technologies in the lines
of Bianchi, Kung and Morales [2019]. This modelling strategy has been already introduced
in a NK model with sticky prices by Jørgensen and Ravn [2019] who show that a shock to
government consumption generates an increase in private consumption by lowering prices
which induces the central bank to reduce the nominal interest rate. Differently, we detect
empirically significant sector differences in technology and quantify the role of the technol-
ogy channel in determining the size of government spending multipliers on sectoral hours
worked and value added.4 While the aforementioned articles assume Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion functions, we find empirically a significant impact of the government spending shock
on sectoral LISs and to reproduce their dynamics, we relax the assumption of Hicks-neutral
technological change whilst assuming CES production functions.
Second, we contribute to the extensive literature investigating fiscal transmission both
empirically and theoretically at a sectoral level. Benetrix and Lane [2010] document ev-
idence which reveals that a government spending shock disproportionately increases non-
traded value added. Cardi, Restout and Claeys [2020] find empirically that the non-traded
sector is highly intensive in shocks to government consumption which cause a reallocation
of labor toward this sector, and all the more so in countries where workers’ costs of switch-
ing sectors are lower. The authors rationalize these findings by considering a small open
economy setup with tradables and non-tradables in the lines of Fernández de Córdoba and
Kehoe [2000]. In contrast to both aforementioned works, we highlight empirically the tech-
nology channel of government spending shocks and connect the TFP differential and sector
differences in FBTC to the distribution of government spending multipliers across sectors.5
4D’Alessandro, Fella and Melosi [2019] endogenize technological progress by assuming skill accumulation
through past work experience which echo to learning-by-doing mechanism. In contrast to Jørgensen and
Ravn [2019] and D’Alessandro, Fella and Melosi [2019], we find empirically that prices increase in both the
traded and non-traded sectors. In addition, our work complements their studies as our estimates reveal that
the acceleration in technological change following a rise in government spending is concentrated in traded
industries. While technology improvements increase the government spending multiplier on traded value
added, technological change leads non-traded firms to use labor more intensively so that the bulk of the rise
in hours worked is concentrated in the non-traded sector.
5In contrast to Benetrix and Lane [2010] and Cardi, Restout and Claeys [2020], we do not find a dispro-
portionate increase in non-traded value added, although our estimates confirm that the non-traded sector
is highly intensive in the government spending shock. As shown in Online Appendix M.5, the reason is
twofold. Our dataset is running from 1970-2015 instead of ending in 2005 or 2007 and includes 18 OECD
countries. Importantly, we adopt a two-step estimation method where we first identify the shock by adopt-
ing the Blanchard and Perotti [2002] approach and we estimate the dynamic effects by using Jordà’s [2005]
projection method which does not impose the dynamic restrictions implicitly embedded in VARs and can
accommodate non-linearities in the response function. Our two-step approach ensures that all variables
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Third, our paper also relates to a broad literature which studies fiscal transmission by
breaking down aggregate government spending into sub-categories. Like Boehm [2020],
we consider a two-sector model with imperfect mobility of labor across sectors and put
emphasis on the composition of government spending. In contrast to the author who
estimates the fiscal multipliers by making the distinction between government consumption
and government investment shocks, we restrict our attention to government consumption
and disentangle the sectoral value added and sectoral labor effects into a reallocation channel
caused the biasedness of the government spending shock and a technology channel. Like
Cox, Müller, Pastén, Schoenle, and Weber [2020], we find the government spending shocks
are strongly biased towards a few industries and do not purely mimic consumer spending. In
our model, the reallocation of productive resources toward the non-traded sector is caused
by the discrepancy between the non-tradable content of government spending and the share
of non-tradables in GDP. Bouakez, Rachedi and Santoro [2018] provide a decomposition
of the contribution of sectors to the aggregate fiscal multiplier by evaluating the role of
production networks. This research highlights the key role of both the sectoral composition
of government purchases and sectoral labor intensity in determining employment effects like
us but the mechanism is very different. In our paper, a government spending shock produces
larger employment effects by targeting the sector that has the highest labor compensation
share and biases technological change toward the labor.
Finally, recently, the literature has investigated the redistributive effects of fiscal shocks.
Like Cantore and Freund [2021], we find that a shock to government consumption increases
the aggregate LIS. In contrast to the authors who stress the role of household heterogeneity
in a model with sticky prices, we focus on the redistributive effects at a sectoral level in
a model with flexible prices. Our estimates reveal that the rise in aggregate LIS is driven
by the increase in the non-traded LIS whilst the LIS in the traded sector declines. We
find numerically that a semi-small open economy model with CES production functions
can account for the evidence once we allow for technological change biased toward labor
in the non-traded sector and biased toward capital in the traded sector. When we turn to
cross-country differences, we find a strong positive cross-country relationship between the
responses of sectoral LISs and FBTC, in line with our evidence.
2 Sectoral Fiscal Multipliers and Technology: Evidence
In this section, we document evidence about the role of technology in determining govern-
ment spending multipliers on sectoral value added and labor. We first establish a set of
empirical facts for a sample of eighteen OECD countries and then take advantage of the
panel data dimension to investigate the role of technology in driving cross-country differ-
respond to the same identified spending shock.
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ences in sectoral fiscal multipliers. To further explore the role of technological change, we
adapt the Sims and Zha [2006] methodology to provide an attempt to answer the following
question: what would the sectoral government spending multiplier be if the technology
channel were shut down?
2.1 Preliminaries
Recently, the literature has uncovered the role of technology in driving fiscal policy trans-
mission. The evidence documented by D’Alessandro, Fella and Melosi [2019] and Jørgensen
and Ravn [2019] on U.S. data shows that a shock to government consumption increases ag-
gregate TFP. Building on the work of Bianchi et al. [2019], Jørgensen and Ravn [2019]
generate a rise in TFP by considering that firms can raise the utilization rate of technology
to accommodate higher demand for final output. The decision to increase TFP relies on
the trade-off between the rise in output generated by enhanced productivity and the cost
associated with a higher utilization rate. Because such a trade-off varies across sectors, we
investigate whether technology improvement is uniformly distributed across sectors and if
not, we quantify the discrepancy in sectoral fiscal multipliers caused by sector differences in
technology improvement. Since exporting firms are far more productive than non-exporting
firms, a natural way to allow for asymmetric technological change across sectors is to make
the distinction between a traded (indexed by the superscript H) vs. non-traded sector
(indexed by the superscript N).
To discipline our empirical investigation, we decompose below the government spending
multiplier and emphasize the role of technology. We consider an initial steady-state where
prices are those at the base year so that real GDP, YR, collapses to nominal GDP, Y , initially.
The percentage change in real GDP relative to its initial steady-state following a rise in
government spending, or the aggregate fiscal multiplier, is denoted by ŶR,t.6 Using the fact
that real GDP is the sum of value added at constant prices, i.e., YR,t = PHY Ht + P
NY Nt ,
and log-linearizing in the neighborhood of the initial steady-state shows that the aggregate
fiscal multiplier is the sum of sectoral fiscal multipliers:
ŶR,t = νY,H Ŷ Ht + ν
Y,N Ŷ Nt , (1)





Y jt −Y j
Y j
measures the percentage deviation of value added (at constant prices) relative to its initial
steady-state. Note that νY,H + νY,N = 1.
While we estimate the size of sectoral government spending multipliers, we also aim
at uncovering the factors that rationalize cross-sector differences in government spending
6To ease the discussion in this subsection, we refer to ŶR,t as the aggregate spending multiplier and ν
Y,j Ŷ jt
as the sectoral fiscal multiplier although it is an abuse of language as both are computed (empirically and
numerically) later as the ratio of the present value of cumulative change in value added to the present value
of cumulative change in government consumption over a t-year horizon.
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multipliers. Subtracting ŶR,t from both sides of (1) leads to the sum of the excess (measured
in percentage point of GDP) of sectoral value added growth over real GDP growth, i.e.,







Ŷ jt − ŶR,t
)
. By rearranging the above equality
as follows νY,j Ŷ jt = ν
Y,j ŶR,t + dν
Y,j
t , it is straightforward to see that dν
Y,j
t is a sufficient
statistic to measure the extent to which the aggregate government spending multiplier is
distributed symmetrically across sectors. When dνY,jt = 0, the rise in real GDP caused
by a shock to government consumption is symmetrically distributed across sectors as each
sector receives a share of real GDP growth in accordance with their value added share, i.e.,
νY,j Ŷ jt = ν
Y,j ŶR,t. If dν
Y,j
t > 0, the value added (at constant prices) of sector j increases
disproportionately relative to the value added of the other sector.
As shown below, the change in the sectoral value added share (i.e., dνY,jt ) can be broken
down into a technology channel and a factor reallocation channel. Assuming constant
returns to scale in production and perfectly competitive markets, denoting the sectoral










j is hours worked in sector j = H,N . Denoting the
aggregate capital-labor ratio by kt ≡ Kt/Lt, the percentage deviation of real GDP relative
to initial steady-state reads ŶR,t = ˆTFPt + L̂t + (1− sL) k̂t. By using the fact that the
percentage deviation of aggregate TFP relative to its initial steady-state is equal to the
weighted sum of the percentage deviation of sectoral TFP relative to initial steady-state:




1− νY,H) ˆTFPNt , (2)






















k̂Nt − (1− sL) k̂t
]
. (3)
According to (3), keeping technological change fixed, a rise in the value added share of
non-tradables (at constant prices) can be brought about by a labor and/or a capital inflow
as captured by the second and the third term on the RHS of (3). Incentives for reallocating
production factors toward the non-traded sector come from the biasedness of the demand
shock toward non-tradables. Using data from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD)
[2013], [2016], we constructed time series for sectoral government consumption and find
empirically that the non-traded sector receives on average 80% of government consumption
(see column 4 of Table 7). As shown by Cardi et al. [2020], when the intensity of the non-
traded sector in the government spending shock, denoted by ωGN , is higher than the share
of non-tradables in GDP (which averages 64%, see column 1 of Table 7), the demand shock
moves productive resources toward the non-traded sector, and thus increases νY,Nt , keeping
technology constant. If government consumption induces exporting firms to increase the
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efficiency in the use of labor and capital, the rise in traded relative to non-traded TFP may
neutralize the impact of the biasedness of the demand shock toward non-tradables on νY,Nt .
While changes in sectoral TFPs determine the distribution of real GDP growth across
sectors, technology adjustment also shapes the responses of sectoral hours worked as a result
of factor-biased technological change (FBTC henceforth). To shed some light on the impact
of factor-biased technological adjustment on sectoral hours worked responses, we start with
the sectoral decomposition of the rise in total hours worked which says that L̂t following a
shock to government consumption is equal to the weighted sum of the percentage deviation
of sectoral hours worked relative to initial steady-state (i.e., L̂jt ):











L = 1. Subtracting
the share of higher total hours worked received by each sector from the change in sectoral












, j = H,N. (5)
Eq. (5) can be rewritten so as to relate the government spending multiplier on non-traded
hours worked, αNL L̂
N
t , to the change in the labor share of non-tradables, dν
L,N





αNL L̂t + dν
L,N
t . The negative wealth effect caused by a government spending shock leads
households to supply more labor and each sector j will receive a fraction αjL of L̂t > 0. If
the government spending shock is biased toward non-tradables, as evidence suggests, the
non-traded sector will experience a labor inflow, i.e., dνL,Nt > 0. In an economy subject
to frictions into the movement of capital and labor between the traded sector and the
non-traded sector and where firms choose the optimal combination of labor- and capital-
augmenting technological change, the ability of the non-traded sector to increase hours
worked disproportionately by generating a reallocation of labor, i.e., dνL,Nt > 0, will depend
on barriers to mobility and production technology as discussed below.
Two factors hamper the reallocation of labor toward the non-traded sector: labor mo-
bility costs and endogenous terms of trade. Labor mobility costs amount to assuming that
sectoral hours worked are imperfect substitutes. Denoting the elasticity of labor supply










where ϑj stands for the weight attached to labor supply
in sector j = H, N , W jt and Wt are sectoral and aggregate wage rates, respectively. We
assume perfectly competitive markets and constant returns to scale in production. Under
these assumptions, labor is paid its marginal product. Denoting the labor income share by







, must equate the wage rate W jt . The
same logic applies at an aggregate level, i.e., sL,t YtLt = Wt where sL,t is the aggregate LIS, Yt
is GDP at current prices. Dividing WNt by Wt, making use of the labor supply schedule to
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eliminate the relative wage WNt /Wt and solving for the labor share of non-tradables leads
to (see Online Appendix B):
LNt
Lt










where ωY,Nt is the value added share of non-tradables at current prices and the aggregate
LIS is a weighted average of sectoral LISs, i.e., sL = νY,HsHL +
(
1− νY,H) sNL . In a model
where production functions are Cobb-Douglas, LISs remain fixed. Under this assumption,
(6) says that the labor share of non-tradables, LNt /Lt, increases if the demand shock raises
the value added share of non-tradables at current prices. For ωY,N to increase, the demand
shock must be biased toward non-tradables. Because the traded sector also receives a share
of the rise in government spending and experiences an increase in its relative price, by
mitigating the rise in ωY,Nt , the appreciation in the terms of trade acts like a barrier to
mobility. As labor mobility costs are higher (i.e., ε takes lower values), LNt /Lt increases
less for a given change in ωY,Nt . If sectoral goods are produced by means of CES production
functions, sectoral LISs are no longer constant and their adjustment can amplify or mitigate
the government spending multiplier on non-traded labor. More specifically, a rise in sNL,t/sL,t
tilts the demand for labor toward the non-traded sector which increases the government
spending multiplier on non-traded hours worked by causing a shift of labor toward the
non-traded sector.
2.2 VAR Model and Identification
To conduct our empirical study, we compute the responses of selected variables by using
a two-step estimation procedure. We first identify shocks to government consumption by
considering a baseline VAR model where government spending is ordered before the other
variables. In the second step, we trace out the dynamic effects of the identified shock to
government consumption by using Jordà’s [2005] single-equation method.
The first step amounts to adopting the standard Cholesky decomposition pioneered by
Blanchard and Perotti [2002]. More specifically, we estimate the reduced-form VAR model
in panel format on annual data:
Zi,t = αi + αt + βit +
2∑
k=1
A−1BkZi,t−k + A−1εi,t, (7)
where subscripts i and t denote the country and the year. The vector of endogenous variables
is denoted by Zi,t, k is the number of lags; the specification includes country fixed effects,
αi, time dummies, αt, and country-specific linear time trends; A is a matrix that describes
the contemporaneous relation among the variables collected in vector Zi,t, Bk is a matrix
of lag specific own- and cross-effects of variables on current observations, and the vector
εi,t contains the structural disturbances which are uncorrelated with each other. In line
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with the current practice, we include two lags in the regression model and use a panel OLS
regression to estimate the coefficients A−1Bk and the reduced-form innovations A−1εi,t.
Like Blanchard and Perotti [2002], we base the identification scheme on the assumption
that there are some delays inherent to the legislative system which prevents government
spending to respond endogenously to contemporaneous output developments. Such an
assumption amounts to assuming that the matrix A is lower-triangular and thus government
spending is exogenous within the year.7 The VAR model we estimate in the first step
includes government final consumption expenditure, real GDP, total hours worked, private
investment, the real consumption wage, and aggregate total factor productivity, where all
variables are logged, while all quantities are expressed in real terms and scaled by the
working age population.
In the second step, we estimate the effects on selected variables detailed later by using
the Jordà’s [2005] single-equation method. The local projection method amounts to running
a series of regressions of each variable of interest on a structural identified shock for each
horizon h = 0, 1, 2, ...:
xi,t+h = αi,h + αt,h + βi,ht + ψh (L) zi,t−1 + γhεGi,t + ηi,t+h, (8)
where αi,h are country fixed effects, αt,h are time dummies, and we include country-specific
linear time trends; x is the logarithm of the variable of interest, z is a vector of control
variables (i.e., past values of government spending and of the variable of interest), ψh (L) is
a polynomial (of order two) in the lag operator and εGi,t is the identified government spending
shock. Country fixed effects and country-specific linear time trend control for countries’
characteristics which are time-invariant and time-varying respectively, while time dummies
control for macroeconomic shocks which are common across countries.
2.3 Data Construction
Before presenting evidence on fiscal transmission across sectors, we briefly discuss the
dataset we use. Our sample contains annual observations and consists of a panel of 18
OECD countries. The baseline period is running from 1970 to 2015. All quantities are
logged, expressed in real terms and scaled by the working age population. Government
final consumption expenditure (Gi,t) in volume is taken from OECD Economic outlook.
7While using annual data makes the assumption of government spending being unresponsive to current
output developments due to decision and implementation lags in the legislative process less relevant, the test
performed by Born and Müller [2012] reveals that the assumption that government spending is predetermined
within the year cannot be rejected. In Online Appendix M.1, based on the presumption that this industry is
government-dominated, we perform a robustness analysis by excluding the industry ”Community Social and
Personal Services” from non-tradable industries’. In doing this, we purge for the potential and automatic
link between non-traded value added and public spending, see e.g., Beetsma and Giuliodori [2008]. While
the labor effects are mitigated quantitatively when we remove this industry from the non-traded sector, all
of our conclusions hold. In Online Appendix M.2, we also conduct an investigation of the potential presence
of anticipation effects by using a dataset constructed by Born, Juessen and Müller [2013] which contains
one year-ahead OECD forecasts for government spending. Our estimates show that our main results are
not affected by the inclusion of forecasts for government spending growth.
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We describe below how we construct time series at a sectoral level. For more details, see
Online Appendix C.
Since our primary objective is to quantify the role of the technology channel in de-
termining the sectoral effects of a government spending shock, we describe below how we
construct time series at a sectoral level. Our sample covers eleven 1-digit ISIC-rev.3 indus-
tries which are split into traded and non-traded sectors by adopting the classification by De
Gregorio et al. [1994]. Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing; Mining and quarrying;
Total manufacturing; Transport, storage and communication are classified as traded indus-
tries. Following Jensen and Kletzer [2006], we updated the classification by De Gregorio
et al. [1994] by treating Financial intermediation as a traded industry. Electricity, gas
and water supply; Construction; Wholesale and retail trade; Hotels and restaurants; Real
estate, renting and business services; Community, social and personal services are classified
as non-traded industries.8
Once industries have been classified as traded or non-traded, series for sectoral value
added in current (constant) prices are constructed by adding value added in current (con-

















k,it where the bar indicates that prices P
j are those of the base year), from which
we construct price indices (or sectoral value added deflators), P jit. Normalizing base year
price indices P̄ j to 1, the relative price of non-tradables, Pit, is defined as the ratio of the
non-traded value added deflator to the traded value added deflator (i.e., Pit = PNit /P
H
it ).
The relative price of home-produced traded goods (or the TOT, denoted by PHit ) is con-
structed as the ratio of the traded value added deflator (PHit ) to the price deflator of imported





k,it) and labor compensation in the traded and the non-traded sectors which
allow us to construct sectoral wages, W jit. We also construct the share of hours worked and
value added (at constant prices) of sector j in total hours worked and GDP, respectively,
denoted by νL,jit and ν
Y,j
it . To estimate the redistributive effects and infer FBTC, we calcu-
late the LIS for each sector j, denoted by sjL,it, as the ratio of labor compensation to valued
added at current prices in sector j.
We construct time series for capital-utilization-adjusted sectoral TFPs, Zj , to approx-
imate technical change. Sectoral TFPs are constructed as Solow residuals from constant-
price (domestic currency) series of value added, Y jit, capital stock, K
j











8Because ”Financial Intermediation” and ”Real Estate, Renting and Business Services” are made up of
sub-sectors which display a high heterogeneity in terms of tradability and ”Hotels and Restaurants” has
experienced a large increase in tradability over the last fifty years, we perform a sensitivity analysis with
respect to the classification for the three aforementioned sectors in Online Appendix M.1. Treating ”Finan-
cial Intermediation” as non-tradables or classifying ”Hotels and Restaurants” or ”Real Estate, Renting and
Business Services” as tradables does not affect our main results.
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where sjL,i is the LIS in sector j averaged over the period 1970-2015. To obtain series
for the capital stock in sector j, we first compute the overall capital stock by adopting
the perpetual inventory approach, using constant-price investment series taken from the
OECD’s Annual National Accounts. Following Garofalo and Yamarik [2002], we split the
gross capital stock into traded and non-traded industries by using sectoral valued added
shares. Once we have constructed the Solow residual for the traded and the non-traded
sector, we construct a measure for technological change by adjusting the Solow residual








where we follow Imbs [1999] in constructing time series for uK,jit , see Appendix D.
2.4 Sectoral Effects of Government Spending Shocks: VAR Evidence
We generated impulse response functions by means of local projections. The dynamic ad-
justment of variables to an exogenous increase in government spending by 1% of GDP
is displayed by the solid blue line in Fig. 2. The shaded areas indicate 90% confidence
bounds. The horizontal axis of each panel measures the time after the shock in years and
the vertical axis measures deviations from trend. Responses of sectoral value added and
sectoral hours worked are re-scaled by the sample average of sectoral value added to GDP
and sectoral labor compensation share, respectively. As such, on impact the responses
of sectoral value added at constant prices and sectoral hours worked can be interpreted as
government spending multipliers on value added and labor as they are expressed in percent-
age point of GDP and total hours worked, respectively. We also compute the government
spending multipliers over a six-year horizon by computing the ratio of the present value of
the cumulative change in value added/labor to the present value of the cumulative change
in government consumption, setting the world interest rate to 3% in line with our estimates
summarized in Table 6.
Aggregate effects. The first row of Fig. 2 displays the aggregate effects of a shock to
government consumption. As shown in Fig. 2(a), government consumption follows a hump-
shaped response and displays a high level of persistence since it takes more than eight years
before government consumption is restored back toward its initial level. Fig. 2(b) and Fig.
2(c) reveals that a rise in government consumption has a strong expansionary effect on
total hours worked and real GDP. Total hours worked increase by 0.9% on impact while
real GDP increases by 1.2%. The government spending multiplier on real GDP and total
hours worked average 1.4 and 1.15, respectively, the first six years, both responses being
statistically significant over this period. One key factor that generates a multiplier on real
GDP larger than one is technology since 39% of real GDP growth is driven by aggregate
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TFP growth (displayed by Fig. 2(d)) over a six-year horizon.9 We find some strong support
of this finding by adapting the methodology proposed by Sims and Zha [2006], Bachman
and Sims [2012]. We find that the fiscal multiplier is reduced by 42% when the response of
TFP to a shock to government consumption is shut down.10
Government spending multiplier on sectoral labor. The second row of Fig. 2
displays the dynamic adjustment of sectoral hours worked. Fig. 2(e) and 2(f) reveals
that a shock to government consumption by 1% of GDP increase both traded and non-
traded hours worked but only the latter is statistically significant. More specifically, the
government spending multiplier on non-traded hours worked averages 1.02 ppt of total
hours worked while the government spending multiplier on traded hours worked averages
0.13 ppt of total hours worked. Therefore, the rise in non-traded hours worked contribute
88% to the increase in total hours worked. Fig. 2(g) shows the response of the labor share
of non-tradables, i.e., LN/L, which measures the change in non-traded hours worked driven
by labor reallocation only. On average, over the first six years, the non-traded goods-sector
share of total hours worked increases by 0.3 ppt of total hours worked. The shift of labor
toward the non-traded sector contributes 29% to the rise in LN . As mentioned previously,
the reallocation of labor toward the non-traded sector is driven by the biasedness of the
demand shock toward-non-tradables.11 The second factor that encourages labor to move
toward the non-traded sector is the non-traded LIS which builds up relative to the traded
LIS, as displayed by Fig. 2(h). As detailed below, the rise in sNL /s
H
L is brought about by
technological change biased toward labor which amplifies the reallocation of labor toward
the non-traded sector and thus rationalizes a government spending multiplier on non-traded
hours worked of about one.12
Government spending multiplier on sectoral value added and technology. The
third row of Fig. 2 shows that a rise in government consumption increases both traded and
non-traded value added at constant prices. Both responses are statistically significant. Over
the first six years, the government spending multiplier on traded value added averages 0.52
ppt of GDP while the government spending multiplier on non-traded value added averages
0.89 ppt. In contrast to labor, the non-traded sector contributes 64% only to real GDP
growth, a value which collapses to the share of non-tradables in GDP. In accordance with
9There is a slight discrepancy between the response of real GDP which is constructed as the sum of
traded and non-traded value added and the sum of the responses of traded and non-traded value added. To
ensure consistency, we calculate the government spending multiplier and the contribution of TFP growth to
real GDP growth by calculating the response of real GDP as the sum of the responses of Y H and Y N .
10When we estimate a VAR model which includes government consumption, aggregate TFP and real
GDP, the government spending multiplier in real GDP over a six-year horizon averages 1.25 and thus is
slightly smaller than that obtained when we adopt a two-step approach. When we shut down technological
change, the government spending multiplier averages 0.73 the first six years.
11See Fig. 9 relegated to the Online Appendix E which shows that a shock to government consumption
by 1% of GDP is associated with a rise in GN by 0.8% of GDP on impact.
12We compute the LIS like Gollin [2002], i.e., labor compensation is defined as the sum of compensa-
tion of employees plus compensation of self-employed. We find that our results are robust to alternative
constructions of the LIS, see Online Appendix M.3.
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this observation, Fig. 2(k) reveals that the value added share of non-tradables (at constant
prices) remains unresponsive to the shock, thus confirming that the government spending
multiplier on real GDP is symmetrically distributed across sectors, i.e., in accordance with
their value added share. This result is puzzling because the government spending shock
is strongly biased toward non-tradables and triggers a reallocation of productive resources
toward the non-traded sector. As shown in Fig. 2(l), traded TFP increases significantly
relative to non-traded TFP. On average, over the first six years, the TFP differential between
tradables and non-tradables amounts to 1.5% on average (per year). The technology gap
is large enough to offset the impact of the reallocation of productive resources toward the
non-traded sector and leaves unchanged νY,Nt .
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Fiscal policy and utilization-adjusted TFP. The last row of Fig. 2 displays the
dynamic adjustment of TFP and FBTC for tradables and non-tradables, which are both
adjusted with capital utilization to reflect the true variations of technological change, see
Basu, Fernald and Kimball [2006]. Fig. 2(m) and 2(n) show the responses of traded and
non-traded TFP once we control for varying utilization of capital at a sectoral level. See
Online Appendix D where we detail the adaptation of the approach proposed by Imbs [1999]
to measure the capital utilization rate in the traded and non-traded sector by considering
CES production functions. After correcting for capital utilization, Fig. 2(m) and Fig. 2(n)
confirm that technology improves in the traded sector and is essentially unchanged in the
non-traded sector. Because the capital utilization rate increases in the traded relative to
the non-traded sector, these findings indicate that the rise in the relative TFP of trad-
ables shown in Fig. 2(l) is driven by both a higher utilization of capital and a technology
improvement in the traded sector.
Fiscal policy and utilization-adjusted FBTC. While the rise in traded relative
to non-traded TFP leads real GDP growth to be uniformly distributed across sectors, the
last two panels of the last row of Fig. 2 show that the differential in FBTC between
non-tradables and tradables can rationalize the concentration of labor growth in the non-
traded sector. To measure capital-utilization-adjusted-FBTC in the traded and non-traded
sector, we draw on Caselli and Coleman [2006] and Caselli [2016]. Denoting the elasticity
of substitution between capital and labor by σj , capital- and labor-augmenting efficiency
by Bjt and A
j
t , respectively, our measure of capital-utilization-adjusted-FBTC, denoted by
13We are aware that the traded and non-traded sectors are made-up of several industries and variations
in TFP in broad sectors could be the result of changes in the value added share of sub-sectors (between-
effect) rather than a technology improvement within the industry (within-effect). Our dataset covers eleven
industries and in Online Appendix M.4, we conduct the same empirical analysis as in the main text but at a
disaggregate industry level. First, we find that the behavior of industries classified as tradables experience
an increase in traded TFP while the responses of TFP in non-traded industries are more heterogenous and
clustered around the horizontal axis.
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Figure 2: Sectoral Effects of a Shock to Government Consumption. Notes: The solid blue line shows
the response of aggregate and sectoral variables to an exogenous increase in government final consumption expenditure
by 1% of GDP. Shaded areas indicate the 90 percent confidence bounds. To estimate the dynamic responses to a
shock to government consumption, we adopt a two-step method. In the first step, the government spending shock is
identified by estimating a VAR model that includes real government final consumption expenditure, real GDP, total
hours worked, the real consumption wage, and aggregate TFP. In the second step, we estimate the effects by using
Jordà’s [2005] single-equation method. Horizontal axes indicate years. Vertical axes measure percentage deviation
from trend in GDP units (sectoral value added, sectoral value added share, labor income share), percentage deviation
from trend in total hours worked units (sectoral hours worked, labor share), percentage deviation from trend (sectoral
TFPs, sectoral FBCT). Sample: 18 OECD countries, 1970-2015, annual data.
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where a bar refers to averaged values of the corresponding variable over 1970-2015. To
construct time series for FTBCjt,adjK , we plug estimates for the elasticity of substitution




, the capital-labor ratio, kjt , and the capital utilization rate, u
K,j
t , in
sector j = H,N . An increase in our measure FTBCjt,adjK described by (11) means that
technological change is biased toward labor. Since this measure crucially depends on σj ,
we have estimated this parameter for both sectors, see Online Appendix J.3. We find
empirically that σH = 0.64 for the traded sector and σN = 0.80 for the non-traded sector
for the whole sample, as summarized in columns 18 and 19 of Table 7. Evidence displayed
by Fig. 2(o) and 2(p) suggests that technological change is biased toward capital in the
traded sector while technological change is biased toward labor in the non-traded sector.
These findings are consistent with the rise in non-traded LIS relative to the traded LIS
shown in Fig. 2(h). Because capital and labor are gross complements in production, our
evidence indicates that traded firms tend to lower BH/AH and non-traded firms to increase
BN/AN . In Online Appendix K.2, we document evidence which rationalizes the decision to
bias technological change toward one specific factor. Because the non-traded sector must
pay higher wages to encourage workers to shift, non-traded firms increase labor-augmenting
productivity to mitigate the rise in the labor cost. Since labor- and capital-augmenting
productivity are strong complements along the technology frontier, capital productivity
disproportionately increases, thus generating a rise in BN/AN . The other way around is true
in the traded sector. For both sectors, point estimates of FTBCjt,adjK are associated with
wide confidence bounds which may suggest that the direction of FBTC varies substantially
across countries. We explore this assumption in the next subsection.
2.5 Fiscal Transmission and Technology: Cross-Country Differences
Our evidence above reveals that a shock to government consumption leads traded firms
to improve their technology and non-traded firms to increase capital- relative to labor-
augmenting efficiency. In this subsection, we further explore the role of the technology
channel following a shock to government consumption by considering cross-country dif-
ferences. To conduct this analysis, we use a two-step estimation procedure as in section
2.2, except that we consider one country at a time and plot responses of sectoral variables
against measures of technology in Fig. 3. In Fig. 3(a), we plot the change in the value added
share of non-tradables against the TFP differential between tradables and non-tradables,
while in Fig. 3(d) we plot the variation in the non-traded-goods-share of total hours worked
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against the capital-utilization-adjusted FBTC differential between non-tradables and trad-
ables. Because dνY,Nt and dν
L,N
t determine the size of the government spending multiplier
on non-traded value added and hours worked, respectively, in the first column we show the
present value of the cumulative change of the corresponding variable divided by the present
value of the cumulative change in government consumption, both computed over a six-year
horizon.14 In the second and third column Fig. 3, we focus on impact responses.
Value added share of non-tradables and relative TFP. Evidence in Fig. 3(a)
reveals that TFPHt /TFP
N
t increases in two-third of the countries of our sample while traded
TFP declines significantly relative to non-traded TFP in six countries, including Canada,
France, Korea, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden.15 The downward sloping trend line shows that
the value added share of non-tradables increases less in countries where traded relative
to non-traded TFP increases more since the TFP differential offsets the impact of the
reallocation of labor triggered by the biasedness of the demand shock toward non-tradables
(see eq. (3)).
Unit cost and technology adjustment. The wide cross-country dispersion in the
adjustment of the relative TFP of tradables shown in Fig. 3(a) suggests that technology
decisions vary substantially between OECD economies. In the top panel of the third column
of Fig. 3, we shed some light on the factor which leads firms to increase the efficiency
in the use of inputs. In a model with flexible prices, firms equate their prices to the
unit cost for producing divided by the capital-utilization-adjusted-TFP. In face of a higher
unit cost for producing, sectors can increase prices or improve technology or both. Firms
will decide to further increase the efficiency in the use of inputs as the cost of improving
technology is lower. As detailed in Online Appendix G, we construct a measure of the
unit cost for producing and we divide this measure by the value added deflator of the
corresponding sector to control for price adjustments. In Fig. 3(c) and Fig. 3(f), we plot the
response of the capital-utilization-adjusted-TFP on the vertical axis for tradables and non-
tradables, respectively, against the change in the real unit cost on the horizontal axis. The
trend line reveals a strong positive cross-country relationship between the decision to adjust
technology and the real cost for producing which suggests that technology improvements
are driven by a cost-minimization strategy.
Sectoral LIS and FBTC. In the second column of Fig. 3, we plot the responses
of the ratio of labor to capital income share, Sjt =
sjL,t
1−sjL,t
, against the adjustment of our
measure of capital-utilization-adjusted-FBTC (see eq. (11)).16 As can be seen in Fig. 3(b)
14In doing this, we control for cross-country differences in the adjustment of Gt. When we compute the
present value of the cumulative change of a variable at a country level, we take the (country-specific) interest
rate from the first column of Table 6.
15While traded TFP also declines relative to non-traded TFP in Belgium and Denmark, this rise is not
















and thus the percentage deviation of the ratio of labor to capital income share relative
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Figure 3: Effects of Government Spending Shocks and Cross-Country Differences in Tech-
nology Adjustment. Notes: Fig. 3 plots responses to an exogenous increase in government consumption by 1%
of GDP against measures of technological change. Fig. 3(a) plots the present value of the cumulative change in the
value added share of non-tradables, νY,Nt (vertical axis) against the present value of the cumulative change in the
ratio of traded TFP to non-traded TFP (horizontal axis), both computed over a six-year horizon and divided by the
present value of the cumulative change in government consumption. In accordance with eq. (3), the TFP differential
is scaled by multiplying by
(
1− νY,H) νY,H . Fig. 3(d) plots the present value of the cumulative change in the share
of non-traded hours worked in total hours worked (vertical axis) against the present value of the cumulative change
in the differential in capital-utilization-adjusted FBTC between non-tradables and tradables (horizontal axis), both
computed over a six-year horizon and divided by the present value of the cumulative change in government consump-
tion. To construct time series for FTBCjt,adjK for each country, we use eq. (11) and take estimates of the elasticity
of substitution between capital and labor σj from columns 18 and 19 of Table 7. The response of FTBCjt,adjK in
sector j is adjusted with 1− sjL and the differential is scaled by αHL αNL , see the last of eq. (178) in Online Appendix
K.2. The second column of Fig. 3 plots impact responses of sectoral LISs (vertical axis) against the adjustment of
capital-utilization adjusted FBTC (the horizontal axis). The third column of Fig. 3 plots impact responses of the ratio
of the unit cost for producing to the value added deflator (vertical axis) against the adjustment of capital-utilization
adjusted TFP (horizontal axis). The construction of the unit cost for producing is detailed in Online Appendix G.
Sample: 18 OECD countries, 1970-2015, annual data.
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for tradables and Fig. 3(e) for non-tradables, a rise in government spending increases the
share of the value added paid to workers in half of the countries while the LIS falls in the
rest of the sample. The trend line reveals that there exists a strong positive cross-country
relationship between the variations of the LIS and capital-utilization-adjusted-FBTC. For
example, countries which lie in the north-east of the scatter-plot experience an increase
in the LIS driven by technological change biased toward labor. By contrast, for countries
which lie in the south-west of the scatter-plot, technological change biased toward capital
lowers the LIS.
Labor share of non-tradables and relative non-traded LIS. While the non-
traded-goods-share of total hours worked increases as the result of the biasedness of the
government spending shock toward non-tradables, the reallocation of labor toward the non-
traded sector will be amplified if technological change makes non-traded production more
labor intensive. This channel is captured a rise in sNL,t/sL,t in eq. (6). According to the
evidence displayed by the second column of Fig. 3, the non-traded LIS increases relative
to the aggregate LIS as long as technological change is biased toward labor in the non-
traded sector and is biased toward capital in the traded sector. Fig. 3(d) shows that the
change in the labor share of non-tradables is positively correlated with the differential in
capital-utilization-adjusted FBTC between non-tradables and tradables. More specifically,
in countries positioned in the north-east, technological change is more biased toward labor in
the non-traded relative to the traded sector which amplifies the rise in LNt /Lt. Conversely,
as can be seen in the south-west of the scatter-plot, when technological change is more
biased toward labor (or less biased toward capital) in the traded sector, the labor share of
non-tradables can decline such as in Australia, Korea, Norway, Spain, the UK.
2.6 Isolating the Pure Technology Effect in Driving Fiscal Transmission
In this subsection, we move a step further and isolate the pure technology transmission
mechanism following a shock to government consumption. More specifically, the responses
of sectoral value added (and labor) to an exogenous increase in government spending can
be broken down into two effects. First, a government spending shock has a direct impact on
sectoral value added and sectoral hours worked by increasing the demand for the sectoral
good. In addition to this standard mechanism, there is a second effect passing through
technological change. Because a rise in government consumption puts upward pressure
on the unit cost for producing, firms may decide to increase the efficiency in the use of
inputs and to modify the mix of capital- and labor-augmenting efficiency. By increasing
its sectoral TFP, technology improvements performed by one sector increase its output
multiplier relative to the other sector. If firms increase capital- relative to labor-augmenting
to its initial steady-state is proportional to the percentage change in the LIS, ŝjL,t, we refer interchangeably
to the LIS or the ratio of factor income share as long as it does not cause confusion.
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productivity in one sector, the technology of production becomes more intensive in labor if
capital and labor are gross complements which increases the relative magnitude of the fiscal
multiplier on labor of this sector. To study how important the response of technology is in
the transmission of a government spending shock, we generate the dynamic adjustment of
sectoral variables if technological factors were unresponsive to the fiscal shock and compare
it to the actual response of sectoral variables.
The decomposition implemented below is based on the methodology proposed by Sims
and Zha [2006], and Bachmann and Sims [2012]. This methods amounts to constructing the
hypothetical sequence of the other shocks in the system so that the response of technological
factors to a government spending shock is zero at all horizons. Online Appendix I details our
empirical strategy. We consider three VAR models where all variables are logged and quan-
tities are divided by population. Within each VAR specification, government consumption
is ordered first, technology is ordered second and sectoral variables are ordered third. Fig.
4 shows the dynamic effects of an exogenous increase in government consumption by 1% of
GDP. The blue line displays the actual response of variables while the red line shows the
hypothetical response of the same variable when we restrict government consumption not
to move technology at any horizon. Whilst the first row shows the response of government
consumption, the second and the third row shows the dynamic adjustment of technology
and sectoral variables. To start with, as can be seen in the first row, the endogenous re-
sponse of government consumption remains fairly unchanged whether technology is shut
down or not.
Value added share of non-tradables. In the first column of Fig. 4, we plot the
response of the ratio of traded to non-traded TFP and the dynamic adjustment of the
value added share of non-tradables to a shock to government consumption, in the middle
and lower panel, respectively.17 In Fig. 4(d), the blue line shows that traded TFP increases
relative to non-traded TFP by 1% on average the first six years. As the productivity
differential builds up, Fig. 4(g) reveals that the value added share of non-tradables does
not increase significantly. In the red line in Fig. 4(d), we shut down the response of
the relative productivity of tradables and as can be seen in Fig. 4(g), the hypothetical
adjustment of the value added share of non-tradables is distinct from its actual response.
Quantitatively, when we divide the present value of the cumulative change in νY,Nt by the
present value of the cumulative change in Gt over a six-year horizon, we find a rise in the
value added share of non-tradables by 0.26 ppt of GDP as the result of the shift of labor and
capital toward the non-traded sector when holding the response of TFPHt /TFP
N
t constant.
The rise in νY,Nt is almost divided by a factor of three, as it amounts to 0.09 ppt of GDP,
when we allow sectoral TFPs to react to the demand shock. In the latter case, the response
17We estimate a VAR model which includes government consumption, the ratio of traded to non-traded
TFP and the value added share of non-tradables.
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Figure 4: Dynamic Adjustment to Government Spending Shocks: Isolating the Technology
Channel. Notes: Fig. 4 plots the dynamic adjustment of sectoral variables to an exogenous increase in government
consumption by 1% of GDP by isolating the pure technology effect. We plot the actual dynamic adjustment of
sectoral variables to a government spending shock in the blue line. The red line shows the hypothetical dynamic
adjustment of sectoral variables if technology were unresponsive to the spending shock at all horizons. The first row
displays the endogenous response of government consumption to the exogenous fiscal shock. The second row shows
the actual dynamic adjustment of technology to a government spending shock in the blue line while the red line keeps
the dynamic response of technology unchanged. In the third row, we plot the actual dynamic adjustment of sectoral
variables to a government spending shock in the blue line while the red line shows the responses if technology were
shut down. The first and the third column displays the dynamic response of the value added share and the labor
share of non-tradables, respectively. The second column plots the dynamic response of the ratio of the non-traded to
the traded LIS. Sample: 18 OECD countries, 1970-2015, annual data.
of νY,Nt is not statistically significant however.
The relative LIS of non-tradables. In the second column of Fig. 4, we plot the
response of the differential in capital-utilization-adjusted-FBTC between non-tradables and
tradables in the upper panel and the dynamic adjustment of the ratio of the non-traded
to the traded LIS, sNL,it/s
H
L,it, in the lower panel.
18 As shown in the blue line in Fig. 4(h),
sNL,it/s
H
L,it increases significantly after two years and the rise in the relative LIS of non-
tradables averages 1.73% the first six years. The blue line in Fig. 4(e) reveals that the
rise in the non-traded relative to the traded LIS is driven by the differential in FBTC.
18In accordance with the decomposition of the labor share of non-tradables detailed in Online Appendix















In Online Appendix I, see Fig. 11, we find empirically that technological change is biased
toward labor in the non-traded sector and biased toward capital in the traded sector. When
we shut down FBTC in the red line, the annual increase in the non-traded relative to the
traded LIS averages 0.25% only, the rise in the non-traded LIS being driven by the the
capital inflow which pushes kN up.
The adjusted labor share of non-tradables. In the third column of Fig. 4, we
quantify the reallocation of labor toward the non-traded sector driven by the response of
the non-traded relative to aggregate LIS to a government spending shock. To isolate the
pure effect of the movement in the LIS on the labor share of non-tradables, in accordance
with (6), we adjust the share of non-traded hours worked in total hours worked with the
value added share of non-tradables at current prices augmented with the elasticity of labor







1+εi .19 The blue line in Fig. 4(i) shows the actual rise
in the (adjusted) labor share of non-tradables while the red line displays its adjustment if
the LIS were unresponsive to the government spending shock. As displayed by the blue line
in Fig. 4(f), the shock to government consumption increases the non-traded LIS relative to
the aggregate LIS which reflects the fact that the technology of production becomes more
labor intensive. When we divide the present value of the cumulative change in νL,Nt by
the present value of the cumulative change in Gt over a six-year horizon, we find a rise
in the (adjusted) labor share of non-tradables by 0.11 ppt of total hours worked when we
shut down the response of the non-traded relative to the aggregate LIS, and by 0.2 ppt of
total hours worked when we allow sNL,it/sL,it to respond to the government spending shock.
Since the bulk of the variation in LIS is driven by FBTC, our empirical findings reveal
that technological change biased toward labor in the non-traded sector and biased toward
capital in the traded sector almost doubles the reallocation of labor toward the non-traded
sector.
3 A Semi-Small Open Economy Model with Tradables and
Non-Tradables
We consider a semi-small open economy that is populated by a constant number of identical
households and firms that have perfect foresight and live forever. The country is assumed
to be semi-small in the sense that it is price-taker in international capital markets, and
thus faces a given world interest rate, r?, but is large enough on world good markets to
influence the price of its export goods. The open economy produces a traded good which
can be exported, consumed or invested and imports consumption and investment goods.
19Our sample includes eighteen OECD countries which differ in terms of labor mobility costs and intensity
of the non-traded sector in the government spending shock. To control for cross-country differences in labor
mobility and biasedness of the government spending shock toward non-tradables, we adjust the ratio of non-
traded hours worked to total hours worked with
(
ωY,Nit
)− εi1+εi . In doing this, we ensure that we capture
the rise in the labor share of non-tradables driven by an increase in sNL /sL.
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Besides the home-produced traded good, denoted by the superscript H, a non-traded sector
produces a good, denoted by the superscript N , for domestic absorption only. The foreign
good is chosen as the numeraire. Time is continuous and indexed by t.
3.1 Households
At each instant the representative household consumes traded and non-traded goods de-















where 0 < ϕ < 1 is the weight of the traded good in the overall consumption bundle and φ
corresponds to the elasticity of substitution between traded goods and non-traded goods.
The traded consumption index CT (t) is defined as a CES aggregator of home-produced





















where 0 < ϕH < 1 is the weight of the home-produced traded good and ρ corresponds
to the elasticity of substitution between home- and foreign-produced traded goods. The
consumption-based price index PC(t) is a function of traded and non-traded prices, denoted











where the price index for traded goods is a function of the terms of trade denoted by PH(t):












As shall be useful later in the quantitative analysis, we denote the relative price of non-
tradables by P (t) = PN (t)/PH(t).
The representative household supplies labor to the traded and non-traded sectors, de-
noted by LH(t) and LN (t), respectively. To put frictions into the movement of labor
between the traded sector and the non-traded sector, we assume that sectoral hours worked













where 0 < ϑ < 1 parametrizes the weight attached to the supply of hours worked in the
traded sector and ε is the elasticity of substitution between sectoral hours worked. The











where W j(t) is the wage rate paid in sector j = H, N .
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The representative agent is endowed with one unit of time, supplies a fraction L(t) as
labor, and consumes the remainder 1− L(t) as leisure. At any instant of time, households
derive utility from their consumption and experience disutility from working. Assuming that
the felicity function is additively separable in consumption and labor, the representative
















where β > 0 is the discount rate, σC > 0 the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for
consumption, and σL > 0 the Frisch elasticity of (aggregate) labor supply.
Households supply labor L(t) and capital services K(t) and in exchange receive a wage
rate W (t) and a capital rental rate R(t). We assume that households choose the level of
capital utilization uK,j(t) in sector j. They also own the stock of intangible capital Z̄j and
decide about the level of utilization uZ,j(t) of existing technology in sector j. 20 In the
sequel, we normalize the stock of knowledge, Z̄j , to one as we abstract from endogenous
choices on the stock of knowledge.21 Because households may decide to use more intensively
the stock of knowledge in sector j which increases the efficiency in the use of inputs and thus
value added, the counterpart is a rise in factor prices in accordance with the Euler Theorem,
i.e., P j(t)uZ,j(t)Y j(t) = uZ,j(t)W j(t)Lj(t) + uZ,j(t)R(t)uK,j(t)Kj(t) where P j is the value
added deflator and Y j stands for technology-utilization-adjusted value added. Both the
capital uK,j(t) and technology utilization rate uZ,j(t) collapse to one at the steady-state.
We let the function CK,j(t) and CZ,j(t) denote the adjustment costs associated with the
choice of capital and technology utilization rates which are increasing and convex functions
of utilization rates uK,j(t) and uZ,j(t):
CK,j(t) = ξj1
(





uK,j(t)− 1)2 , (19a)
CZ,j(t) = χj1
(





uZ,j(t)− 1)2 , (19b)
where ξj2 > 0, χ
j
2 > 0 are free parameters; as ξ2 →∞, χ2 →∞, utilization is fixed at unity.
Households can accumulate internationally traded bonds (expressed in foreign good
units), N(t), that yield net interest rate earnings of r?N(t). Denoting lump-sum taxes by
T (t), household’s flow budget constraint states that real disposable income (on the RHS of
the equation below) can be saved by accumulating traded bonds, consumed, PC(t)C(t), or
20We assume that the technology utilization rate is Hicks-neutral. We could alternatively assume that
households choose the utilization rate of capital- and labor-augmenting efficiency. We have considered
this possibility both theoretically and numerically. Since the decision to use more intensively the existing
factor-augmenting technology is pro-cyclical, we have to assume an implausible high utilization cost of
labor-augmenting productivity in the non-traded sector to produce a rise in capital-augmenting relative to
labor-augmenting productivity. The increase in relative capital efficiency cannot generate the magnitude of
the rise in the non-traded LIS we estimate empirically.
21Bianchi et al. [2019] assume that firms can choose both the technology utilization rate and the stock of
knowledge. Because we consider a temporary demand shock and find empirically that utilization-adjusted-
sectoral TFP, is restored back toward its initial steady-state level, see Fig. 2(m) and Fig. 2(n), we abstract
from endogenous choices on the stock of knowledge.
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invested, PJ(t)J(t):
Ṅ(t) + PC(t)C(t) + PJ(t)J(t) + PH(t)CK,H(t)αK(t)K(t) + PN (t)CK,N (t) (1− αK(t))K(t)
+ PH(t)CZ,H(t) + PN (t)CZ,N (t) =
[





αK(t)uK,H(t)uZ,H(t) + (1− αK(t))uK,N (t)uZ,N (t)
]
R(t)K(t) + r?N(t)− T (t), (20)
where we denote the share of traded capital in the aggregate capital stock by αK(t) =
KH(t)/K(t) and the labor compensation share of tradables by αL(t) =
W H(t)LH(t)
W (t)L(t) .
The investment good is (costlessly) produced using inputs of the traded good and the




















where 0 < ϕJ < 1 is the weight of the investment traded input and φJ corresponds to
the elasticity of substitution between investment traded goods and investment non-traded
goods. The index JT (t) is defined as a CES aggregator of home-produced traded inputs,





















where 0 < ιH < 1 is the weight of the home-produced traded input and ρJ corresponds
to the elasticity of substitution between home- and foreign-produced traded inputs. The






)1−φJ + (1− ι) (PN (t))1−φJ
] 1
1−φJ , (23)
where the price index for traded investment goods reads:





)1−ρJ + (1− ιH)
] 1
1−ρJ . (24)
Installation of new investment goods involves convex costs, assumed quadratic. Thus,
total investment J(t) differs from effectively installed new capital:









where the parameter κ > 0 governs the magnitude of adjustment costs to capital accumu-
lation. Denoting the fixed capital depreciation rate by 0 ≤ δK < 1, aggregate investment,
I(t), gives rise to capital accumulation according to the dynamic equation:
K̇(t) = I(t)− δKK(t). (26)
Households choose consumption, worked hours and investment in physical capital by
maximizing lifetime utility (18) subject to (20) and (26) together with (25). Denoting by
28
λ and Q′ the co-state variables associated with (20) and (26), the first-order conditions
characterizing the representative household’s optimal plans are:
(C(t))−
1
σC = PC(t)λ(t), (27a)
γ (L(t))
1










λ̇(t) = λ (β − r?) , (27d)
Q̇(t) = (r? + δK) Q(t)−
{ [
αK(t)uK,H(t)uZ,H(t) + (1− αK(t))uK,N (t)uZ,N (t)
]


















uK,H(t)− 1)] , (27f)






uK,N (t)− 1)] , (27g)






uZ,H(t)− 1)] , (27h)






uZ,N (t)− 1)] , (27i)
and the transversality conditions limt→∞ λ̄N(t)e−βt = 0 and limt→∞Q(t)K(t)e−βt = 0; to
derive the labor supply decision (27b), we use the fact that
[
αL(t)uZ,H(t) + (1− αL(t))uZ,N (t)
]
W (t) =
W̃H(t)LH(t) + W̃N (t)LN (t) where we add a tilde when factor prices are inclusive of tech-
nology utilization. Plugging W̃ j(t) = uZ,j(t)W j(t) into (17) leads to W̃ (t). To derive (27c)
and (27e), we used the fact that Q(t) = Q′(t)/λ(t). In an open economy model with a
representative agent having perfect foresight, a constant rate of time preference and perfect
access to world capital markets, we impose β = r? in order to generate an interior solution.
Setting β = r? into (27d) implies that the shadow value of wealth is constant over time,
i.e., λ(t) = λ. When new information about the fiscal shock arrives, λ jumps (to fulfill the
intertemporal solvency condition determined later) and remains constant afterwards.








+ δK , leads to a positive rela-
tionship between investment and Tobin’s q which is defined as the shadow value to the firm
of installed capital, Q(t), divided by its replacement cost, PJ(t). For the sake of clarity, we
drop the time argument below provided this causes no confusion.
Applying Shephard’s lemma (or the envelope theorem) yields the following demand for











































and the demand for non-traded consumption and investment goods, respectively:
CN = (1− ϕ) (PN/PC
)−φ




Given the aggregate wage index (17) and W̃ j(t) = uZ,j(t)W j(t), the allocation of ag-












where ε determines the percentage change in the share of hours worked in sector j, Lj/L,
following a rise in the relative wage, W̃ j/W̃ , by 1%. As the elasticity of labor supply across
sectors, ε, takes higher values, workers experience lower mobility costs and thus more labor
shifts from one sector to another.
3.2 Firms
We denote the value added in sector j = H, N by Y j . When we add a tilde, it means that
value added is inclusive of the technology utilization rate, i.e., Ỹ j(t) = uZ(t)Y j(t). Both
the traded and non-traded sectors use physical capital (inclusive of capital utilization),
denoted by K̃j(t) = uK,j(t)Kj(t), and labor, Lj , according to a constant returns to scale

















where 0 < γj < 1 and 0 < 1− γj < 1 are the weight of labor and capital in the production
technology, respectively, σj is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in sec-
tor j = H, N . We allow for labor- and capital-augmenting efficiency denoted by Ãj(t) and
B̃j(t). We assume that factor-augmenting productivity has a symmetric time-varying com-
ponent which collapses to uZ,j(t) such that Ãj(t) = uZ,j(t)Aj(t) and B̃j(t) = uZ,j(t)Bj(t).
Firms lease the capital from households and hire workers. They face two cost compo-
nents: a capital rental cost equal to R(t), and a labor cost equal to the wage rate W j(t).
Both sectors are assumed to be perfectly competitive and thus choose capital services and
labor by taking prices as given. While capital can move freely between the two sectors,






















σj = R(t), (32b)
where we denote by kj(t) ≡ Kj(t)/Lj(t) the capital-labor ratio for sector j = H, N , and
yj(t) ≡ Y j(t)/Lj(t) refers to value added per hours worked.
Demand for inputs can be rewritten in terms of their respective cost in value added; for






σj . Applying the same logic for capital and denoting
22Since the profit function is a linear function of the technology utilization rate, i.e., Π̃j(t) = uZ,j(t)Πj(t),
uZ,j(t) does not show up in the first-order conditions shown in (32).
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When technological change is assumed to be Hicks-neutral, productivity increases uniformly
across inputs, i.e., Âj(t) = B̂j(t). Hence a change in Bj(t)/Aj(t) on the RHS of eq.
(33) has no impact on sectoral LISs which are only indirectly affected through changes in
uK,j(t)kj(t). Therefore, if sector j decides to use less capital, its LIS sjL(t) declines because
capital and labor are gross complements in production, i.e., σj < 1, as evidence suggests. By
contrast, when technological change is factor-biased, an increase in capital relative to labor
efficiency (i.e., a rise in Bj(t)/Aj(t)) impinges on the sectoral LIS directly and indirectly
through changes in capital use k̃j(t) = uK,j(t)kj(t). The measure of capital-utilization-





technological change is biased toward labor when FBTCjadjK(t) increases.
Finally, aggregating over the two sectors gives us the resource constraint for capital:
KH(t) + KN (t) = K(t). (34)
3.3 Technology Frontier
While households choose capital and technology utilization rates, firms within each sector
j = H, N decide about the split of capital-utilization-adjusted TFP, denoted by Zj(t) =
uZ,j(t)Z̄j where Z̄j is normalized to one, between labor- and capital-augmenting efficiency
Ãj(t) and B̃j(t). Following Caselli and Coleman [2006] and Caselli [2016], we assume that




























where Zj(t) > 0 is the height of the technology frontier, 0 < γjZ < 1 is the weight of labor
efficiency in TFP and σjZ > 0 corresponds to the elasticity of substitution between labor-
and capital-augmenting productivity. Firms choose labor and capital efficiency, Ãj and B̃j ,
along the technology frontier described by eq. (35) that minimize the unit cost function.























Z . Inserting this equality
into the log-linearized version of the technology frontier (35) enables us to express the per-
centage deviation of utilization-adjusted TFP in sector j relative to its initial steady-state
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While the technological frontier imposes a structure on the mapping between the utilization-
adjusted TFP and factor-augmenting efficiency, as described by (37), it has the advantage to
ensure a consistency between the theoretical and the empirical approach where we used the
utilization-adjusted-Solow residual to measure technological change, the latter being driven
by factor-augmenting productivity shifts which can occur at the same rate or at different
rate, thus leading technological change to be biased toward one factor of production, in the
latter case.
3.4 Government
The final agent in the economy is the government. Government spending includes expen-
diture on non-traded goods, GN , home- and foreign-produced traded goods, GH and GF ,
respectively. The government finances public spending by raising lump-sum taxes, T . As
a result, Ricardian equivalence obtains and the time path of taxes is irrelevant for the
real allocation. We may thus assume without loss of generality that government budget is
balanced at each instant:
G(t) ≡ PN (t)GN (t) + PH(t)GH(t) + GF (t) = T (t). (38)
3.5 Model Closure and Equilibrium
To fully describe the equilibrium, we impose goods market clearing conditions for non-
traded and home-produced traded goods:
Y N (t) = CN (t) + JN (t) + GN (t) + CK,N (t)KN (t) + CZ,N (t), (39a)
Y H(t) = CH(t) + JH(t) + GH(t) + XH(t) + CK,H(t)KH(t) + CZ,H(t), (39b)
where XH stands for exports of home-produced goods; exports are assumed to be a de-





where ϕX > 0 is a scaling parameter, and φX is the elasticity of exports w.r.t. PH .
In order to account for the dynamic adjustment of G(t) (see Fig. 2(a)), we assume that
the deviation of government spending relative to its initial value as a percentage of initial
GDP is governed by the law of motion:
dG(t)/Y = e−ξt − (1− g) e−χt. (41)
23Domestic exports are the sum of the foreign demand for the domestically produced tradable consumption
goods and investment inputs denoted by CF,? and JF,?, and we assume that the rest of the world have similar
preferences with potentially different elasticities (i..e, φ? 6= φ and φ?J 6= φJ) between foreign and domestic
tradable goods. Since we abstract from trend labor-augmenting technological change, foreign prices remain
fixed so that domestic exports are decreasing in the terms of trade, P H(t).
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where dG(t) = G(t) − G is the deviation of government consumption relative to the ini-
tial steady-state, g > 0 parametrizes the magnitude of the exogenous fiscal shock, ξ > 0
and χ > 0 are (positive) parameters which are set in order to capture the hump-shaped
endogenous response of G(t). We assume that the rise in government consumption is split
into non-traded, ωGN , home-produced traded goods, ωGH =
P HGH
G , and foreign-produced
traded goods, ωGF . Formally we have dG(t)/Y =
∑
g=F,H,N ωGgdG(t)/Y . In line with the
evidence we document in Appendix E, ωGN refers to the non-tradable content of govern-
ment consumption as well as the intensity of the government spending shock in non-traded
goods.
As detailed in subsection 4.2, we estimate the dynamic adjustment of Âj(t) and B̂j(t)
which are required to explain the variation in the ratio of labor to the capital income share
Sj(t) in sector j, as described by eq. (33), and also satisfy the shifts along the technology
frontier (37). To achieve a perfect match with the data, we specify the law of motion for
labor- and capital-augmenting efficiency:
Âj(t) = e−ξ
j
At − (1− aj) e−χjAt, (42a)
B̂j(t) = e−ξ
j
Bt − (1− bj) e−χjBt, (42b)
and choose aj (bj) to reproduce the impact response of labor- (capital-) augmenting tech-
nological change while ξjA > 0 (ξ
j
B > 0) and χ
j
A > 0 (χ
j
B > 0) are chosen to reproduce the
shape of factor-augmenting productivity together with their cumulative change following a
shock to government consumption we infer from (33) and (37).
The adjustment of the open economy toward the steady state is described by a dynamic
system which comprises six equations that are functions of K(t), Q(t), G(t), Aj(t), Bj(t):
K̇(t) = Υ
(





K(t), Q(t), G(t), AH(t), BH(t), AN (t), BN (t)
)
, (43b)
where j = H,N . The first dynamic equation corresponds to the non-traded goods market
clearing condition (39a) and the second dynamic equation corresponds to (27e) which equal-
izes the rates of return on domestic equities and foreign bonds, r?, once we have substituted
appropriate first-order conditions.
Linearizing the dynamic equations (43a)-(43b) in the neighborhood of the steady-state,
inserting the law of motion of government consumption (41) and factor-augmenting effi-
ciency (42a)-(42b) leads to a system of first-order linear differential equations which can be
solved by applying standard methods (see Buiter [1984] who presents the continuous time
adaptation of the method of Blanchard and Kahn [1980]):
K(t)− K̃ = X1(t) + X2(t), Q(t)− Q̃ = ω12X1(t) + ω22X2(t), (44)
where we denote the negative eigenvalue by ν1, the positive eigenvalue by ν2, and ωi2 is
the element of the eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue νi (with i = 1, 2) and X1(t)
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and X2(t) are solutions which characterize the trajectory of K(t) and Q(t). See Online
Appendix P which details the solution method.
Using the properties of constant returns to scale in production, identities PC(t)C(t) =
∑
g P
g(t)Cg(t) and PJ(t)J(t) =
∑
g P
g(t)Jg(t) (with g = F,H, N) along with market
clearing conditions (39), the current account equation (20) can be rewritten as a function
of the trade balance:
Ṅ(t) = r?N(t) + PH(t)XH(t)−MF (t), (45)
where MF (t) = CF (t) + JF (t) stands for imports of foreign-produced consumption and
investment goods. Eq. (45) can be written as a function of state and control variables,
i.e., Ṅ(t) ≡ r?N(t) + Ξ (K(t), Q(t), G(t), AH(t), BH(t), AN (t), BN (t)). Linearizing around
the steady state, substituting the solutions for K(t) and Q(t) given by (44), solving and
invoking the transversality condition leads to the intertemporal solvency condition:
(N0 −N) + ω
1
N
















are terms which are functions of parameters, eigenvalues and eigenvectors. The assumption
β = r? requires the joint determination of the transition and the steady-state since the
constancy of the marginal utility of wealth implies that the intertemporal solvency condition
(46) depends on eigenvalues’ and eigenvectors’ elements, see e.g., Turnovsky [1997].24
4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we take the model to the data. For this purpose we solve the model
numerically. Therefore, first we discuss parameter values before turning to the effects of an
exogenous temporary increase in government consumption.
4.1 Calibration
At the steady-state, utilization rates for technology, uZ,j , and capital, uK,j , collapse to one
so that Ỹ j = Y j and K̃j = Kj . We consider an initial steady-state with Hicks-neutral
technological change and normalize Aj = Bj = Zj to 1. To ensure that the steady-state is
invariant when σj is changed, we normalize (31) by choosing the initial steady-state in a
model with Cobb-Douglas production functions as the normalization point. Denoting the
LIS in sector j in the Cobb-Douglas economy by θj , the normalized version of the CES
























24Eq. (46) determines the steady-state change in the net foreign asset position following a temporary
fiscal expansion as the assumption β = r? implies that temporary policies have permanent effects.
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where quantities in the CES economy are divided by their Cobb-Douglas counterparts
denoted with a bar. Because we consider the initial steady-state with Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction functions as the normalization point, we have to calibrate the model with σj = 1
to the data. To calibrate the reference model, we estimated a set of ratios and parameters
for the eighteen OECD economies in our dataset. Our reference period for the calibration
corresponds to the period 1970-2015. Table 7 summarizes our estimates of the ratios and
estimated parameters for all countries in our sample.
We first calibrate the model to a representative OECD country to assess the model
performance when we allow for time-varying technological change and contrast the model’s
predictions when we shut down technological change. Because the evidence we have docu-
mented in section 2 shows that technology shifts vary considerably across countries, later,
we move a step further and calibrate the model to country-specific data to quantify the
contribution of technological change to international differences in sectoral government
spending multipliers. To capture the key properties of a typical OECD economy, we take
unweighted average values of ratios which are shown in the last line of Table 7. Among the
32 parameters that the model contains, 22 have empirical counterparts while the remaining






1 together with initial conditions
(N0, K0) must be endogenously calibrated to match ratios 1−αC , 1−αJ , αH , αHJ , L
N
L , ωJ ,
R/PH , R/PN , Y H , Y N , υNX = NXP HY H with NX = P
HXH−CF −IF −GF , as summarized
in Table 1. We choose the model period to be one year and set the world interest rate, r?,
which is equal to the subjective time discount rate, β, to 3%, in line with the average of
our estimates shown in the last line of Table 6.
The degree of labor mobility captured by ε is set to 0.83, in line with the average of our
estimates shown in the last line of column 17 of Table 7. Estimated values of ε range from
a low of about 0.1 for Ireland and Norway to a high of 2.3 for South Korea and 2.4 for the
United States.25
Building on our panel data estimates, the elasticity of substitution φ between traded
and non-traded goods is set to 0.77 in the baseline calibration since this value corresponds
to the average of estimates shown in the last line of column 16 of Table 7. This value
is close to the value estimated by Mendoza [1995] who reports an estimate of 0.74.26 The
weight of consumption in non-tradables 1−ϕ is set to target a non-tradable content in total
consumption expenditure (i.e., 1−αC) of 56%, in line with the average of our estimates (see
the last line of column 2 of Table 7). Following Backus et al. [1994], we set the elasticity of
substitution, ρ, in consumption between home- and foreign-produced traded goods (inputs)
25To estimate ε, we run the regression in panel format on annual data of the percentage change in the
labor share of sector j on the percentage change in the relative share of value added paid to workers in
sector j. The Online Appendix J.2 details our empirical strategy and shows our panel data estimations of ε.
26The Online Appendix J.2 details our empirical strategy and shows our panel data estimations of φ by
running the regression of the logged share of non-tradables in consumption expenditure on the logged ratio
of the price of non-tradables to the consumption price index.
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to 1.5. The weight of consumption in home-produced traded goods ϕH is set to target a
home content of consumption expenditure in tradables (i.e. αH) of 66%, in line with the
average of our estimates shown in the last line of column 8.
We choose a value of one for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for consumption,
σC , which is a typical choice in the business cycle literature. We set the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply to 1 which is halfway between the large values of σL reported by Peterman
[2016] and low values reported by Fiorito and Zanella [2012]. The weight of labor supply to
the non-traded sector, 1−ϑ, is set to target a share of non-tradables in total hours worked
of 62% (see the last line of column 5 of Table 7).
We now describe the calibration of production-side parameters. We assume that physical
capital depreciates at a rate δK = 7.8% to target an investment-to-GDP ratio of 24% (see
column 14 of Table 7). In line with mean values shown in columns 11 and 12 of Table 7, the
shares of labor income in traded and non-traded value added, θH and θN , are set to 0.63 and
0.69, respectively, which leads to an aggregate LIS of 66% (see the last line of column 13 of
Table 7). We set the elasticity of substitution, φJ , between JT and JN to 1, in line with the
empirical findings documented by Bems [2008] for OECD countries. Further, the weight
of non-traded investment (1− ϕI) is set to target a non-tradable content of investment
expenditure of 69% (see the last line of column 3 of Table 7). Likewise for consumption
goods, following Backus et al. [1994], we set the elasticity of substitution, ρJ , in investment
between home- and foreign-produced traded inputs to 1.5. The weight of home-produced
traded investment ιH is set to target a home content of investment expenditure in tradables
(i.e. αHJ ) of 43% (see column 9 of Table 7). We choose the value of parameter κ so that
the elasticity of I/K with respect to Tobin’s q, i.e., Q/PJ , is equal to the value implied by
estimates in Eberly, Rebelo, and Vincent [2008]. The resulting value of κ is equal to 17.27
As shown in columns 4 and 10 of Table 7, the non-tradable, ωGN , and the home-produced
tradable content, ωGH , of government spending averages 80% and 18%, respectively. The
import content of government spending is lower at ωGF = 2%. We set government con-
sumption on non-traded goods and home-produced traded goods, i.e., GN and GH , so as
to target both the non-tradable and home-tradable share of government spending, together
with government spending as a share of GDP of 19% (see column 15 Table 7).
We choose initial conditions so that trade is initially balanced. Since net exports are
nil, the investment-to-GDP ratio, ωJ , and government spending as a share of GDP, ωG,
implies a consumption-to-GDP ratio of ωC = 57%. It is worth mentioning that the tradable
content of GDP is endogenously determined by the tradable content of consumption, αC ,
investment, αJ , and government expenditure, ωGT , along with ωC , ωJ , and ωG. More
27Eberly, Rebelo, and Vincent [2008] run the regression I/K = α + β . ln(q) and obtain a point estimate
for β of 0.06. In our model, the steady-state elasticity of I/K with respect to Tobin’s q is 1/κ. Equating






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































precisely, dividing the traded goods market clearing condition by GDP, Y , leads to an
expression that allows us to calculate the tradable content of GDP:
PHY H/Y = ωCαC + ωJαJ + ωGT ωG = 36%, (47)
where ωC = 57%, αC = 44%, ωJ = 24%, αJ = 31%, ωGT = 20%, and ωG = 19%. According
to (47), the ratios we target for demand components generates a tradable content of GDP
of 36% as found in the data (see the last line of column 1 of Table 7). Finally, building on
structural estimates of the price elasticities of aggregate exports documented by Imbs and
Mejean [2015], we set the export price elasticity, φX , to 1.7 in the baseline calibration (see
the last line of last column of Table 7). Because trade is balanced, export as a share of
GDP, ωX = PHXH/Y , is endogenously determined by the import content of consumption,
1− αH , and investment expenditure, 1− αHJ , along with ωC and ωJ .
Since the model with Cobb-Douglas production functions is the normalization point,
when we calibrate the model with CES production functions, ϕ, ι, ϕH , ιH , ϑ, δK , N0, K0,
are endogenously set to target 1− ᾱC , 1 − ᾱJ , ᾱH , ᾱHJ , L̄N/L̄, ω̄J , ῡNX , K̄, respectively,
where a bar indicates that the ratio is obtained from the Cobb-Douglas economy. Drawing
on Antràs [2004], we estimate the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor for
tradables and non-tradables and set σH and σN , to 0.64 and 0.80 (see the last line of
columns 18 and 19 of Table 7).
4.2 Government Spending Shock and Technology: Calibration
Endogenous response of government consumption to exogenous fiscal shock. In
order to capture the endogenous response of government spending to an exogenous fiscal
shock, we assume that the dynamic adjustment of government consumption is governed by
eq. (41). In the quantitative analysis, we set g = 0.01 so that government consumption
increases by 1% of initial GDP. To calibrate ξ and χ that parametrize the shape of the
dynamic adjustment of government consumption along with its persistence, we proceed as
follows. Because G(t) peaks after one year, we have Ġ(1)/Y = − [ξe−ξ − χ (1− g) e−χ] = 0.
In addition, the cumulative response of government consumption over a six-year horizon is
∫ 5
0 [dG(τ)/Y ] e
−r?τdτ = g′ with g′ = 5.5 percentage point of GDP. We choose ξ = 0.430 and
χ = 0.439. Left-multiplying eq. (41) by ωGg (with g = H,N) gives the dynamic adjustment






e−ξt − (1− g) e−χt
]
, (48)
where ωGg is the fraction of government consumption in good g. To determine (48), we
assume that the parameters that govern the persistence and shape of the response of sectoral
government consumption are identical across sectors, while the sectoral intensity of the
government spending shock is constant over time and thus corresponds to the share of
38
government final consumption expenditure on good j.28
Capital and technology utilization adjustment costs. We turn to the calibration
of parameters which govern the capital and technology adjustment cost functions described
by (19a) and (19b), respectively. Evaluating first-order conditions (27f)-(27g) at the steady-
state leads to ξj1 =
R
P j
and thus ξj1 is endogenously pinned down by the initial steady-state
value of the ratio of the capital rental rate to the value added deflator, P j . It gives us
ξH1 = 0.11 and ξ
N
1 = 0.09. Denoting R









According to eq. (49), it is profitable to increase the capital utilization rate when the real
capital cost goes up while the parameter ξj2 determines the magnitude of the adjustment in
uK,j(t). We choose a value for the parameter ξj2 so as to account for the empirical response
of the capital utilization rate to government shock found in the data, see Fig. 8 in Online
Appendix D. As reported in Table 1, we choose a value for ξH2 of 0.27 and a value for ξ
N
2
of 0.03.29 The same logic applies to pin down the parameters governing the endogenous
response of the technology utilization rate in sector j to a shock to government consumption.
Evaluating first-order conditions (27h)-(27i) at the steady-state leads to χj1 = Y
j and thus
χj1 is endogenously pinned down by the initial steady-state of value added at constant prices
in sector j, Y j . We obtain χH1 = 0.84 and χ
N





According to eq. (50), the technology utilization rate is pro-cyclical; intuitively, since
Y j(t) = W
j(t)Lj(t)+R(t)K̃j(t)
P j(t)
, it is profitable to increase the technology rate when the real
cost of producing goes up. The parameter χj2 determines the magnitude of the response of
the technology utilization rate uZ,j(t). We choose a value for χj2 in order to reproduce the
empirical response of capital-utilization-adjusted-TFP, Zj(t). It gives us χH2 = 0.8 for the
traded sector and χN2 = 2.85 for the non-traded sector.
Factor-augmenting efficiency. Since our VAR evidence documented in subsection
2.5 reveals that technological change is factor-biased, we need to set the dynamics for
factor-augmenting efficiency, Bj(t) and Aj(t). We first derive the change in capital relative







j(t)− k̂j(t)− ûK,j(t), (51)
28Assuming that the intensity of the non-traded sector in the government spending shock collapses to
the non-tradable content of government consumption is in line with the evidence documented in Online
Appendix E, especially in the short-run.








. Plugging empirical IRF from VAR estimations




all variables being expressed in percentage deviation from the initial steady-state. Given
the adjustment of relative capital efficiency inferred from (51), we have to determine the
dynamics of Bj(t) and Aj(t) consistent with the technology frontier. Using the fact that
factor-augmenting productivity has a symmetric time-varying component denoted by uZ,j(t)
such that Ãj(t) = uZ,j(t)Aj(t) and B̃j(t) = uZ,j(t)Bj(t), eq. (51) and the log-linearized



















Plugging estimated values for σj and empirically estimated responses for sjL(t), k
j(t), uK,j(t)
into above equations enables us to recover the dynamics for Aj(t) and Bj(t) consistent with
the demand of factors of production (33) and the technology frontier (37). In this regard,
the route taken to infer Âj(t) and B̂j(t) from (52a)-(52b) amounts to conducting a wedge
analysis.
Once we have determined the underlying dynamic process for labor and capital efficiency
by using (52a)-(52b), we have to choose values for exogenous parameters xj (for x = a, b),
ξjX (for X = A,B) within sector j = H, N , which are consistent with the continuous time
paths (42). Setting t = 0 into (42a)-(42b) yields aj = Âj(0), and bj = B̂j(0) and we choose
aj and bj so as to reproduce impact responses of factor-augmenting productivity in sector
j. Making use of the time series generated by (52a) and (52b) gives us aH = −0.006,
bH = 0.010, aN = −0.017, bN = 0.037. Next, we choose values for ξjX and χjX so as to
reproduce the shape of the dynamic adjustment of sectoral factor-augmenting efficiency
recovered by using (52) together with its cumulative change over a six-year period. It
gives us ξHA = 0.395 and χ
H
A = 0.430, ξ
H
B = 0.460 and χ
H
B = 0.393 for the traded sector,
ξNA = 0.350 and χ
N
A = 0.316, ξ
N
B = 0.300 and χ
N
B = 0.383 for the non-traded sector.
4.3 Government Spending Shock and Technology: Model Performance
In this subsection, we analyze the role of technology in shaping the size of sectoral fiscal
multipliers in an open economy following an exogenous temporary increase in government
consumption by 1% of GDP. In our baseline calibration, we assume that capital and technol-
ogy utilization rates, uK,j(t) and uZ,j(t), respond endogenously to the government spending
shock, and allow for time-varying FBTC in sector j driven by the dynamic adjustment of
labor- and capital-augmenting efficiency whilst sectoral goods are produced from CES pro-
duction functions. To gauge the quantitative implications of technology for fiscal transmis-
sion, we contrast our results with those obtained in a model with Cobb-Douglas production
functions where we shut down the endogenous response of capital and technology utilization
40
by letting ξj2 and χ
j








B = 0 so that
uK,j(t) = uZ,j(t) = Aj(t) = Bj(t) = 1.
In Table 2, we report the simulated impact (i.e., at t = 0) and six-year cumulative
(i.e., at t = 0, ..., 5) effects. Cumulative effects are expressed in present discounted value
terms.30 While columns 1 and 4 show impact and (present discounted value of) cumulative
responses from local projection for comparison purposes, columns 2 and 5 show results for
the baseline model. We contrast the benchmark results with those shown in columns 3
and 6 for impact and cumulative effects, respectively, which are obtained in the restricted
model.
Adjustment in government consumption. As shown in Fig. 6(a), the black line
with squares lies within the confidence bounds and therefore the endogenous response of
government spending to an exogenous fiscal shock that we generate theoretically by speci-
fying the law of motion (41) reproduces well the dynamic adjustment of G(t)/Y estimated
from the local projection. As can be seen in the first row of panel A of Table 2, the baseline
(and the restricted) model generates a present discounted value of the cumulative change
in government consumption of 5.46 ppt of GDP (see columns 5-6), close to our estimation
of 5.51 ppt (see column 4).
Restricted model. We first consider the scenario with Cobb-Douglas production
functions, i.e., σj = 1, we let ξj2 and χ
j







B = 0. Results for the restricted model are reported in columns 3 and 6 of Table
2. Because the capital and technology utilization rates remain fixed, sectoral TFPs are
unchanged, as can be seen in panel D. Because the elasticity of value added w.r.t. inputs
(i.e., θj) is fixed, the fraction of value added paid to workers, i.e., the LIS, does not change
over time, as shown in panel E.
We start with the aggregate effects. By producing a negative wealth effect, a balanced-
budget government spending shock leads agents to supply more labor, which in turn in-
creases real GDP. As shown in panel A of Table 2, a rise in government consumption by
1% of GDP generates an increase in total hours worked by 0.63% and a rise in real GDP
by 0.42% on impact, the latter value being almost three times smaller what we estimate
empirically (i.e., 1.18%, see column 1).
Panel B Table 2 shows the distribution of the rise in total hours worked across sectors.
Hours worked increase by 0.54 ppt of total hours worked in the non-traded sector and
by 0.09 ppt only in the traded sector. Formally, the rise in non-traded hours worked
can be broken into two components, i.e., αNL L̂
N = αNL L̂(t) + dν
L,N (t). According to this
decomposition, the non-traded sector receives a fraction (equal to αNL = 63% in the data)
30The percentage deviation of each macroeconomic variable X(t) relative to its initial steady-state is
denoted with a hat, i.e., X̂(t) = dX(t)/X. We calculate the present discounted value of the percentage






of the increase in total hours worked and also benefits from labor reallocation because the
rise in government spending is biased toward non-tradables. As shown in the third row
of panel B, the demand shock raises the labor share of non-tradables by 0.14 ppt of total
hours worked on impact, close to what we estimate empirically. In this regard, it is worth
mentioning that we allow for barriers to mobility which avoids the model overestimating
the reallocation of labor. If we had imposed perfect mobility of labor and exogenous terms
of trade, the labor share of non-tradables would have increased by 0.77 ppt of total hours
worked while traded hours worked would have declined dramatically (by αHL L̂
H(0) = −0.71
ppt of total hours worked).31 Conversely, by increasing the demand for labor in the traded
sector and hampering the reallocation of labor toward the non-traded sector, both the
appreciation in the terms of trade and workers’ mobility costs mitigate the rise in νL,N (t)
and thus allow the model to generate an increase in LH . However, these two elements are
not sufficient on their own to reproduce the cumulative value of labor reallocation along the
transitional path. As shown in column 6, the restricted model shutting down technological
change predicts a cumulative change in νL,N (t) by 0.71 ppt of total hours worked, a value
which is more than two times smaller what is estimated empirically (i.e., 1.68 ppt of total
hours worked).
We turn to the distribution of the rise in real GDP across sectors displayed by Panel C of
Table 2. The first row of panel C reveals that Ỹ H falls by 0.04 ppt of GDP and non-traded
value added rises by 0.46 ppt of GDP. The decline in traded value added caused by the
capital outflow experienced by this sector is at odds with the evidence as we find empirically
that Ỹ H rises by 0.33 ppt of GDP on impact (see column 1). The restricted model also
understates the rise in Ỹ N both on impact (0.46 ppt against 0.85 ppt in the data) and
along the transitional path (2.41 ppt against 4.88 ppt in the data). Whilst the restricted
model underpredicts ˆ̃Y N (t), it produces a cumulative change in νY,N (t) by 1.07 ppt of
GDP, in contradiction with our empirical findings indicating that the value added share of
non-tradables is essentially unchanged (see the third row of column 4). According to the
decomposition of non-traded value added, i.e., νY,N ˆ̃Y N (t) = νY,N ˆ̃YR(t)+dνY,N (t), since the
model overstates the rise in νY,N (t) both on impact and in cumulative terms (see column
3 and 6), the underestimation of the increase in Ỹ N (t) is caused by the underestimation of
real GDP growth as TFP remains fixed.
Baseline model. The performance of the model increases when capital and technology
utilization rate are allowed to respond endogenously to the government spending shock and
firms bias technological change toward production factors. Quantitative results are shown
in column 2 for impact effects and column 5 for (the present discounted value of the)
31Columns 3 and 6 of Table 13 in Online Appendix L show numerical results for a model assuming Cobb-
Douglas production frictions, abstracting from technological change, imposing perfect mobility of labor
across sectors (i.e., we let ε tend toward infinity) and exogenous terms of trade (i.e., we let ρ and ρJ tend
toward infinity).
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Table 2: Impact and Cumulative Effects of an Increase in Government Consumption by 1%
of GDP
LP t = 0 Impact Responses LP t = 0..5 Cumulative Responses
Data CES-TECH CD Data CES-TECH CD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A.Aggregate Multipliers
Gov. spending, dG(t) 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.51 5.46 5.46
Total hours worked, dL(t) 0.91 0.97 0.63 6.37 5.61 3.34
Real GDP, dYR(t) 1.18 1.07 0.42 7.74 7.36 2.14
B.Sectoral Labor
Traded labor, dLH(t) 0.21 0.18 0.09 0.73 0.69 0.47
Non-traded labor, dLN (t) 0.71 0.78 0.54 5.64 4.92 2.87
Labor share of non-tradables, dνL,N (t) 0.13 0.16 0.14 1.68 1.26 0.71
Decomposition
Caused by dωY,N (t) 0.14 0.14 0.31 0.71
Caused by cap. deep. differential 0.01 0.00 -0.24 0.00
Caused by FBTC differential 0.01 0.00 1.20 0.00
C.Sectoral Value Added
Traded VA, dY H(t) 0.33 0.20 -0.04 2.86 3.12 -0.28
Non-traded VA, dY N (t) 0.85 0.88 0.46 4.88 4.24 2.41
Non-traded VA share, dνY,N (t) 0.16 0.20 0.20 -0.01 -0.41 1.07
Decomposition
Caused by TFP differential 0.03 0.00 -0.47 0.00
Caused by labor reallocation 0.16 0.14 1.30 0.72
Caused by capital reallocation 0.01 0.06 -1.23 0.35
D.Technology
Traded technology utilization, duZ,H(t) 0.21 0.28 0.00 6.04 4.35 0.00
Non-Traded technology utilization, duZ,N (t) 0.37 0.41 0.00 2.15 1.97 0.00
Traded TFP, dTFPH(t) 0.66 0.34 0.00 7.82 5.50 0.00
Non-Traded TFP, dTFPN (t) 0.36 0.49 0.00 0.28 2.37 0.00
E.Redistributive effects
Traded LIS, dsHL (t) 0.14 0.12 0.00 -2.23 -3.08 0.00
Decomposition
Caused by capital deepening -0.09 0.96
Caused by FBTC 0.21 -4.04
Non-traded LIS, dsNL (t) 0.25 0.25 0.00 3.07 2.99 0.00
Decomposition
Caused by capital deepening -0.04 -0.58
Caused by FBTC 0.29 3.57
Notes: Impact (t = 0) and cumulative (t = 0...5) effects of an exogenous temporary increase in government consumption by 1% of
GDP. Panels A,B,C,D,E show the deviation in percentage relative to steady-state for aggregate and sectoral variables. Sectoral
value added and value added share are expressed in percent of initial GDP while sectoral labor and labor shares are expressed
in percent of initial total hours worked; responses of sectoral LISs are measured in percent of value added of the corresponding
sector. Columns 2 and 5 labelled ’CES-TECH’ show predictions of the baseline model while columns 3 and 6 labelled ’CD’
shows predictions of the restricted version of the model. In the restricted model, we impose σj = 1 so that production functions
are Cobb-Douglas, let ξj2, χ
j







B to zero so that labor- and capital-augmenting technological rate remains fixed. In columns 1 and 4, we report
point estimates from the VAR model. Since there is a (slight) discrepancy between the response of aggregate real GDP (total
hours worked) and the sum of the responses of traded and non-traded value added (hours worked), columns 1 and 4 report the
sum of responses of Y H and Y N (LH and LN , resp.) to ensure consistency between aggregate and sectoral responses. We also
report the reconstructed response of non-traded TFP and capital-utilization adjusted non-traded TFP in order to be consistent
with macroeconomic identities. We reconstruct the empirical response of TFPN (t) and ZN (t) because we found a discrepancy
between empirically estimated and reconstructed responses. To reconstruct the empirical responses of TFPN (t) and ZN (t), we
use empirical responses of aggregate and traded TFP which are both statistically significant to recover the dynamic response
of ˆTFP
N
(t) (by using eq. (67)) and we plug the latter together with the response of ûK,N (t) to recover ẐN (t). Inspection of
Fig. 5(d) and Fig. 5(e) gives a sense of the discrepancy between the estimated vs. reconstructed response of capital-utilization
adjusted non-traded TFP and non-traded TFP.
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cumulative effects over a six-year horizon.
As can be seen in panel A of Table 2, the baseline model does a good job in reproducing
the aggregate effects of a shock to government consumption. More specifically, total hours
worked increase by 0.97%, close to the rise by 0.91% we estimate empirically. Like in the
data, we find a government spending multiplier above one as real GDP increases by 1.07%
on impact against 1.18% in the data. Along the transitional path, the baseline model
produces a cumulative change in L(t) and real GDP of 5.61% and 7.36% (vs. 6.37% and
7.74% in the data), respectively, thus generating a government spending multiplier on labor
and real GDP of 1.03 and 1.35 on average the first six years close to the multipliers of 1.16
and 1.40 we estimate empirically. Three factors amplify the rise in total hours worked and
in real GDP compared with the restricted model. First, in face of a higher real capital
cost, both sectors, especially traded firms, increase the capital utilization rate, uK,j(t). By
raising the demand for labor and the use of capital input, higher capital utilization amplifies
the rise in L(t) and ỸR(t). Second, because the rise in government spending puts upward
pressure on the unit cost for producing, it is optimal to increase the technology utilization
rate in both sectors.32 Whilst the rise in aggregate TFP increases directly real GDP, it
also raises ỸR(t) by increasing the wage rate which encourages agents to supply more labor.
Third, as discussed below, the rise in L(t) (and thereby in real GDP) is amplified because
the production technology becomes more labor intensive in the non-traded sector which
accounts for two-third of total hours worked.
The responses of technology to an exogenous shock to government consumption are
shown in panel D. The first two rows of panel D reveal that the capital-utilization ad-
justed TFP increases by 0.28% and 0.41%, respectively, in the traded and the non-traded
sector, close to what we estimate empirically (i.e., 0.21% and 0.37%) on impact. Whilst
technology improvements are similar across sectors on impact, the cumulative effect over
a six-year horizon reveals that the increase in the efficiency in the use of inputs is much
more pronounced in the traded than in the non-traded sector because the cost of adjusting
technology is lower in the traded than in the non-traded sector.33 The combined effect of
a higher capital and technology utilization rate pushes up traded and non-traded TFP by
5.5% and 2.37% in cumulative terms, respectively.34
Panel E of Table 2 shows that our model reproduces well the adjustment in the sectoral
LISs both on impact and over a six-year horizon. Log-linearizing (33) and using the fact





, shows that the response of the LIS in sector j is driven by
32Aggregate TFP increases by 0.43%, a value close to what we estimate empirically (i.e., 0.5%) on impact.
33Although the model understates the cumulative change in the capital-utilization-adjusted-traded TFP
(4.35% against 6.04% in the data), the model reproduces well the cumulative change in traded value added
(3.12 ppt against 2.86 ppt of GDP in the data).
34The model overstates the rise in non-traded TFP as it somewhat overpredicts the increase in the non-
traded capital utilization rate.
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σj . The first term on the RHS cap-
tures the effect of capital deepening while the second term reflects the impact of utilization-
adjusted-FBTC in sector j. When we shut down technological change and assume σj < 1
(as evidence suggests), both sectors experience a fall in k̃j(t) which lowers sjL(t), in contra-
diction with our evidence.35 Conversely, as long as we allow for time-varying FBTC, the
ability of the model to reproduce the dynamics of sectoral LISs substantially increases. As
shown in column 5, technological change biased toward capital in the traded sector generates
a cumulative decline in sHL (t) by -4.04% while technological change biased toward capital in
the non-traded sector increases sNL (t) by 3.57%. Because FBTC now shifts capital toward
the traded sector which becomes more capital intensive, the traded LIS increases through
the capital deepening channel by 0.96%. Conversely, the non-traded sector experiences a
capital outflow which lowers sNL (t) by -0.58% through the capital deepening channel. In
both cases, the FBTC channel more than offsets the capital deepening channel so that the
baseline model predicts a cumulative fall in the traded LIS by -3.08% (-2.28% in the data)
and a cumulative increase in the non-traded LIS by 2.99% (3.07% in the data).
While FBTC is key to reproducing the dynamics of sectoral LISs, it also increases the
performance of the model in reproducing the shift of labor across sectors. Panel B of
Table 2 reveals that the baseline model with endogenous technology reproduces well the
adjustment in traded and non-traded hours worked both on impact (column 2 vs. column
1) and over a six-year horizon (column 5 vs. column 4). As mentioned above, the restricted
model understates the expansionary effect of a government spending shock on sectoral hours
worked by shutting down the capital and technology utilization rates together with FBTC.
Conversely, as shown in column 5, the baseline model reproduces well the cumulative rise
in traded and non-traded hours worked which amounts to 0.69 ppt and 4.92 ppt of total
hours worked. The reason is twofold. First, the model allowing for technological change can
account for the increase in total hours worked, each sector receiving a share (equal to their
labor compensation share αjL) of L̂(t). Second, because non-traded firms bias technological
change toward labor and traded firms bias technological change toward capital, technology
further tilts the demand of labor toward non-tradables which amplifies the shift of labor
toward the non-traded sector as detailed below.
In the last three rows of panel B, we break down the change in the labor share of non-
tradables into three components by log-linearizing its equilibrium value described by eq.
35For reasons of space, we do no show results for the model assuming CES production functions and
abstracting from technological change. This restricted model predicts a fall in both k̃H(t) and k̃N (t) which
generates a (present value) cumulative decline in sHL (t) by -0.6% and in s
N
L (t) by -0.12%, both computed
over six-year horizon, see column 6 of panel E of Table 13 in Online Appendix L.
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(6) and by making use of (53) (see Online Appendix K.2):
dνL,N (t) = αL (1− αL) ε1 + ε
ˆ̃ωY,N (t)
1− ωY,N

























The first term on the RHS of (54) measures the change in νL,N (t) driven by the rise in
the value added share of non-tradables at current prices denoted by ωY,N (t). This term
measures the change in νL,N (t) driven by the biasedness of the demand shock toward non-
tradables which increases ωY,N (t). The second and third term on the RHS of eq. (54)
measures the change in νL,N (t) driven by the rise in the non-traded relative to the traded
LIS. As shown in eq. (53), both capital deepening and FBTC impinge on the LIS. The
second term on the RHS of (54) measures the change in νL,N (t) driven by sector differences
in capital deepening. The third term on the RHS of (54) captures the change in νL,N (t)
driven by the differential in the utilization-adjusted-FBTC (scaled by LIS) between non-
tradables and tradables. Focusing on cumulative changes, the decomposition shown in
column 6 of panel B for the restricted model reveals that the rise in νL,N (t) by 0.71 ppt
of total hours worked is only driven by the biasedness of the demand shock toward non-
tradables. When we turn to the decomposition of dνL,N (t) for the baseline model shown in
column 5, we find that technological change biased toward labor in the non-traded sector
and biased toward capital in the traded sector generates on its own a cumulative reallocation
of labor of 1.2 ppt of total hours worked toward the non-traded sector. The biasedness of
the demand shock toward non-tradables further increases νL,N (t) by 0.31 ppt of total hours
worked. Conversely, by increasing the productivity of labor in the traded sector, the shift
of capital toward this sector lowers νL,N (t) by -0.24 ppt of total hours worked. The sum
of these three effects results in a cumulative increase in the labor share of non-tradables
by 1.26 ppt of total hours worked (1.68 ppt in the data). Importantly, FBTC contributes
69% on its own to the change un νL,N (t) on average the first six years.36 As shown in the
second row, because traded firms use more intensively physical capital than non-traded firms
which increases the productivity of labor in the traded sector, capital deepening mitigates
the impact of FBTC on νL,N (t).
We turn to the adjustment in sectoral value added at constant prices shown in panel C
of Table 2. While FBTC influences labor reallocation and the responses of sectoral hours
36Because each factor contributing to dνL,N (t) may exert either a positive or a negative impact on the
labor share of non-tradables, we calculate the contribution of each factor k as follows:






where k is either ωY,N (t), the capital deepening differential between non-tradables and tradables, or the
FBTC differential between non-tradables and tradables.
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worked, the variations in sectoral value added are mostly influenced by changes in sectoral
TFPs. As can be seen in the first row of panel C, the restricted model abstracting from
endogenous technological change predicts a fall in Y H both on impact and over a six-year
horizon which enters in sharp contradiction with our estimates shown in columns 1 and 4.
In contrast, by letting traded firms to use more intensively installed capital and existing
technology, the baseline model generates an increase in Ỹ H(t) by 0.20 ppt of GDP on impact
(0.33 ppt in the data) and 3.12 ppt of GDP over a six-year horizon (2.86 ppt in the data),
as can be seen in columns 2 and 5. As discussed below, by allowing for sectoral differences
in technology improvement, the baseline model can account for the distribution of the
government spending multiplier on real GDP across sectors. More specifically, we estimate
empirically a government spending multiplier of 0.52 (= 2.86/5.51) for tradables and 0.89
(= 4.88/5.51) for non-tradables on average over a six-year horizon while the baseline model
generates a multiplier of 0.57 (= 3.12/5.46) for tradables and 0.78 (= 4.24/5.46) for non-
tradables, respectively.
According to the decomposition of the percentage deviation of sectoral value added,
νY,j ˆ̃Y j(t) = νY,j ˆ̃YR(t) + dνY,j(t), each sector receives a fraction (equal to νY,j) of real GDP
growth while the change in the value added share, dνY,j(t), indicates whether real GDP
growth is symmetrically (i.e., dνY,j(t) = 0) or asymmetrically distributed across sectors.
As shown in the third row of column 4, the value added share of non-tradables remains
unchanged and thus real GDP growth is distributed across sectors in accordance with their
value added share. To quantify the role of technology in driving the distribution of the
government spending multiplier across sectors, we break down analytically the change in
the value added share of non-tradables into three components (see Online Appendix K.1)37

























The first term on the RHS of (55) measures the change in νY,N (t) driven by the TFP
differential. The second and the third term on the RHS of (55) captures the change in the
value added share of non-tradables driven by labor and capital reallocation. The last three
rows of panel C of Table 2 provides a quantitative decomposition of the cumulative change
in the value added share of non-tradables. As can be seen in column 6, when technological
change is shut down, both labor and capital shifts toward the non-traded sector, increasing
νY,N (t) by 1.07 ppt of GDP. In contrast, in the baseline model, because technological
change is biased toward labor in the non-traded sector and biased toward capital in the
traded sector, more labor shifts toward the non-traded sector while capital shifts away from
this sector. As displayed by the last three rows of column 5, the capital outflow caused




ˆ̃Y N (t)− ˆ̃Y H(t)
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Figure 5: Theoretical vs. Empirical Responses Following Unanticipated Government Spend-
ing Shock: Technology Effects. Notes: Solid blue line displays point estimate of VAR with shaded areas
indicating 90% confidence bounds; in the dotted blue line, we reconstruct the empirical response of TFPN (t) and
ZN (t) because we found a substantial discrepancy between the empirically estimated and reconstructed responses.
In the latter case, we use empirical responses of aggregate and traded TFP which are both statistically significant to
reconstruct the dynamic responses of ˆTFP
N
(t) (by using eq. (67)) and we plug the latter together with the response of
ûK,N (t) to recover ẐN (t). The thick solid black line with squares displays model predictions in the baseline scenario
with capital and technology utilization together with FBTC while the dashed red line shows predictions of a model
with Cobb-Douglas production functions and abstracting from capital and technology utilization.
by the FBTC differential almost offsets the labor inflow, and the TFP differential causes a
cumulative fall in νY,N (t) by -0.47 ppt of GDP.
While in Table 2, we restrict our attention to impact and cumulative responses, in Fig.
5 and Fig. 6, we contrast theoretical (displayed by solid black lines with squares) with
empirical (displayed by solid blue lines) dynamic responses. Empirical responses display
the point estimate obtained from local projection, with the shaded area indicating the 90%
confidence bounds. We also contrast theoretical responses from the baseline model with
the predictions of the restricted model where we shut down the response of technology as
shown in the dashed red lines.
We start with the adjustment of technology displayed by Fig. 5. Because higher govern-
ment consumption increases the demand for traded and non-traded goods, both sectors find
it profitable to raise the efficiency in the use of inputs to meet higher demand for sectoral
goods. While the demand shock is biased toward non-traded goods, Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(d)
show that technology improvements along the transitional path (i.e., Ẑj(t) > 0) are much
more pronounced in the traded than in the non-traded sector because the former sector ex-
periences a lower adjustment cost of technology. Since the demand of capital rises in both
sectors which puts upward pressure on the real capital rental rates, it is profitable to use the
stock of capital more intensively (i.e., uK,j(t) rises) which results in higher sectoral TFPs
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Figure 6: Theoretical vs. Empirical Responses Following Unanticipated Government Spend-
ing Shock: Labor and Output Effects. Notes: Solid blue line displays point estimate of VAR with shaded
areas indicating 90% confidence bounds; the thick solid black line with squares displays model predictions in the base-
line scenario with capital and technology utilization together with FBTC while the dashed red line shows predictions








ûK,j(t) > 0), as displayed by Fig. 5(b) and Fig. 5(e).
Besides technology improvements, firms change the mix of labor- and capital-augmenting
efficiency. Because traded firms bias technological change toward capital, the traded LIS
falls below trend as shown in Fig. 5(c). Conversely, non-traded firms bias technological
change toward labor which increases the non-traded LIS as displayed by Fig. 5(f).
As shown in Fig. 6, both the shift in the technology frontier and the change in the mix
of labor- and capita-augmenting efficiency along the technology frontier increase the ability
of the two-sector open economy model to account for the VAR evidence. Following a rise
in government consumption shown in Fig. 6(a), the baseline model is able to capture the
dynamics of total hours worked and real GDP once we allow for an endogenous response
of sectoral TFP, as can be seen in Fig. 6(b) and Fig. 6(c). Intuitively, technology im-
provements and a higher labor intensity of production result in a higher wage rate which
encourages agents to supply more labor. The combined effect of the rise in aggregate TFP
and higher labor supply amplifies the increase in real GDP.
We turn to the second row of Fig. 6 which shows the distribution of the rise in total
hours worked between the traded and the non-traded sector. Fig. 6(f) reveals that the
baseline model reproduces well the rise in labor share of non-tradables because non-traded
(traded) firms use labor (capital) more intensively which amplifies the reallocation of hours
worked toward this sector. By contrast, as shown in the dashed red line, the biasdedness of
the demand shock toward non-traded goods is not sufficient on its own to account for the
adjustment in the labor share. As it stands out in Fig. 6(d) and Fig. 6(e), the model tracks
well the dynamics of traded and non-traded hours worked once we allow non-traded firms
to bias technological change toward labor and let traded technology become more capital
intensive.
The third row of Fig. 6 shows the distribution of the rise in real GDP across sectors.
As displayed by the dashed red lines in Fig. 6(i), because the restricted model overstates
the shift of productive resources toward the non-traded sector and generates an increase
in the value added share of non-tradables, it generates a decline in Ỹ H(t) in contradiction
with our evidence (see Fig. 6(g)). Conversely, a shown in Fig. 6(g), the baseline model
is able to generate the hump-shaped dynamics of traded value added which is driven by
the endogenous rise in the capital and technology utilization rates. Because it generates
an expansionary effect on real GDP in line with the evidence, only the baseline model can
account for the dynamics of Ỹ N (t) shown in Fig. 6(h).
While in section 2, we focus on the adjustment of quantities and stress the role of
technology, in the fourth row of Fig. 6, we assess the ability of our model to account for
the behavior of relative wages W̃ j(t)/W̃ (t) and the relative price of non-tradables. As
shown in Fig. 6(j) and Fig. 6(k), non-traded firms pay higher wages relative to traded
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firms to encourage workers to shift hours worked toward the non-traded sector. Because
technological change is biased toward capital in the traded sector and toward labor in the
non-traded sector, the adjustment in relative wages is more pronounced in the baseline
model, in line with the evidence. As can be seen in Fig. 6(l), because the demand shock is
biased toward non-tradables, the relative price of non-tradables appreciates. The apprecia-
tion in PN (t)/PH(t) is more pronounced in the baseline model because the TFP differential
mitigates the increase in non-traded relative to traded value added.
4.4 Government Spending Shock and Technology: Cross-Country Differ-
ences
We now move a step further and calibrate our model to country-specific data. Our ob-
jective is to assess the impact of international differences in the adjustment of technology
following a fiscal shock on sectoral fiscal multipliers. To isolate the pure role of techno-
logical change, we control for international differences in the biasedness of the demand
shock toward non-tradables by assuming that the intensity of the non-traded sector in the
government spending shock, ωGN , is symmetric across countries.
Calibration to country-specific data. To conduct our cross-country analysis, we
calibrate our model to match key ratios of the 18 OECD economies in our sample, as
summarized in Table 7, while ε, φ, σj , φX are set in accordance with estimates shown in
the last five columns of the table. We also set β = r? in line with our estimates for each
OECD country shown in the first column of Table 6.
As discussed in subsection 4.1, we consider the initial steady-state with Cobb-Douglas
production functions as the normalization point and calibrate the reference model to the
data; ϕ, ι, ϕH , ιH , ϑ, δK together with initial conditions need to be endogenously calibrated
to target 1−αC , 1−αJ , αH , αHJ , L
N
L , ωJ , and υNX = 0 (see subsection 4.1); we also choose
values for the LIS, θj , in accordance with our estimates shown in columns 11 and 12 of
Table 7; ωGN and ωG are chosen to match the non-tradable content of government spending
and the share of government spending in GDP (see columns 4 and 15, respectively, of Table
7). The remaining parameters, i.e., σL, σC , ρ, φJ , ρJ , κ take the same values as those
summarized in Table 1.
The high uncertainty surrounding estimates of responses of sectoral capital utiliza-
tion rates at a country level leads us to abstract from endogenous capital utilization so
that technology improvement collapses to variations of TFP. Because we aim at quanti-
fying precisely sectoral government spending multipliers, we treat technological progress
as an exogenous process and proceed as follows. Because we abstract from capital uti-
lization and treat technological change as exogenous, we remove the tilde notation. Let-
ting ξj2 tend toward infinity (which implies û








j(t) − k̂j(t). Making use of the log-linearized version of the
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nology improvements are now captured by changes in sectoral TFP. Solving for Âj(t) and





















. We plug country-specific estimates of σj and country-specific
estimated responses for sjL(t), k
j(t), TFPj(t) into the above equations to recover the dy-
namics for Aj(t) and Bj(t) and choose parameters āj , b̄j , ξjX , χ
j
X for X = A,B within
sector j = H, N so as to reproduce the dynamic adjustment of sectoral factor-augmenting
efficiency, as described by eq. (42a)-(42b), specific to each country; in addition, we ensure
that the cumulative change in Aj(t), Bj(t), TFPj(t) over a six-year horizon reproduces the
cumulative change we estimate empirically.
As for a representative OECD economy, the endogenous response of government con-
sumption to an exogenous fiscal shock is governed by the continuous time path (41) and
we choose parameters ξ and χ to reproduce the empirical response of G(t) we estimate for
each country of our sample. In calibrating the model to country-specific data, we assume
that the biadedness of the shock to government consumption is symmetric across countries
while technological change is country-specific. We thus set ωGN = 80% and ωGH = 18% for
each OECD country. Once the model is calibrated, we estimate numerically the effects of
an exogenous temporary increase in government consumption by 1% of GDP.
Columns 1-3 of Table 3 show numerical results when we simulate the baseline model with
CES production functions and technological change. Columns 5-7 of Table 3 show the excess
of the government spending multiplier driven by technological change which is computed
as the difference between the government spending multiplier in the baseline model and
the government spending multiplier in the restricted model with no technological change.
Column 4 shows the TFP differential between tradables and non-tradables for Panel A and
the FBTC differential between non-tradables and tradables (where FBTCj(t) is scaled by
the capital income share 1 − sjL) for panel B. Each figure is computed as the ratio of the
present discounted value of the cumulative change of the corresponding quantity divided
by the present discounted value of the cumulative change of government consumption, both
calculated over a six-year period. Therefore, each cell indicates the average annual rise in
value added or hours worked following a rise in government spending by 1% of GDP the
first six years.
Cross-country differences in government spending multiplier on non-traded
value added. How international differences in the response of technology to a government
spending shock modify the government spending multiplier on sectoral value added? For
convenience, we repeat the decomposition of the rise in non-traded value added following
a rise in government consumption:
νY,N Ŷ N (t) = νY,N ŶR(t) + dνY,N (t). (56)
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When dνY,N (t) = 0, real GDP growth is symmetrically distributed across sectors. If
dνY,N (t) > 0, the government spending shock benefits disproportionately the non-traded
sector. Column 1 of Panel A of Table 3 shows the (cross-country) average value of the gov-
ernment spending multiplier on real GDP.38 The government spending multiplier averages
about one the first six years. As shown in column 2 of Table 3, the government spending
multiplier on non-traded value added is equal to 0.6 ppt of GDP while the value added share
of non-tradables declines very slightly by 0.05 ppt of GDP as can be seen in column 3. The
rationale behind the insignificant change in νY,N (t) lies in the TFP differential between
tradables and non-tradables of 0.12% shown in column 4 which offsets the positive impact
of the biasedness of the government spending shock toward non-tradables on dνY,N (t).39
Column 5 of Table 3 shows the excess of the government spending multiplier on real GDP
caused by technological change. On average, technological change increases the government
spending multiplier by 0.64 ppt of GDP. Fig. 7(a) plots the excess (or the reduction) of
the government spending multiplier driven by technological change over a six-year horizon
against the excess of traded over non-traded TFP. One-third of OECD countries which
are positioned in the south-west experience a decline in traded relative to non-traded TFP
which averages 0.92% (see column 4 of Table 3). For these economies, technological change
lowers the government spending multiplier by -1 ppt of GDP (see the row before the last
in column 5) because these economies experience a decline in aggregate TFP. Conversely,
countries positioned in the north-east of Fig. 7(a) experience a positive TFP differential
which averages 0.64% and these economies also have a government spending multiplier
which is 1.5 ppt of GDP larger on average (see the last row of column 5). The reason is
that when technological change is concentrated in traded industries, evidence indicates that
aggregate TFP rises.
Interestingly, the excess (driven by technological) change) of the government spending
multiplier on non-traded value added shown in column 6 remains similar whether traded
TFP increases or declines relative to non-traded TFP. The reason is intuitive. In countries
which experience a fall in traded relative to non-traded TFP (as shown in the north-
west of Fig. 7(c)), the rise in νY,N (t) by 0.79 ppt of GDP more than offsets lower ŶR(t).
The corollary is that technological change lowers considerably traded value added in these
OECD economies. More specifically, using the formula νY,H Ŷ H(t) = νY,H ŶR(t)− dνY,N (t)
where νY,H = 0.36, allowing for technological change reduces the multiplier on traded value
added by 1.16 ppt of GDP. In countries where TFPH(t)/TFPN (t) increases (as shown in
the south-east of Fig. 7(c)), additional real GDP growth more than offsets the fall in
38Table 11 of Online Appendix K.1 shows the government spending multiplier on real GDP over a six-year
period for each OECD country.
39In accordance with eq. (3) which decomposes the change in the value added share of non-tradables at
constant prices, we scale the TFP differential by
(
1− νY,H) νY,H so that the figure gives the change in the
value added share of non-tradables in ppt of GDP driven by the change in the relative TFP of tradables.
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Table 3: Numerically Computed Values of Government Spending Multiplier on Non-
Tradables
A-Value Added Baseline Model Excess Baseline Model over Restricted model
ŶR(t) ν
Y,N Ŷ N (t) dνY,N (t) TFP diff ŶR(t) ν
Y,N Ŷ N (t) dνY,N (t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean 1.03 0.60 -0.05 0.12 0.64 0.18 -0.22
TFP diff < 0 -0.92 -1.01 0.15 0.79
TFP diff > 0 0.64 1.47 0.19 -0.73
B-Hours Baseline Model Excess Baseline Model over Restricted model
L̂(t) αL,N L̂N (t) dνL,N (t) FBTC diff L̂(t) αL,N L̂N (t) dνL,N (t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean 0.68 0.55 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.03
FBTC diff < 0 -0.54 -0.19 -0.27 -0.13
FBTC diff > 0 0.69 0.24 0.36 0.19
Notes: Columns 1-4 show numerical results when we simulate the baseline model with CES production functions and
technological change. Columns 1-2 show the government spending multiplier on real GDP and non-traded value added
(panel A), on total hours worked and non-traded hours worked (panel B). Column 3 shows the change in the value added
(panel A) and labor share (panel B) of non-tradables. Column 4 shows the response of the TFP differential between
tradables and non-tradables (panel A) and FBTC differential between non-tradables and tradables (panel B) to a shock
to government consumption. We compute numerically the responses of real GDP/hours worked, non-traded value
added/hours worked, value added/labor share of non-tradables to a 1% temporary increase in government consumption
and calculate the government spending multiplier as the ratio of the present discounted value of the cumulative change
of the corresponding quantity to the present discounted of the cumulative change of government consumption over
a six-year horizon. To ensure consistency, the TFP/FBTC differential is expressed in present discounted cumulative
change divided by the present discounted cumulative change of government consumption. Columns 5-6 show the excess
of the government spending multiplier in the baseline model over a model with Cobb-Douglas production functions and
shutting down technological change (panel A) or FBTC (panel B). Column 7 shows the excess of the change in the
value added (panel A) and labor share (panel B) of non-tradables in the baseline model over the restricted model.
νY,N (t) by -0.73 ppt of GDP. By using the formula above, the multiplier on traded value
added is increased by 1.28 ppt of GDP through the technology channel. In conclusion,
while on average government spending shocks bias technological change toward traded
industries which ensures that real GDP growth is symmetrically distributed across sectors,
international differences in responses of TFPH(t)/TFPN (t) result in a wide cross-country
heterogeneity in νY,H Ŷ H(t) while νY,N Ŷ N (t) displays a smaller cross-country dispersion
because νY,N (t) increases when ŶR(t) gets smaller.
Cross-country differences in government spending multipliers on non-traded
hours worked. We now explore the role of international differences in technology in driving
cross-country differences in the government spending multiplier on non-traded hours worked
which can be broken down into two components:
αNL L̂
N (t) = αNL L̂(t) + dν
L,N (t), (57)
where αNL is the labor compensation share of non-tradables. When dν
L,N (t) = 0, the
rise in total hours worked caused by a shock to government consumption is distributed
symmetrically across sectors, i.e., in accordance with their labor compensation share. If
dνL,N (t) > 0, then non-traded hours worked increase disproportionately relative to traded
hours worked as labor shifts toward the non-traded sector.
As can be seen in column 1 of Panel B of Table 3, the government spending multiplier
on total hours worked averages 0.68 over a six-year horizon. Column 2 reveals that non-
traded hours worked increase by 0.55 ppt of total worked which account for more than 80%
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Figure 7: Government Spending Multiplier and Technology: Cross-Country Analysis.
Notes: Fig. 7(a) plots the excess of the government spending multiplier on real GDP (vertical axis) in the base-
line model over a model with Cobb-Douglas production functions shutting down technological change against the









7(b) plots the excess of the government spending multiplier on total hours worked in the baseline model over a
model with Cobb-Douglas production functions with time-varying sectoral TFPs while shutting down sectoral FBTC













(t). Fig. 7(c) plots the excess of the change in the value added share of non-tradables, dνY,N (t),
in the baseline model over a model shutting down technological change (vertical axis), against the (scaled) excess of









plots the excess of the change in the labor share of non-tradables, dνL,N (t), in the baseline model over a model
imposing Hicks-neutral technological change (vertical axis) against the differential in the utilization-adjusted FBTC
scaled by the capital income share between non-tradables and tradables (horizontal axis).
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of the rise in L(t). The bulk of the labor growth is concentrated in the non-traded sector
because this sector accounts for almost two-third of total hours worked and also benefits
from a shift of labor as captured by a rise in νL,N (t) by 0.10 ppt of total hours worked. The
reallocation of hours worked toward the non-traded sector is driven by the biasedness of
the demand shock toward non-tradables together with technological change biased toward
non-tradables.
Column 4 displays the adjusted differential in FBTC (scaled by the capital income
share) between non-tradables and tradables.40 Column 5 shows that the excess of the rise
in total hours worked in a model which allows for FBTC compared with a model which
imposes Hicks-neutral technological change averages 0.02 ppt of total hours worked. As
can be seen in column 6, FBTC amplifies the rise in non-traded hours worked by 0.05
ppt of total hours worked, mostly due to the reallocation of labor toward the non-traded
sector which amounts to 0.03 ppt of total hours worked. These low figures mask a wide
cross-country dispersion however. In Fig. 7(b), we plot the excess of total hours worked
caused by FBTC (on the vertical axis) against the weighted sum of FBTC in the traded











The scatter-plot shows that there exists a strong and positive cross-country relationship
between the weighted sum of sectoral FBTC and the rise in total hours worked following
a government spending shock. More specifically, in (the seven OECD) countries where










(t) < 0, the
rise in total hours worked is 0.6 ppt lower than the increase in L(t) in a model abstracting
from FBTC. Conversely, in countries positioned in the north-east part of Fig. 7(b) where
technological change is biased toward labor, the rise in total hours worked is amplified by
0.4 ppt on average.
As can be seen in the last two rows of column 4 of Panel B of Table 3, the FBTC
differential between non-tradables and tradables varies widely across countries.42 Column
6 shows that in countries where technological change is biased toward capital in the non-
traded sector (relative to the traded sector), the rise in non-traded hours worked is lowered
by 0.27 ppt of total hours worked. Conversely, in countries where technological change is
(relatively) biased toward labor in the non-traded sector (relative to the traded sector),
the rise in non-traded hours worked is amplified by 0.36 ppt of total hours worked. As















dance with eq. 54, we scale the FBTC differential with αHL α
N
L so that the the figure gives directly the
change in the labor share of non-tradables in ppt of total hours worked driven by the difference in FBTC
between the non-traded and the traded sector.
41It is worth mentioning that the weighted sum of FBTC in the traded and the non-traded sector is
strongly correlated with non-traded FBTC.











its impact on the rise in total hours worked, in Fig. 7(d), we consider the FBTC differential as we are
interested in determining its impact on the difference in the government spending multiplier as captured by
dνL,N (t).
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shown in eq. (57), the reduction or the amplification of the rise in LN (t) is the result
of the reduction or the amplification of the rise in total hours worked together with the
reduction or the amplification of the rise in the labor share of non-tradables. Column 7
reveals that in countries where technological change is (relatively) biased toward capital,
νL,N (t) is reduced by 0.13 ppt of total hours worked (compared with a model shutting
down FBTC) while νL,N (t) is amplified by 0.19 ppt of total hours worked in countries
where technological change is (relatively) biased toward labor. Therefore, on average, half
of the reduction or the amplification of the government spending multiplier on non-traded
hours worked is the result of the change in νL,N (t) (which measures the reallocation of
labor toward the non-traded sector).
Fig. 7(d) plots the average change (over a six-year horizon) in the labor share of
non-tradables caused by FBTC (vertical axis) against the adjusted differential in FBTC
between non-tradables and tradables (horizontal axis). Inspection of Fig. 7(d) reveals that
technological change is more biased toward labor in the non-traded than in the traded
sector in about half of the countries. For these nine economies positioned in the north-
east, technological change amplifies the shift of labor toward the non-traded sector and
thus further increases the government spending multiplier on non-traded hours worked.
Conversely, in the remaining nine OECD countries positioned in the south-west, a shock to
government consumption leads non-traded firms to bias technological change toward capital
which shifts labor toward the traded sector and thus reduces the rise in non-traded hours
worked.
5 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature related to the effects of a government spending
shock both empirically and theoretically. From an empirical point of view, we use a panel of
eighteen OECD countries over the period 1970-2015 and document evidence pointing at the
key role of technological change in determining the size of sectoral fiscal multipliers. First,
we find empirically a government spending multiplier higher than one over a six-year horizon
and 39% of the rise in real GDP is driven by the endogenous increase in aggregate TFP.
Second, the value added share of non-tradables (at constant prices) remains unresponsive
to the demand shock at any horizon. According to our evidence, real GDP growth is
distributed uniformly across sectors because technology improvement is concentrated in
traded industries which neutralizes the impact of the biasedness of the spending shock
toward non-tradables on the value added share of non-tradables. Third, 88% of the rise
in total hours worked is concentrated in the non-traded sector. Our empirical findings
reveal that the disproportionate increase in non-traded hours worked is driven by FBTC as
non-traded firms bias technological change toward labor and traded firms bias technological
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change toward capital. Fourth, our hypothesis of FBTC accords well with the redistributive
effects we document empirically as our estimates reveal that the non-traded LIS increases
whilst the traded LIS declines.
To rationalize our evidence, we develop a semi-small open economy with tradables and
non-tradables, in the lines of Kehoe and Ruhl [2009], which contains three sets of key
features. First, we allow for labor mobility costs and endogenous terms of trade to account
for the frictions on factor movements between the traded and non-traded sector. Second,
to account for real GDP growth and its distribution across sectors, drawing on Bianchi et
al. [2019], we assume that each sector can choose to use more intensively the capital stock
and existing technologies. We put forward FBTC as a third key ingredient. Adapting the
methodology of Caselli and Coleman [2006] to our model with capital and labor, we allow
firms to change the mix of labor- and capital-augmenting technological change at each point
of time.
To quantify the role of technology in determining the size of government spending multi-
pliers and their distribution across sectors, we contrast the predictions of the baseline model
with those of a restricted model where technological change is shut down and sectoral goods
are produced from Cobb-Douglas production functions. Our quantitative analysis shows
that a model abstracting from technological change cannot generate the rise in real GDP
and in total hours worked we estimate empirically, generates a disproportionate increase in
non-traded relative to traded value added in contradiction with our evidence, understates
the rise in non-traded hours worked and cannot account for the dynamics of sectoral LISs.
Conversely, letting technological change respond endogenously to the government spending
shock, the model can account for the evidence once we let the decision on technology im-
provement vary across sectors and allow firms to change the factor intensity of production
over time.
We also take advantage of the panel data dimension of our sample to quantity the role
of technology in driving international differences in government spending multipliers. We
calibrate the semi-small open economy to country-specific data and isolate the pure effect
of technology by assuming that the intensity of the non-traded sector in the government
spending shock is symmetric across countries. We compute the aggregate and sectoral
government spending multipliers over a six-year horizon in the baseline and the restricted
model where technological change is shut down which allows us to calculate the excess
or the reduction of value added growth through the technology channel. While traded
relative to non-traded TFP increases in two-third of the OECD economies in response
to a government spending shock, non-traded relative to traded TFP rises in one-third of
the countries. Technological change amplifies real GDP growth which disproportionately
benefits the traded sector in the first group of countries whilst the decline in aggregate TFP
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reduces real GDP growth in the second group of countries where non-traded value added
increases disproportionately. Importantly, while the increase in the government spending
multiplier on non-traded value added driven by technological change which remains stable
in both groups of countries, the multiplier on traded value added displays a wide dispersion,
exceeding one in the first group and moving into negative values in the second group.
Turning to labor, we compute the aggregate and sectoral government spending multipli-
ers on hours worked over a six-year horizon in the baseline and the restricted model where
technological change is assumed to be Hicks-neutral which allows us to calculate the excess
or the reduction of labor growth caused by FBTC. We find that a government spending
shock leads firms to bias technological toward labor in two-third of OECD countries which
increases labor growth by 0.4 ppt. Conversely, in the remaining countries where technolog-
ical change is biased toward capital, the rise in total hours worked is reduced by 0.6 ppt.
FBTC also varies between sectors which affects the distribution of labor growth between
the traded and non-traded sector. In half of the countries, technological change is more
biased toward labor in the non-traded than in the traded sector which increases the govern-
ment spending multiplier on non-traded hours worked by 0.36 ppt of total hours worked.
Conversely, in the remaining half of OECD countries, technological change is more biased
toward capital in the non-traded than in the traded sector which lowers the government
spending multiplier on non-traded hours worked by 0.27 ppt of total hours worked. In both
cases, half of the excess or reduction in the multiplier on non-traded hours worked is caused
by the reallocation of labor toward or away from the non-traded sector.
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Bachmann, Rüdiger and Eric R. Sims (2012) Confidence and the Transmission of Government Spending Shocks.
Journal of Monetary Economics, 59(3), pp. 235-249.
Baqaee, David, Emmanuel Farhi and Kunal Sangani (2021) The Supply-Side Effects of Monetary Policy. NBER
Working Papers 28345.
Basu, Susanto, Miles S. Kimball, John G. Fernald (2006) Are Technology Improvements Contractionary? Amer-
ican Economic Review, 96(5), pages 1418-1448.
Baxter, Marianne and Robert G. King (1993) Fiscal Policy in General Equilibrium. American Economic Review,
83(3), pp. 315-334.
Bems, Rudolfs (2008) Aggregate Investment Expenditures on Tradable and Nontradable Goods. Review of Eco-
nomic Dynamics, 4, pp. 852-883.
Benetrix, Agustin and Philip R. Lane (2010) Fiscal Shocks and the Sectoral Composition of Output. Open
Economies Review, 21(3), pp. 335-350.
Bertinelli, Luisito, Olivier Cardi, and Romain Restout (2019) Labor Market Effects of Technology Shocks Biased
toward the Traded Sector. Working Paper series LUMS.
Bianchi, Francesco, Howard Kung, and Gonzalo Morales (2019) Growth, Slowdowns, and Recoveries. Journal of
Monetary Economics, 101, pp; 47-63.
59
Bilbiie, Florin O. (2011) Nonseparable Preferences, Frisch Labor Supply, and the Consumption Multiplier of
Government Spending: One Solution to a Fiscal Policy Puzzle Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 43(1),
pp. 221-251.
Blanchard, Olivier J. and Charles M. Kahn (1980) The Solution of Linear Difference Models underRational
Expectations. Econometrica, 48(5), pp. 1305-1311.
Blanchard, Olivier J., and Roberto Perotti (2002) An Empirical Characterization of the Dynamic Effects of
Changes in Government Spending and Taxes on Output. Quarterly Journal of Economcis 177, pp. 1329-1368.
Boehm, Christoph E. (2020) Government Consumption and Investment: Does the Composition of Purchases
Affect the Multiplier? Journal of Monetary Economics, 115(C), pages 80-93.
Born, Benjamin, and Gernot Müller (2012) Government Spending Shocks in Quarterly and Annual Time Series.
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 44(2), pp. 507-517.
Born, Benjamin, Falko Juessen, and Gernot J. Müller (2013) Exchange Rate Regimes and Fiscal Multipliers.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 37(2), pp. 446-465.
Bouakez, Hafedh, Omar Rachedi, and Emiliano Santoro (2018) Sectoral Heterogeneity, Production Networks,
and the Effects of Government Spending. mimeo.
Buiter, Willem H. (1984) Saddlepoint Problems in Continuous Time Rational Expectations Models: A General
Method and some Macroeconomic Examples. Econometrica, 52, pp. 665-80.
Cantore, Cristiano, and Lukas B. Freund (2021) Workers, Capitalists, and the Government: Fiscal Policy and
Income (Re)Distribution. Journal of Monetary Economics, forthcoming.
Cardi, Olivier, Romain Restout, and Peter Claeys (2020) Imperfect Mobility of Labor across Sectors and Fiscal
Transmission in Open Economy. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, forthcoming.
Caselli, Francesco (2016) Technology Differences over Time and Space. Princeton University Press.
Caselli, Francesco, and Wilbur John Coleman II (2006) The World Technology Frontier. American Economic
Review, 96(3), pp. 499-522.
Chirinko, Robert S., and Debdulal Mallick (2017) The Substitution Elasticity, Factor Shares, and the Low-
Frequency Panel Model. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 9(4), pp 225-253.
Christiano, Lawrence, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo (2011) When is the Government Spending Multi-
plier is Large? Journal of Political Economy, 119(1), pp. 78-121.
Cox, Lydia, Gernot Müller, Ernesto Pastén, Raphael Schoenle, and Michael Weber (2020) Big G. NBER Working
Papers 27034.
D’Alessandro, Antonello, Giulio Fella and Leonardo Melosi (2019) Fiscal Stimulus With Learning-By-Doing.
International Economic Review, 60(3), pp. 1413-1432.
De Ferra, Sergio (2018) Sovereign Debt Crises, Fiscal Austerity and Corporate Default. Mimeo.
Delong, Brad, and Lawrence H. Summers (2012) Fiscal Policy in a Depressed Economy Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, Spring, pp. 233-274.
Eberly, Janice Sergio Rebelo, and Nicolas Vincent (2008) Investment and Value: A Neoclassical Benchmark.
NBER Working Papers 13866.
European Union KLEMS, 2017. Growth and productivity accounts.
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A Sectoral Decomposition of Real GDP
We consider an open economy which produces domestic traded goods, denoted by a superscript
H, and non-traded goods, denoted by a superscript N . The foreign-produced traded good is the
numeraire and its price is normalized to 1. We consider an initial steady-state where prices are those
at the base year so that initially real GDP, denoted by YR, and the value added share at constant
prices, denoted by νY,j , collapses to nominal GDP (i.e., Y ) and the value added share at current
prices, respectively. Before moving forward, it is worth mentioning that whilst in the model and
the quantitative analysis, we add a tilde when value added is inclusive of the technology utilization
rate since we allow for endogenous utilization of existing technologies, we do not need to make this
distinction in the data and Y jt refers to value added inclusive of technology improvement below.
Summing value added at constant prices across sectors gives real GDP:
YR,t = PHY Ht + P
NY Nt , (58)
where PH and PN stand for the price of home-produced traded goods and non-traded goods,
respectively, which are kept fixed since we consider value added at constant prices.
Log-linearizing (58), and denoting the percentage deviation from initial steady-state by a hat
leads to:
ŶR,t = νY,H Ŷ Ht + ν
Y,N Ŷ Nt , (59)
where νY,j = P
jY j
Y is the value added share of home-produced traded goods evaluated at the initial
steady-state. Eq. (59) corresponds to eq. (1) in the main text. We drop the time index
below as long as it does not cause confusion.
Subtracting real GDP growth from both sides of (59) leads to the sum of the change in the value
added share denoted by dνY,jt :
0 = dνY,Ht + dν
Y,N
t . (60)
The change in the value added share is computed as the excess (measured in ppt of GDP) of value




Ŷ jt − ŶR,t
)
. (61)
Capital Kj can be freely reallocated across sectors while labor Lj is subject to mobility costs
which creates a sectoral wage differential. We denote the capital rental cost by R and the wage rate
in sector j by W j (with j = H,N). Under assumption of perfect competition in product and input









Assuming constant returns to scale in production and making use of (62), the log-linearized version
of the production function reads:











where sjL and TFP
j are the labor income share and total factor productivity in sector j, respectively,
and kj ≡ Kj/Lj stands for the capital-labor ratio.
We derive below an expression of the deviation of real GDP relative to initial steady-state. Since
we assume perfect capital mobility, the resource constraint for capital reads as follows K = KH+KN .
Totally differentiating, multiplying both sides by the capital rental cost R, and dividing by GDP
leads to:






1− νY,H) (1− sNL
)
K̂Nt . (64)
The same logic applies to labor except that we assume imperfect mobility of labor across sectors.
In this case, the percentage deviation of total hours worked relative to its initial steady-state is
defined as the weighted sum of the percentage deviation of sectoral hours worked relative to initial
steady-state, i.e., L̂t = αLL̂Ht + (1− αL) L̂Nt , where αL = W
HLH
WL is the labor compensation share
for tradables. Multiplying both sides by total compensation of employees, WL, and dividing by
GDP leads to:




1− νY,H) sNL L̂Nt . (65)
Plugging (63) into (59) and making use of (64)-(65) allows us to express the change in real GDP in
terms of aggregate TFP changes and accumulation of inputs:
ŶR,t = ˆTFPt + sLL̂t + (1− sL) K̂t, (66)
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where the percentage deviation of aggregate TFP relative to its initial steady-state is equal to the
weighted sum of the percentage deviation of TFP relative to initial steady-state in the traded and
the non-traded sector




1− νY,H) ˆTFPNt . (67)
Eq. (67) corresponds to eq. (2) in the main text.
Considering the non-traded sector (i.e., setting j = N) and plugging (66) into (61) shows that
the change in the value added share at constant prices of non-tradables can be brought about by a
TFP growth differential, a labor and/or a capital inflow. Formally, the decomposition of the change

















k̂Nt − (1− sL) k̂t
]
, (68)
where kN ≡ KN/LN is the capital-labor ratio in the non traded sector, k ≡ K/L is the aggregate
capital-labor ratio, and we used the fact that changes in sectoral value added and aggregate real
GDP, as described by (63) and (66), respectively, can be rewritten as follows:









ŶR,t = ˆTFPt + L̂t + (1− sL) k̂t. (69b)
Plugging the sectoral decomposition of the deviation of aggregate TFP relative to its initial
steady-state described by eq. (67) into the change in the value added share of non-tradables at






















k̂Nt − (1− sL) k̂t
]
. (70)
Eq. (70) corresponds to eq. (3) in the main text.
B Sectoral Decomposition of Hours Worked
In this section, we detail the steps of derivation of the relationship between the labor share of
non-tradables and the responses of LISs. While Y jt refers to value added inclusive of technology
improvement below, we make the distinction between the capital stock Kjt and the capital stock
inclusive of capital utilization K̃jt by adding a tilde.
In an economy where labor is imperfectly mobile across sectors, the percentage deviation of
total hours worked relative to its initial steady-state (i.e., L̂t) following a shock to government
consumption is equal to the weighted sum of the percentage deviation of sectoral hours worked
relative to initial steady-state (i.e., L̂jt ):
L̂t = αLL̂Ht + (1− αL) L̂Nt . (71)
where αL (1 − αL) is the labor compensation share of tradables (non-tradables). Eq. (71) cor-
responds to eq. (4) in the main text. Note that we use interchangeably αL = αHL and
1− αL = αNL .
If we subtract the share of L̂t received by each sector from the change in sectoral hours worked,
we obtain the change in the labor share of sector j, denoted by νL,j , which measures the contribution







j = H, N. (72)
Eq. (72) corresponds to eq. (5) in the main text. The differential between the responses
of sectoral and total hours worked on the RHS of eq. (72) can be viewed as the change in labor in
sector j if L remained fixed and thus reflects higher employment in this sector resulting from the
reallocation of labor.
Both the traded and non-traded sectors use physical capital (inclusive of capital utilization),
K̃j = uK,jKj , and labor, Lj , according to constant returns to scale production functions which are





















43While the two measures are equivalent in level, we differentiate between νL,j and αL since the change
in the labor share is calculated by keeping W j/W constant.
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where γj and 1 − γj are the weight of labor and capital in the production technology, σj is the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in sector j = H, N , Aj and Bj are labor- and
capital-augmenting efficiency. Both sectors face two cost components: a capital rental cost equal to
R, and a labor cost equal to the wage rate, i.e., WH in the traded sector and WN in the non-traded
sector.
Both sectors are assumed to be perfectly competitive and thus choose capital and labor by












t −W jt Ljt −RtK̃jt
}
. (74)
Since capital can move freely between the two sectors, the value of marginal products in the traded





























σj ≡ Rt, (75b)
where we denote by k̃jt ≡ K̃jt /Ljt the capital-labor ratio for sector j = H, N , and yjt ≡ Y jt /Ljt value



















Denoting the LIS in sector j by sjL, and pre-multiplying both sides of (75a) by L
j and dividing by









Multiplying both sides of (75b) by Kj and dividing by value added at current prices in sector j
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Table 4: Sample Range for Empirical and Numerical Analysis
Country Code Period Obs.
Australia (AUS) 1970 - 2015 46
Austria (AUT) 1970 - 2015 46
Belgium (BEL) 1970 - 2015 46
Canada (CAN) 1970 - 2015 46
Denmark (DNK) 1970 - 2015 46
Spain (ESP) 1970 - 2015 46
Finland (FIN) 1970 - 2015 46
France (FRA) 1970 - 2015 46
Great Britain (GBR) 1970 - 2015 46
Ireland (IRL) 1970 - 2015 46
Italy (ITA) 1970 - 2015 46
Japan (JPN) 1974 - 2015 41
Korea (KOR) 1970 - 2015 46
Netherlands (NLD) 1970 - 2015 46
Norway (NOR) 1970 - 2015 46
Portugal (PRT) 1970 - 2015 46
Sweden (SWE) 1970 - 2015 46
United States (USA) 1970 - 2015 46
Total number of obs. 823
Main data sources EU KLEMS & OECD STAN
Notes: Column ’period’ gives the first and last observa-
tion available. Obs. refers to the number of observations






stands for the value added share of sector j at current prices. Drawing on
Horvath [2000], we generate imperfect mobility of labor ny assuming that sectoral hours worked are










where ϑj stands for the weight attached to labor supply in sector j = H,N and ε is the elasticity of
labor supply across sectors which captures the degree of labor mobility. Plugging labor supply to

















Eq. (85) corresponds to eq. (6) in the main text.
C Data Description for Empirical Analysis
Coverage: Our sample consists of a panel of 18 countries: Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT),
Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Denmark (DNK), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Ireland (IRL),
Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Korea (KOR), the Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), Portugal (PRT),
Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), the United Kingdom (GBR) and the United States (USA). The
baseline period is running from 1970 to 2015, except for Japan (1974-2015). Table 4 summarizes
our dataset.
Sources: Our primary sources for sectoral data are the OECD and EU KLEMS databases. We
use data from EU KLEMS ([2011], [2017]) March 2011 and July 2017 releases. The EU KLEMS
dataset covers all countries of our sample, with the exceptions of Canada and Norway. For these
two countries, sectoral data are taken from the Structural Analysis (STAN) database provided by
the OECD ([2011], [2017]). For both EU KLEMS and STAN databases, the March 2011 release
provides data for eleven 1-digit ISIC-rev.3 industries over the period 1970-2007 while the July 2017
release provides data for thirteen 1-digit-rev.4 industries over the period 1995-2015.
The construction of time series for sectoral variables over the period 1970-2015 involves two
steps. First, we identify tradable and non-tradable sectors. We adopt the classification proposed by
De Gregorio et al. [1994]. Following Jensen and Kletzer [2006], we have updated this classification
by treating the financial sector as a traded industry. We map the ISIC-rev.4 classification into the
ISIC-rev.3 classification in accordance with the concordance Table 5. Once industries have been
classified as traded or non-traded, for any macroeconomic variable X, its sectoral counterpart Xj
for j = H,N is constructed by adding the Xk of all sub-industries k classified in sector j = H,N as
follows Xj =
∑
k∈j Xk. Second, series for tradables and non-tradables variables from EU KLEMS
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[2011] and OECD [2011] databases (available over the period 1970-2007) are extended forward up to
2015 using annual growth rate estimated from EU KLEMS [2017] and OECD [2017] series (available
over the period 1995-2015).
Table 5: Summary of Sectoral Classifications
Sector ISIC-rev.4 Classification ISIC-rev.3 Classification
(sources: EU KLEMS [2017] and OECD ([2017]) (sources: EU KLEMS [2011] and OECD ([2011])
Industry Code Industry Code
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing A Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing AtB
Mining and Quarrying B Mining and Quarrying C
Tradables Total Manufacturing C Total Manufacturing D
(H) Transport and Storage H Transport, Storage and Communication I
Information and Communication J
Financial and Insurance Activities K Financial Intermediation J
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply D-E Electricity, Gas and Water Supply E
Construction F Construction F
Wholesale and Retail Trade, Repair
Non of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles G Wholesale and Retail Trade G
Tradables Accommodation and Food Service Activities I Hotels and Restaurants H
(N) Real Estate Activities L Real Estate, Renting and Business Services K
Professional, Scientific, Technical,
Administrative and Support Service Activities M-N
Community Social and Personal Services O-U Community Social and Personal Services LtQ
Relevant to our work, the EU KLEMS ([2011], [2017]) and OECD STAN ([2011], [2017])
databases provide data, for each industry and year, on value added at current and constant prices,
permitting the construction of sectoral deflators of value added, as well as details on labor compensa-
tion and hours worked data, allowing the construction of sectoral wage rates. All quantity variables
are scaled by the working age population (15-64 years old). Source: OECD ALFS Database for the
working age population (data coverage: 1970-2015). Normalizing base year price indices P̄ j to 1,
we describe below the construction for the sectoral data employed in the main text (mnemonics are
given in parentheses):
• Sectoral value added, Y j : sectoral value added at constant prices in sector j = H,N
(VA QI). Sources: EU KLEMS ([2011], [2017]) and OECD STAN ([2011], [2017]) databases.
• Sectoral value added share, νY,j : ratio of value added at constant prices in sector j to
GDP at constant prices, i.e., Y j/(Y H + Y N ) for j = H, N .
• Relative price of non-tradables, P : ratio of the non-traded value added deflator to the
traded value added deflator, i.e., P = PN/PH . The sectoral value added deflator P j for
sector j = H, N is calculated by dividing value added at current prices (VA) by value added
at constant prices (VA QI) in sector j. Sources: EU KLEMS ([2011], [2017]) and OECD
STAN ([2011], [2017]) databases.
• Terms of trade, PH/PF : ratio of the traded value added deflator to price deflator of imports
of goods and services, i.e., PH/PF . The traded value added deflator PH is calculated by
dividing value added at current prices (VA) by value added at constant prices (VA QI) in
sector H. Sources: EU KLEMS ([2011], [2017]) and OECD STAN ([2011], [2017]) for PH and
OECD National Accounts Database for PF .
• Sectoral hours worked, Lj : total hours worked by persons engaged in sector j (H EMP).
Sources: EU KLEMS ([2011], [2017]) and OECD STAN ([2011], [2017]) databases.
• Sectoral labor share, νL,j : ratio of hours worked in sector j to total hours worked, i.e.,
Lj/(LH + LN ) for j = H, N .
• Sectoral nominal wage, W j : ratio of the labor compensation (compensation of employees
plus compensation of self-employed) in sector j = H,N (LAB) to total hours worked by
persons engaged (H EMP) in that sector. Sources: EU KLEMS ([2011], [2017]) and OECD
STAN ([2011], [2017]) databases.
• Relative wage, W j/W : ratio of the nominal wage in the sector j to the aggregate nominal
wage W .
• Labor income share (LIS), sjL: ratio of labor compensation (compensation of employees
plus compensation of self-employed) in sector j = H,N (LAB) to value added at current
prices (VA) of that sector. Sources: EU KLEMS ([2011], [2017]) and OECD STAN ([2011],
[2017]) databases.
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We detail below the data construction for aggregate variables (mnemonics are in parentheses).
For all variables, the reference period is running from 1970 to 2015:
• Government spending, G: government final consumption expenditure (CGV). Source:
OECD Economic Outlook Database [2017].
• Gross domestic product, YR: real gross domestic product. By construction, real GDP
is the sum of traded and non-traded value added at constant prices. Sources: EU KLEMS
([2011], [2017]) and OECD STAN ([2011], [2017]) databases.
• Total hours worked, L: total hours worked by persons engaged (H EMP). By construction,
total hours worked is the sum of traded and non-traded hours worked. Sources: EU KLEMS
([2011], [2017]) and OECD STAN ([2011], [2017]) databases.
• Real consumption wage, WC = W/PC : nominal aggregate wage divided by the consumer
price index (CPI). Source: OECD Prices and Purchasing Power Parities Database [2017] for
the consumer price index. The nominal aggregate wage is calculated by dividing labor com-
pensation (LAB) by total hours worked by persons engaged (H EMP). Sources: EU KLEMS
([2011], [2017]) and OECD STAN ([2011], [2017]) databases.
• Aggregate total factor productivity, TFP : Aggregate TFP is constructed as a Solow
residual from constant-price domestic currency series of GDP, capital, LIS sL, and total hours
worked. In Appendix D, we detail the procedure to construct time series for the aggregate
capital stock. The aggregate LIS, sL, is the ratio of labor compensation (compensation of
employees plus compensation of self-employed) (LAB) to GDP at current prices (VA) in sector
averaged over the period 1970-2015 (except Japan: 1974-2015). Sources: EU KLEMS ([2011],
[2017]) and OECD STAN ([2011], [2017]) databases.
D Construction of Capital Utilization Adjusted TFP Time
Series: Imbs [1999] Construction
We construct time-varying capital utilization series using the procedure discussed in Imbs [1999] to
construct our own series of utilization-adjusted TFP. We assume perfectly competitive factor and
product markets. Both the traded and non-traded sectors use physical capital, Kj , and labor, Lj ,























We denote the capital utilization rate by uK,jt . Because more intensive capital use depreciates the






where δK is the capital depreciation rate and φK is the parameter which must be determined. At
the steady-state, we have uK,j = 1 and thus capital depreciation collapses to δK which is assumed
to be symmetric across sectors. Firms also choose Aj and Bj along the technology frontier that we








Note that both Aj and Bj in (86) include technology utilization. Thus in contrast to the model’s
notations, Y j stands for value added at constant prices and thus is inclusive of technology utilization.
While in the main text, we assume that the technology frontier (35) is CES and above we assume








B̂jt , see eq. (37).
Denoting the capital rental cost by Rt = PJ,t (δK,t + r?) , and the labor cost by W
j
t , firms choose





t −W jt Ljt −RtKjt . (89)




















































σj = W jt . (90c)
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By using the definition of the capital income share above and inserting the expression for the
capital rental cost, first-order conditions can be rewritten as follows:
(
1− sjL




= (δK,t + r?) , (92a)
(
1− sjL










= W jt . (92c)
Evaluating (92a) and (92b) at the steady-state and rearranging terms leads to:
(r? + δK) = δKφK , (93)
which allows us to pin down φK . We let the capital depreciation rate δK and the real interest rate
r? (long-run interest rate minus CPI inflation rate) vary across countries to compute φK .
In the line of Garofalo and Yamarik [2002], we use the value added share at current prices to











is the value added
share of sector j = H, N at current prices. The methodology by Garofalo and Yamarik [2002] is
based on the assumption of perfect mobility of capital across sectors and a small discrepancy in the
LIS across sectors, i.e., sHL ' sNL . Inserting (94) into (92a)-(92b), first order conditions on Kj and










= δK,tφK . (95b)















where φK = r
?+δK
δK
(see eq. (93)). Dropping the time index to denote the steady-state value, the

























































Log-linearizing the production function (86) shows that the Solow residual can alternatively be




















Construction of time series for sectoral capital stock, Kjt . To construct the series for
the sectoral capital stock, we proceed as follows. We first construct time series for the aggregate
capital stock for each country in our sample. To construct Kt, we adopt the perpetual inventory
approach. The inputs necessary to construct the capital stock series are a i) capital stock at the
beginning of the investment series, K1970, ii) a value for the constant depreciation rate, δK , iii) real
gross capital formation series, It. Real gross capital formation is obtained from OECD National
Accounts Database [2017] (data in millions of national currency, constant prices). We construct the
series for the capital stock using the law of motion for capital in the model:
Kt+1 = It + (1− δK)Kt. (103)
for t = 1971, ..., 2015. The value of δK is chosen to be consistent with the ratio of capital depreciation











where PJ,t is the deflator of gross capital formation series, Yt is GDP at current prices, and CFC/Y
is the ratio of consumption of fixed capital at current prices to nominal GDP averaged over 1970-
2015. Deflator of gross capital formation, GDP at current prices and consumption of fixed capital are
taken from the OECD National Account Database [2017]. The second column of Table 6 shows the
value of the capital depreciation rate obtained by using the formula (104). The capital depreciates
rate averages to 5%.






where I1970 corresponds to the real gross capital formation in the base year 1970, gI is the average
growth rate from 1970 to 2015 of the real gross capital formation series. The system of equations
(103), (104) and (105) allows us to use data on investment to solve for the sequence of capital stocks
and for the depreciation rate, δK . There are 47 unknowns: K1970, δK , K1971, ..., and K2015, in
47 equations: 45 equations (103), where t = 1971, ..., 2015, (104), and (105). Solving this system
of equations, we obtain the sequence of capital stocks and a calibrated value for depreciation, δK .
Following Garofalo and Yamarik [2002], the gross capital stock is then allocated to traded and
non-traded industries by using the sectoral value added share, see eq. (94).
Construction of time series for sectoral TFPs. Sectoral TFPs, TFPjt , at time t are
constructed as Solow residuals from constant-price (domestic currency) series of value added, Y jt ,
capital stock, Kjt , and hours worked, L
j
t , by using eq. (100). The LIS in sector j, s
j
L, is the ratio
labor compensation (compensation of employees plus compensation of self-employed) to nominal
value added in sector j = H, N , averaged over the period 1970-2015 (except Japan: 1974-2015).
Data for the series of constant price value added (VA QI), current price value added (VA), hours
worked (H EMP) and labor compensation (LAB) are taken from the EU KLEMS ([2011], [2017])
and OECD STAN ([2011], [2017]) databases.
Construction of time series for real interest rate, r?. The real interest rate is computed
as the real long-term interest rate which is the nominal interest rate on 10 years government bonds
minus the rate of inflation which is the rate of change of the Consumption Price Index (CPI).
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook Database [2017] for the long-term interest rate on government
bonds and OECD Prices and Purchasing Power Parities Database [2017] for the CPI. Data coverage:
1970-2015 except for IRL (1990-2015) and KOR (1983-2015). The first column of Table 6 shows the
value of the real interest rate which averages 3% over the period 1970-2015.
Construction of time series for capital utilization, uK,jt . To construct time series for the
capital utilization rate, uK,jt , we proceed as follows. We use time series for the real interest rate,
r? and for the capital depreciation rate, δK to compute φ = r
?+δK
δK
(see eq. (93)). Once we have
calculated φ for each country, we use time series for the LIS in sector j, sjL,t, GDP at current prices,
PtYR,t = Yt, the deflator for investment, PJ,t, and times series for the aggregate capital stock, Kt
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Figure 8: Theoretical vs. Empirical Responses Following Unanticipated Government Spend-
ing Shock: Capital Utilization Rate. Notes: Solid blue line displays point estimate of VAR with shaded
areas indicating 90% confidence bounds; the thick solid black line with squares displays model predictions in the base-
line scenario with capital and technology utilization together with FBTC while the dashed red line shows predictions
of a model with Cobb-Douglas production functions and abstracting from capital and technology utilization.
to compute time series for uK,jt by using the formula (96). Fig. 8 plots empirical responses of the
capital utilization rate for the traded and the non-traded sector shown in blue lines. Black lines with
squares plots theoretical responses for uK,Ht and u
K,N
t . The confidence bounds indicate that none
of the responses are statistically significant. The reason is that there exists a wide cross-country
dispersion in the movement of the capital utilization rates across countries in terms of both direction
and magnitude. As shown in Fig. 8(a), our model reproduces well the adynamic adjustment of the
capital utilization rate for tradables while Fig. 8(b) indicates that the model tends to somewhat
overstate the response of uK,N , especially in the short-term.
Construction of time series for utilization-adjusted TFP, Zjt . According to (101), capital









ln Zjt − ln Z̄jt =
(






ln uK,jt − ln ūK,jt
)
. (106)
The percentage deviation of variable Xt from initial steady-state is denoted by X̂t = ln Xt − ln X̄t
where we let the steady-state varies over time; the time-varying trend ln X̄t is obtained by applying
a HP filter with a smoothing parameter of 100 to logged time series. To compute ˆTFP
j
t , we take the
log of TFPjt and subtract the trend component extracted from a HP filter applied to logged TFP
j
t ,
i.e., ln TFPjt − ln ¯TFPjt . The same logic applies to uK,jt . Once we have computed the percentage
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deviation lnZjt − ln Z̄jt , we reconstruct time series for ln Zjt :
ln Zjt =
(
ln Zjt − ln Z̄jt
)
+ ln Z̄jt . (107)
The construction of time series of logged sectoral TFP, ln TFPjt , capital utilization-adjusted sectoral
TFP, ln Zjt , is consistent with the movement of capital utilization along the business cycle.
E Construction of Non-Traded Demand Components
In this section, we detail the construction of time series for non-traded government consumption,
GNt , non-traded consumption, CNt , and non-traded investment, JNt .We use the World Input-Output
Databases ([2013], [2016]). The 2013 release provides data for eleven 1-digit ISIC-rev.3 industries
over the period 1995-2011 while the 2016 release provides data for thirteen 1-digit-rev.4 industries
over the period 2000-2014. As sectoral data are classified using identical ISIC revisions in both
the EU KLEMS and WIOD datasets, we map the WIOD ISIC-rev.4 classification (the 2016 release)
into the WIOD ISIC-rev.3 classification (the 2013 release) in accordance with the concordance Table
5. Consistent with the methodology we used to extend series taken from the EU KLEMS ([2011],
[2017]), time series for traded and non-traded variables from the WIOD [2013] dataset (available
over the period 1995-2011) are extended forward up to 2014 using annual growth rate estimated
from WIOD [2016] series (available over the period 2000-2014). Coverage: 1995-2014 except for
NOR (2000-2014).
To compute non-traded demand components, we have to overcome two difficulties. While the
input-output WIOD dataset gives purchases of non-traded goods and services from the private
sector, data also includes purchases of imported goods and services. Whereas consumption and
investment expenditure can be split into traded and non-traded expenditure, this split does not
exist for government spending for most of the countries in our sample. We detail below how we
overcome the two aforementioned difficulties.
To begin with, the non traded and the home-produced traded goods markets must clear such
that:
Y N = CN + JN + GN + XN −MN , (108a)
Y H = CH + JH + GH + XH −MH , (108b)
where Y j is value added at constant prices in sector j = H,N , Cj consumption in good j, Jj
investment in good j, Gj government consumption in good j and Xj stands for exports. Imports
(by households, firms, and the government) in good j denoted by M j can be broken into three
components:
MN = CN,F + JN,F + GN,F , (109a)
MH = CH,F + JH,F + GH,F , (109b)
where CH,F , JH,F and GH,F are foreign-produced traded good for consumption, investment and
government spending respectively, and CN,F , JN,F and GN,F denote consumption, investment and
government spending domestic demand for non-traded goods produced by the rest of the world
respectively. Next, each demand component Cj , Jj , Gj of sector j = H, N can be split into a
domestic demand for home-produced good (denoted by Cj,D, Jj,D, Gj,D) and a domestic demand
for foreign-produced good (denoted by Cj,F , Jj,F , Gj,F ) by the rest of the world. This decomposition
yields the following identities:
CN = CN,D + CN,F , (110a)
JN = JN,D + JN,F , (110b)
GN = GN,D + GN,F , (110c)
CH = CH,D + CH,F , (110d)
JH = JH,D + JH,F , (110e)
GH = GH,D + GH,F . (110f)
We denote total imports by M which consist of imports of consumption goods by households and
the government and imports of capital goods by firms:
M = MN + MH . (111)
Total exports to the rest of the world include exports of non-traded and traded goods:
X = XN + XH . (112)
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Obviously, we are aware that non-traded goods are not subject to international trade but we use
this terminology to avoid confusion between the model’s annotations and the data.
Combining (108a) and (108b) and using (111)-(112) leads to the standard accounting identity
between the sum of sectoral value added and final expenditure:
PHY H + PNY N = PCC + PJJ + G + PXX − PMM,
Y = PCC + PJJ + G + NX, (113)
where we normalize PG to one in (113) to be consistent with the model’s annotations. Dividing (113)
by GDP implies that consumption expenditure, investment expenditure, government spending, and
net exports as a share of GDP must sum to one:
1 = ωC + ωJ + ωG + ωNX . (114)
We focus first on components of government spending. We use the accounting identity (108a)
to compute times series for GN :
PNGN = PNY N − PNCN − PNJN − PNXN + PNMN (115)
We divide both sides by nominal GDP, i.e., PHY H + PNY N = Y . The LHS of eq. (115) divided









= ωGN ωG. (116)












While in the model, we assume that non-traded industries do not trade with the rest of the
world, the definition of a non-traded industry in the data is based on an arbitrary rule. Industries
whose the sum of exports plus imports in percentage of GDP is lower than 20% are treated as non-
tradables; since these industries trade, we have to split GN into GN,D and GN,F so as to calculate
time series for ωGN,D . According to (109a), total imports of non-traded goods and services include
imports by households, firms and the government, i.e., MN = CN,F + JN,F + GN,F . Thus, GN,F =
MN −CN,F −JN,F , from which we get ωGN,F = GN,F /G. By using (110c), GN,D can be computed
as GN,D = GN −GN,F . This allows us to recover the share of non-traded government consumption
which excludes imports: ωGN,D = ωGN − ωGN,F . Next, government spending on foreign-produced
traded goods GH,F can be calculated by using the definition of imports of final traded goods and
services: MF = CH,F + JH,F + GH,F , where CH,F and JH,F are consumption and investment in
home-produced traded goods. Rearranging the last equation give GH,F = MH − CH,F − JH,F . It
follows that ωGH,F = GH,F /G. Once we have time series for GN,D, GN,F , GH,F , we can recover
time series for government spending in home-produced traded goods, GH,D by using the accounting
identity which says that total government spending is equal to the sum of four components: G =
GN,D + GN,F + GH,D + GH,F . Dividing both sides by G gives:
1 = ωGN,D + ωGN,F + ωGH,F + ωGH,D ,
1 = ωGN,D + ωGF + ωGH,D ,
ωGH,D = 1− ωGN,D − ωGF , (118)
where ωGN,F + ωGH,F = ωGF is the import content of government spending
Since data taken from WIOD allows to differentiate between domestic demand for home- and
foreign-produced goods, we are able to construct time series for the home content of consumption




















To compute time series for non-traded consumption, CN,D, and non-traded investment, JN,D, we
make use of imports of final consumption and investment goods, and then we divide by total con-
sumption and investment expenditure, respectively, to obtain their non-tradable content:
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, (120a)










We obtain data on GDP and its demand components (consumption, investment, government
spending, exports and imports) from the World Input-Output Databases ([2013], [2016]) for all years
between 1995 and 2014 and all 1-digit ISIC rev.3 and rev.4 industries. Indexing the sector with a
superscript j = H, N and indexing the origin of demand of goods and services with a superscript
k = D, F where D refers to domestic demand of home-produced goods and services and F refers
to domestic demand of foreign-produced goods and services, we provide below details about data
construction:
• Consumption Cj,k for j = H,N and k = D,F : total consumption expenditure (at current
prices) by households and by non-profit organizations serving households on good j produced
by firms from country k. Data coverage: 1995-2014 except for NOR (2000-2014).
• Investment Ij,k for j = H, N and k = D, F : total gross fixed capital formation plus changes
in inventories and valuables (at current prices) on good j produced by firms from country k.
Data coverage: 1995-2014 except for NOR (2000-2014).
• Government spending Gj,k for j = H,N and k = D,F : total consumption expenditure (at
current prices) by government on good j produced by firms from country k. Data coverage:
1995-2014 except for NOR (2000-2014).
• Exports Xj,k for j = H,N and k = D, F : total exports (at current prices) of final and
intermediate good j produced by firms from country k. Data coverage: 1995-2014 except for
NOR (2000-2014).
• Imports M j,k for j = H,N and k = D, F : total imports (at current prices) of final and
intermediate good j produced by firms from country k. Data coverage: 1995-2014 except for
NOR (2000-2014).
Finally, when we use (115) to obtain the time series for GN , the valuation of output Y N and imports
MN include taxes and subsidies on products and trade and transport margins respectively. These
adjustments are necessary to achieve consistency and to balance resources and uses.
Response of non-traded government consumption to government spending shock.
World Input-Output Databases ([2013], [2016]) allow us to get time series for total government




it for j = H,N . All the obtained
series are available at current prices which allows us to compute the non-tradable content of gov-
ernment consumption. To compute time series for non-traded government consumption at constant
prices, we can take two routes. First, we can use time series for the non-tradable content of govern-
ment spending, ωGN,D,it, obtained from WIOD dataset and then we construct time series for G
N,D
it
at constant prices by multiplying time series for real government final consumption expenditure, Git,
with the time-varying non-tradable content of government consumption, ωGN,D,it. Second, we can
alternatively construct time series for GNit at constant prices by multiplying time series for real gov-
ernment final consumption expenditure, Git, with ωGN,D,i averaged over 1995-2014. This alternative
is guided by the data as the non-tradable content of government spending is somewhat erratic. In
Fig. 9, we plot empirical responses of non-traded government consumption at constant prices to
an exogenous increase in aggregate government consumption by 1% of GDP shown in the blue line
and contrast them with theoretical responses shown in black lines with squares. To compute the
theoretical response, we proceed as follows. Denoting by ωGN the non-traded content of government
spending, by ωGH the home component of the traded content of government spending, we have:
G(t) = ωGN G(t) + ωGH G(t) + ωGF G(t), (121)
where ωGF is the imported content of government spending. Using the dynamic adjustment of
dG(t)/Y described by eq. (30) and assuming that ωGj is fixed over time, the endogenous response




= ωGj e−ξt − (1− g) e−χt. (122)
As can be seen in Fig. 9(a) which plots the response of GN (in real terms) constructed by
using the time-varying non-traded content of government spending, the theoretical response shown
in the black line with squares and derived from (122) accounts reasonably well for the empirical IRF.
Since the empirical response of GN to an exogenous shock to government consumption is erratic,
we alternatively construct time series for GN by assuming that ωGN is constant over time and
corresponds to its average over 1995-2014. As shown in Fig. 9(b), the theoretical response derived
from (122) replicates very well the empirical response the first four years and somewhat overstates
the empirical response afterwards. However, the empirical response is not statistically significant
after six years. In Fig. 9(c), we compare the model’s prediction shown in the solid black line with
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Figure 9: Empirical vs. Theoretical Responses of Non-Traded Government Consumption
following a Shock to Aggregate Government Consumption. Notes: The solid blue line shows the
response of aggregate and sectoral variables to an exogenous increase in government final consumption expenditure
by 1% of GDP. In Fig. 9(a), we use time series for the non-traded content of government spending, ωGN ,it, obtained
from WIOD dataset and then we construct time series for GNit at constant prices by multiplying time series for real
government final consumption expenditure, Git, with ωGN ,it. In Fig. 9(b), we estimate the response of G
N at
constant prices whose time series are obtained by calculating the product of time series for real government final
consumption expenditure, Git, with the non-traded content of government consumption averaged over 1995-2014. In
Fig. 9(c), we compare the model’s prediction shown in the solid black line with squares with the empirical responses
with time-varying and fixed ωGN shown in the solid blue line and the dotted blue line with squares, respectively. In
the dotted magenta line line, we allow the non-traded content of government consumption to vary across time and
smooth its adjustment by applying a HP filter to ωGN ,it with a smoothing parameter of 100. Shaded areas indicate
the 90 percent confidence bounds. The black line with squares shows the theoretical response of GN . Sample: 18
OECD countries, 1970-2014 (except for NOR (2000-2014)), annual data.
squares with the empirical responses with time-varying and fixed ωGN shown in the dotted blue
line with squares and the solid blue line, respectively. In the dotted magenta line line, we allow the
non-traded content of government consumption to vary across time and smooth its adjustment by
applying a HP filter to ωGN ,it with a smoothing parameter of 100.
F Construction of Time Series for FBTC
In this section, we detail the methodology to construct time series for capital-utilization-adjusted-
FBTC in sector j = H,N . We choose the initial steady-state in a model with Cobb-Douglas
production functions as the normalization point. When we calibrate the model with Cobb-Douglas
production functions to the data, the ratios we target are averaged values over 1970-2015.
The starting point is the ratio of the labor to the capital income share in sector j given by eq.



















where uK,jt is constructed by using the formula (96).
Since we normalize CES production functions so that the relative weight of labor and capital is



























where variables with a bar are averaged values of the corresponding variables over 1970-2015.
The methodology adopted to calculate γj amounts to using averaged values as the normalization























Eq. (126) corresponds to eq. (11) in the main text. To construct time series for FTBCjt,adjK ,
we plug estimates for the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, σj , and time series
for the ratio of the labor to the capital income share, Sjt , the capital-labor ratio, k
j
t , and the capital
utilization rate, uK,jt , in sector j = H, N . Next we divide yearly data by averaged values of the
corresponding variable over 1970-2015. In Appendix J.3, we detail the empirical strategy to estimate
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor σj .
G Construction of Unit Cost for Producing and Relative La-
bor Cost
In this section, we detail how we construct time series for the real unit cost for producing. Dividing
(75a) by (75b) leads to a positive relationship between the relative cost of labor and the capital-labor











































Inserting eq. (128a) (eq. (128a) resp.) in the CES production function (73) and solving for Lj (K̃j





















































Total cost is equal to the sum of the labor and capital cost:
Cj = W jLj + RK̃j . (131)
Inserting conditional demand for inputs (129) into total cost (131), we find that Cj is homogenous
of degree one with respect to value added:






















Because we investigate how firms adjust technology when the unit cost for producing is modified,
















where γj is described by eq. (124a). To ensure that 0 < γj < 1, we normalize Āj = B̄j = ȳj = 1
(yj is a volume index and thus this assumption has no impact) so that γj = sjL averaged over
1970-2015. To construct time series for UCj , we insert our estimates of the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor, σj , shown in columns 18 and 19 of Table 7, and we plug time series for
the wage rate in sector j and the capital rental rate. While we assume perfect mobility of capital,
the capital rental rate in the traded sector may temporarily deviate from the capital rental rate in
75
the non-traded sector in the data. The property of constant returns to scale in production implies
that value added is exhausted by the payment of factors, i.e., P jY j = W jLj + RjK̃j . Solving the
latter equality for the capital rental rate leads to Rj = P
jY j−W jLj
uK,jKj
where P jY j is value added at
current prices, W jLj is labor compensation, Kj is the stock of capital at constant prices, and uK,j
the capital utilization rate in sector j (see eq. (96)).
Firms choose the optimal level of value added by equating sectoral prices to the ratio of the unit





Eq. (135) shows that in face of a rise the unit cost for producing UCj , firms can increase prices,
P j , or can achieve some technology improvement (i.e., uZ,j increases), or both. Firms will increase
the technology utilization rate by a larger amount in sectors/countries where the cost of adjusting
technology is lower.
H Technology Frontier and FBTC
Following Caselli and Coleman [2006] and Caselli [2016], the menu of possible choices of produc-
tion functions is represented by a set of possible (Aj , Bj) pairs. These pairs are chosen along the



























where Zj > 0 is the height of the technology frontier, 0 < γjZ < 1 is the weight of labor efficiency in
TFP and σjZ > 0 corresponds to the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital efficiency.






























Firms choose Aj and Bj along the technology frontier so that minimizes the unit cost function
described by (133) subject to (136) which holds as an equality. Differentiating (133) w.r.t. Aj and
Bj (while keeping W j and R fixed) leads to:















































































































σj is capital-utilization-adjusted-FBTC in sector j. According to
eq. (139), when we let σjZ tend toward one so that the technology frontier is Cobb-Douglas, rela-
tive capital efficiency Bj(t)/Aj(t) in sector j is decreasing in the wage-to-capital-rental-rate ratio
W j(t)/R(t). Thereby, in face of a rise in W j/R, firms increase Aj and thus lower Bj/Aj . Intuitively,
it is optimal for firms to bias factor efficiency toward the most expensive factor. However, when Aj
and Bj are gross complements in technology production, the rise in Aj will require more units of
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Bj (which may increase disproportionately) which may result in an increase in Bj/Aj if the gross
complementarity between Aj and Bj is high enough, i.e.,
1− σjZ
σjZ
> 1− σj . (140)
When the inequality (140) holds, then a rise in W j(t)/R(t) may increase FBCTjadjK instead of
decreasing it.















σj , and taking log of both sides
of eq. (139) leads to:


















R 0. Our objective is to estimate the responses of
FBTCjadjK(t) and Ω
j(t) to an increase in government consumption by 1% of GDP and to inves-
tigate whether the response of capital-utilization-adjusted FBTC in sector j moves in opposite




When σjZ = 1, δ
j collapses to minus one so that lnFBTCjadjK(t) and ln Ω
j(t) should move in op-
posite direction. However, our estimates reveal that both co-move which suggest that σjZ takes
values much lower than one because δj turns out to be positive, which thus generates a positive
relationship between ln FBTCjadjK(t) and
(
δj
)−1 lnΩj(t). To explore empirically the relationship
between capital-utilization-adjusted FBTC and the adjusted wage-to-capital-rental-rate ratio, we
have to estimate the elasticity of substitution between labor- and capital-augmenting efficiency σjZ


















B̂j(t) = ĉj(t). Setting this equality to













Eq. (142) corresponds to eq. (36) in the main text. Demand for inputs can be rewritten in














































































. We add error terms on the RHS of eq. (145) and run the regression





the logged ratio of labor to capital income share, ln Sj(t), by allowing for country fixed effects,
time dummies and country-specific linear time trend. Since all variables display unit root process,
we estimate cointegrating relationships by using the fully modified OLS (FMOLS) procedure for
cointegrated panel proposed by Pedroni [2000]. Panel data estimations return a value of ζH = −0.6
for the traded sector and a value of ζN = −0.59 for the non-traded sector. By using panel data
estimations of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in the traded and non-traded







to infer the value
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Traded Capital-Utilization-Adjusted Non-Traded Capital-Utilization-Adjusted
FBTC vs. Adjusted-Wage-to-Capital-Cost FBTC vs. Adjusted-Wage-to-Capital-Cost


















































Figure 10: Utilization-Adjusted FBTC and Adjusted-Wage-to-Capital Cost following a
Government Spending Shock. Notes: Fig. 10 explores the factors leading firms to adjust their technology
following an exogenous increase in government consumption b 1% of GDP. Fig. 10(a) and Fig. 10(b) plot the response
of capital-utilization-adjusted FBTC in sector j to the government spending shock shown in the blue line against the





σj , where the response

















lnΩj(t) is shown in the
black line. Sample: 18 OECD countries, 1970-2015, annual data.
for the elasticity of substitution between labor- and capital-augmenting efficiency which is equal to
σHZ = 0.65 for the traded sector and σ
N
Z = 0.72 for the non-traded sector. The values for σ
j and σjZ
implies that the inequality (140) holds so that δj > 0 for both the traded and the non-traded sector,
i.e., δH = 0.515 and δN = 0.905. Because δj is positive, capital-utilization-adjusted-FBTC in sector
j is positively related to the wage-to-capital-rental-rate ratio. Since government spending shocks
are biased toward non-tradables and thus triggers a reallocation of labor towards the non-traded
sector, the existence of labor mobility costs lead non-traded firms to pay higher wages to encourage
workers to shift (i.e., WN/R rises), while WH/R falls in the traded sector. Whilst it is optimal for
firms to bias factor efficiency toward the most expensive factor, the complementarity between labor-
and capital-augmenting productivity leads to an increase in FBTCNadjK(t) in the non-traded sector
and a fall in FBTCHadjK(t) in the traded sector.
To estimate the dynamic adjustment of capital-utilization-adjusted-FBTC in sector j, we con-
struct time series by using (123) and generate the response of FBTCjadjK(t) by using local pro-
jection where the shock is identified by running a VAR model including government consump-






σj , we divide the wage rate W j(t) by the capital rental rate in sector j calcu-
lated as follows Rj(t) = P
j(t)Y j(t)−W j(t)Lj(t)
uK,j(t)Kj(t)
and we use estimates of σj shown in the last line of
columns 18 and 19 of Table 7. Fig. 10(a) and Fig. 10(b) plot the response of capital-utilization
adjusted FBTC in sector j to the government spending shock shown in the blue line against the
response of the adjusted wage-to-capital-rental-rate ratio in sector j. As displayed by the black
line in Fig. 10(a), the adjusted wage-to-capital-rental-rate ratio scaled by 1
δH
falls following a rise
in government spending. If the technology frontier were of the Cobb-Douglas type, traded firms
would increase capital- relative to labor-augmenting efficiency. However, our estimates reveal that
the technology frontier is of the CES type with an elasticity of substitution between AH and BH
smaller than one. The gross complementarity between AH and BH in technology is high enough to
encourage firms to increase AH relative to BH and generate a fall in FBTCHadjK(t) which reflects
the fact that the traded sector biases technological change toward capital. As displayed by the black
line in Fig. 10(b), the adjusted wage-to-capital-rental-rate ratio scaled by 1
δN
increases following a
rise in government spending. While the higher wages lead non-traded firms to bias technological
change toward the most expensive factor, say labor, the gross complementarity between AN and
BN is high enough to generate an increase in the relative capital efficiency. Therefore, as displayed
by the blue line in Fig. 10(b), technological change is biased toward labor labor as reflected into a
rise in FBTCNadjK(t). In both the traded and the non-traded sector, the correlation between the two
impulse response functions is high as it stands at 0.6 in the traded sector and 0.7 in the non-traded
sector.
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I Isolating the Role of Technology
In order to shed some light on the role of the technology channel for fiscal transmission and guide
our quantitative analysis, we estimate the VAR model in panel format on annual data. We consider




BkZi,t−k + εi,t, (146)
where subscripts i and t denote the country and the year, respectively, Zi,t is the vector of endogenous
variables, A is a matrix that describes the contemporaneous relation among the variables collected in
vector Zi,t, Bk is a matrix of lag specific own- and cross-effects of variables on current observations,
and the vector εi,t contains the structural disturbances which are uncorrelated with each other.
Because the VAR model cannot be estimated in its structural form, we pre-multiply (146) by




A−1BkZi,t−k + ei,t, (147)
where A−1Bk and eit = A−1εit are estimated by using a panel OLS regression with country fixed
effects and country specific linear trends. To identify the VAR model and recover the government
spending shocks, we need assumptions on the matrix A as the reduced form of the VAR model that
we estimate contains fewer parameters than the structural VAR model shown in eq. (146). Like
Blanchard and Perotti [2002], we base the identification scheme on the assumption that discretionary
government spending is subject to certain decision and implementation lags that prevent government
spending from responding to current output developments. This amounts to a recursive identification

































where the VAR model includes three variables, i.e., (logged) government consumption, (logged)
technology variables, and (logged) sectoral variables where all quantities are divided by population.
The term a31 in the structural form (148) of the VAR model captures the direct or standard effect
of government consumption on sectoral variables. The term a21 captures the effect of government
consumption on technology variables and the term a32 captures the effect of technological change
on sectoral variables. The multiplicative term a21 × a32 thus measures the technology channel
of government spending on impact. This decomposition paves the way to isolate the technology
channel in the data in the same way as we would do in a model. Our objective is to determine the
hypothetical response of sectoral variables if technology remained unresponsive to the government
spending shock at all forecast horizons. When we compare the actual response of the sectoral variable
with its hypothetical response, we have a measure of the importance of the technology channel in
the transmission of government spending shocks. To determine the hypothetical response of sectoral
variables if the technology channel were shut down, we follow the same methodology as Bachmann
and Sims [2012]. Intuitively, this method amounts to creating a sequence of technology shocks so
as to zero out the response of technology to a rise in government spending. Given this sequence,
we can compute the modified impulse response function of sectoral variables as if technology were
unresponsive to government spending shocks.
In the main text, we consider three variants of the VAR model:
• In the first variant, we consider a VAR model which includes (logged) government consump-
tion, the (logged) ratio of traded to non-traded TFP, the (logged) value added share of non-
tradables, i.e., [git, tfpHit − tfpNit , ln νY,Nit ]. Estimates are shown in the first column of Fig.
3.
• In the second variant, we consider a VAR model which includes (logged) government con-
sumption, the (logged) ratio of non-traded to traded capital-income-hare-adjusted-FBTC, the















Estimates are shown in the second column of Fig. 3.
• In the third variant, we consider a VAR model which includes (logged) government consump-
tion, the (logged) ratio of non-traded to aggregate LIS, the (logged) adjusted labor share of













] where sL is the aggregate LIS, ε
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Non-Traded LIS Traded LIS
and Non-Traded FBTC and Traded FBTC


































Figure 11: Dynamic Adjustment to Government Spending Shocks: Isolating the Technology
Channel. Notes: Fig. 4 plots the dynamic adjustment of sectoral LISs to a 1% exogenous increase in government
by isolating the pure technology effect. We estimate a VAR model including logged government consumption, logged
utilization adjusted-FBTC in sector j, i.e., ln FBTCjadjK,it, and the (logged) LIS in sector j. The blue line shows the
actual dynamic adjustment when we let technological change responds to the government spending shock while the
red line shows the hypothetical dynamic adjustment of variables if FBTC were unresponsive to the demand shock
at all horizons. While the first row shows the responses of LISs, the second row shows the dynamic adjustment of
utilization-adjusted-FBTC in sector j scaled by the capital income share in this sector. Sample: 18 OECD countries,
1970-2015, annual data.
is the elasticity of labor supply across sectors whose estimated values are taken from column
17 of Table 7, ωY,N is the value added share of non-tradables at current prices. We augment
the labor share of non-tradables with ε and ωY,N , in accordance with eq. (6), in order to
control the effects of international differences in labor mobility costs and in the biasedness of
the demand shock toward non-tradables. Estimates are shown in the third column of Fig. 3.
• In the fourth variant, we estimate a VAR model including government consumption, utilization
adjusted-FBTC in sector j, i.e., ln FBTCjadjK,it, and the LIS in sector j. The results are not
included in the main text for reasons of space. Estimates are shown in Fig. 11.
The first row of Fig. 11 displays the dynamic adjustment of the non-traded and traded LIS
while the second row shows the dynamic adjustment of capital-utilization-adjusted FBTC in the
non-traded and traded sector. The blue line shows actual responses of variables while the red line
shows responses of the variable when FBTC is shut down. As is clear from Fig. 11, the rise in the
non-traded LIS is driven by technological change biased toward labor, as captured by an increase in
lnFBTCNadjK,it. Conversely, the decline in the traded LIS is brought about by technological change
biased toward capital, as reflected into a fall in ln FBTCHadjK,it.
J Data for Calibration
J.1 Non-Tradable Content of GDP and its Demand Components
Table 7 shows the non-tradable content of GDP, consumption, investment, government spending,
labor and labor compensation (columns 1 to 6). In addition, it gives information about the sec-
toral labor income shares (columns 11 and 12). The home content of consumption and investment
expenditure in tradables and the home content of government spending are reported in columns 8
to 10. Column 7 shows the ratio of exports to GDP. Columns 11 and 12 shows the labor income
share in the traded and non-traded sector. Columns 13 to 15 display the aggregate labor income
share, investment-to-GDP ratio and government spending in % of GDP, respectively, for the whole
economy. Our sample covers the 18 OECD countries mentioned in section A. The reference period
for the calibration of labor variables is 1970-2015 while the reference period for demand components
is 1995-2014 due to data availability, as detailed below. When we calibrate the model to a repre-
sentative economy, we use the last line which shows the (unweighted) average of the corresponding
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variable.
Aggregate ratios. Columns 13 to 15 show the aggregrate labor income share, sL, the investment-
to-GDP ratio, ωJ and government spending as a share of GDP, ωG. The aggregate labor income
share is calculated as the ratio of labor compensation (compensation of employees plus compensation
of self-employed) to GDP at current prices. Sources: EU KLEMS ([2011], [2017]) and OECD STAN
([2011], [2017]) databases. Data coverage: 1970-2015 (1974-2015 for JPN). To calculate ωJ , we use
time series for gross capital formation at current prices and GDP at current prices, both obtained
from the OECD National Accounts Database [2017]. Data coverage: 1970-2015 for all countries. To
calculate ωG, we use time series for final consumption expenditure of general government (at cur-
rent prices) and GDP (at current prices). Source: OECD National Accounts Database [2017]. Data
coverage: 1970-2015 for all countries. We consider a steady-state where trade is initially balanced
and we calculate the consumption-to-GDP ratio, ωC by using the accounting identity between GDP
and final expenditure:
ωC = 1− ωJ − ωG. (149)
As displayed by the last line of Table 7, investment expenditure (see column 14) and government
spending (see column 15) as a share of GDP average to 24% and 19%, respectively, while the
aggregate labor income share averages to 66% (see column 13).
Non-traded demand components. Columns 2 to 4 show non-tradable content of consump-
tion (i.e., 1−αC), investment (i.e., 1−αJ), and government spending (i.e., ωGN ), respectively. These
demand components have been calculated by adopting the methodology described in eqs. (120a)-
(120b), and eq. (117). Sources: World Input-Output Databases ([2013], [2016]). Data coverage:
1995-2014 except for NOR (2000-2014). The non-tradable share of consumption, investment and
government spending shown in column 2 to 4 of Table 7 averages to 56%, 69% and 80%, respectively.
In the empirical analysis, we use data from EU KLEMS ([2011], [2017]) and OECD STAN
([2011], [2017]) databases for constructing sectoral value added over the period running from 1970
to 2015. Since the demand components for non-tradables are computed over 1995-2014 by using the
WIOD dataset, to ensure that the value added is equal to the sum of its demand components, we





= ωC (1− αC) + ωJ (1− αJ ) + ωGN ωG, (150)
where 1− αC and 1− αJ are the non-tradable content of consumption and investment expenditure
shown in columns 2 and 3, ωGN is the non-tradable content of government spending shown in column
4, ωC and ωJ are consumption- and investment-to-GDP ratios, and ωG is government spending as
a share of GDP.
Non-tradable content of hours worked and labor compensation. To calculate the non-
tradable share of labor shown in column 5 and labor compensation shown in column 6, we split the
eleven industries into traded and non-traded sectors by adopting the classification proposed by De
Gregorio et al. [1994] and updated by Jensen and Kletzer [2006]. Details about data construction
for sectoral output and sectoral labor are provided above. We calculate the non-tradable share of
labor compensation as the ratio of labor compensation in the non-traded sector (i.e., WNLN ) to
overall labor compensation (i.e., WL). Sources: EU KLEMS ([2011], [2017]) and OECD STAN
([2011], [2017]) databases. Data coverage: 1970-2015 for all countries (except Japan: 1974-2015).
The non-tradable content of labor and labor compensation, shown in columns 5 and 6 of Table 7,
average to 62% and 63% respectively.
Home content of consumption and investment expenditure in tradables. Columns 8
to 9 of Table 7 show the home content of consumption and investment in tradables, denoted by αH
and αHJ in the model. These shares are obtained from time series calculated by using the formulas
(119a)-(119b). Sources: World Input-Output Databases ([2013], [2016]). Data coverage: 1995-2014
except for NOR (2000-2014). Column 10 shows the content of government spending in home-
produced traded goods. Taking data from the WIOD dataset, time series for ωGH are constructed
by using the formula (118). Data coverage: 1995-2014 except for NOR (2000-2014). As shown in
the last line of columns 8 and 9, the home content of consumption and investment expenditure in
traded goods averages to 66% and 43%, respectively, while the share of government spending in
home-produced traded goods averages 19%. Since the non-tradable content of government spending
averages 80% (see column 4), the import content of government spending is 1% only.
Since we set initial conditions so that the economy starts with balanced trade, export as a share
of GDP, ωX , shown in column 7 of Table 7 is endogenously determined by the import content of
consumption, 1− αH , investment expenditure, 1− αHJ , and government spending, ωGF , along with
the consumption-to-GDP ratio, ωC , the investment-to-GDP ratio, ωJ , and government spending as
a share of GDP, ωG. More precisely, dividing the current account equation at the steady-state by
GDP, Y , leads to an expression that allows us to calculate the GDP share of exports of final goods
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+ ωGωGF , (151)
ωGF = 1−ωGN,D −ωGH,D . The last line of column 7 of Table 7 shows that the export to GDP ratio
averages 13%.
Sectoral labor income shares. The labor income share for the traded and non-traded sector,
denoted by sHL and s
N
L , respectively, are calculated as the ratio of labor compensation of sector j to
value added of sector j at current prices. Sources: EU KLEMS ([2011], [2017]) and OECD STAN
([2011], [2017]) databases. Data coverage: 1970-2015 for all countries (except Japan: 1974-2015).
As shown in columns 11 and 12 of Table 7, sHL and s
N
L averages to 63% and 69%, respectively.
Estimated elasticities. Columns from 16 to 20 of Table 7 display estimates of the elasticity of
substitution between tradables and non-tradables in consumption, φ, the elasticity of labor supply
across sectors, ε, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in the traded and the non-
traded sector, i.e., σH and σN , respectively, the elasticity of exports w.r.t. the terms of trade, φX .
In subsections J.2 and J.3, we detail the empirical strategy to estimate these parameters, except for
the price elasticity of exports shown in the last column of Table 7 whose estimates are taken from
Imbs and Mejean [2015].
J.2 Estimates of ε and φ: Empirical Strategy
Table 8 shows our estimates of the elasticity of labor supply across sectors, ε, while Table 9 shows
our estimates of the elasticity of substitution in consumption between traded and non-traded goods,
φ. We present our empirical strategy to estimate these two parameters. The derivation of equations
we explore empirically is detailed in the technical appendix of the working paper by Bertinelli, Cardi
and Restout [2020].
Elasticity of labor supply across sectors. Drawing on Horvath [2000], we derive a testable
equation by combining optimal rules for labor supply and labor demand and estimate ε by running
the regression of the worker inflow in sector j = H, N of country i at time t arising from labor
reallocation across sectors computed as L̂ji,t − L̂i,t on the relative labor’s share percentage changes
in sector j, β̂ji,t:
L̂ji,t − L̂i,t = fi + ft + γiβ̂ji,t + νji,t, (152)
where νji,t is an i.i.d. error term; country fixed effects are captured by country dummies, fi, and
common macroeconomic shocks by year dummies, ft. The LHS term of (152) is calculated as the dif-
ference between changes (in percentage) in hours worked in sector j, L̂ji,t, and in total hours worked,
L̂i,t. The RHS term βj corresponds to the fraction of labor’s share of value added accumulating to
labor in sector j. Denoting by P jt Y
j
t value added at current prices in sector j = H, N at time t,













where sjL is the LIS in sector j = H, N defined as the ratio of the
compensation of employees to value added in the jth sector, averaged over the period 1970-2015.
Because hours worked are aggregated by means of a CES function, percentage change in total hours







t . The parameter we are interested in, say the degree of substitutability of hours
worked across sectors, is given by εi = γi/(1− γi). In the regressions that follow, the parameter γi
is assumed to be different across countries when estimating εi for each economy (γi 6= γi′ for i 6= i′).
To construct L̂j and β̂j we combine raw data on hours worked Lj , nominal value added P jY j and
labor compensation W jLj . All required data are taken from the EU KLEMS ([2011], [2017]) and
OECD STAN ([2011], [2017]) databases. The sample includes the 18 OECD countries mentioned
above over the period 1971-2015 (except for Japan: 1975-2015). Table 8 reports empirical estimates
that are consistent with ε > 0. All values are statistically significant at 10%, except for Norway.
Overall, we find that ε ranges from a low of 0.023 for NOR to a high of 2.439 for USA. Since the
estimated value for ε is not statistically significant for Norway, we run the same regression as in eq.
(152) but use the output instead of value added to construct β̂j . We find a value of 0.13, as reported
in column 17 of Table 7, and this estimated value is statistically significant.
Elasticity of substitution between traded and non-traded goods in consumption. To
estimate the elasticity of substitution in consumption, φ, between traded and non-traded goods,
we derive a testable equation by rearranging the optimal rule for optimal demand for non-traded





Ct, since time series for consumption in non-traded goods are
too short. More specifically, we derive an expression for the non-tradable content of consumption
expenditure by using the market clearing condition for non-tradables and construct time series for
1 − αC,t by using time series for non-traded value added and demand components of GDP while


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8: Estimates of Elasticity of Labor Supply across Sectors (ε)
Country Elasticity of labor supply








































Country fixed effects yes
Time dummies yes
Time trend no
Notes: a, b and c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics
are reported in parentheses.
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evidence documented by Bems [2008] for the share of non-traded goods in investment and building
on our own evidence for the non-tradable content of government spending. After verifying that the
(logged) share of non-tradables and the (logged) ratio of non-traded prices to the consumption price
index are both integrated of order one and cointegrated, we run the regression by adding country
and time fixed effects by using a FMOLS estimator. We consider two variants, one including a
country-specific time trend and one without the time trend. We provide more details below.





Ct by PN/PC leads to the non-tradable
content of consumption expenditure:












Because time series for non-traded consumption display a short time horizon for most of the countries
of our sample while data for sectoral value added and GDP demand components are available for all
of the countries of our sample over the period running from 1970 to 2015, we construct time series













− (1− αJ) ωJ,t − ωGN ωG,t
]
. (154)
Since the time horizon is too short at a disaggregated level (for Ij and Gj) for most of the countries,
we draw on the evidence documented by Bems [2008] which reveals that 1−αJ = P N JN
P JJ
is constant
over time; we further assume that P
N GN
G = ωGN is constant as well in line with our evidence. We
thus recover time series for the share of non-tradables by using time series for the non-traded value
added at current prices, PNt Y Nt , GDP at current prices, Yt, consumption expenditure, gross fixed
capital formation, It, government spending, Gt while keeping the non-tradable content of investment
and government expenditure, 1− αJ , and ωGN , fixed.






by using (154), we take the logarithm
of both sides of (153) and run the regression of the logged share of non-tradables on the logged ratio
of non-traded prices to the consumption price index:






where fi captures the country fixed effects, ft are time dummies, and µit are the i.i.d. error terms.
Because parameter ϕ in (153) may display a trend over time, we add country-specific trends, as
captured by αit. It is worth mentioning that PN is the value added deflator of non-tradables.
Data for non-traded value added at current prices, PNt Y
N
t and GDP at current prices, Yt, are
taken from EU KLEMS ([2011], [2017]) and OECD STAN ([2011], [2017]) databases (data coverage:
1970-2015 for all countries, except Japan: 1974-2015). To construct time series for consumption,
investment and government expenditure as a percentage of nominal GDP, i.e., ωC,t, ωJ,t and ωG,t,
respectively, we use data at current prices obtained from the OECD Economic Outlook [2017]
Database (data coverage: 1970-2015). Sources, construction and data coverage of time series for
the share of non-tradables in investment (1−αJ) and in government spending (ωGN ) are described
in depth in Appendix E (see eq. (117)); PN is the value added deflator of non-tradables. Data are
taken from EU KLEMS ([2011], [2017]) and OECD STAN ([2011], [2017]) databases (data coverage:
1970-2015 for all countries, except for Japan: 1974-2015). Finally, data for the consumer price
index PC,t are obtained from the OECD Prices and Purchasing Power Parities [2017] database
(data coverage: 1970-2015).
Since both sides of (155) display trends, we ran unit root and then cointegration tests. Hav-
ing verified that these two assumptions are empirically supported, we estimate the cointegrating
relationships by using the fully modified OLS (FMOLS) procedure for cointegrated panel proposed
by Pedroni [2000], [2001]. FMOLS estimates of (155) are reported in Table 9. When we include a
country-specific time trend, the vast majority (16 out of 18) of the FMOLS estimated coefficients are
positive; yet, twelve out of seventeen are statistically significant, including AUS, AUT, CAN, DNK,
ESP, FIN, IRL, ITA, JPN, KOR, NOR, USA. We thus also run the same regression as in eq. (155)
by ignoring country-specific time trends. We replace inconsistent (i.e., negative or no statistically
significant) estimates for φ when adding a country-specific time trend with those obtained when we
excluded the country-specific time trend. Except for GBR for which estimates are negative in both
cases, one out of the two regressions leads to consistent estimates for the elasticity of substitution.
For the countries mentioned below, estimates for φ obtained with a time trend are replaced with
those when we drop the time trend: φ = 1.221 (t = 1.68) for BEL, φ = 0.978 (t = 2.10) for FRA,
φ = 0.826 (t = 6.25) for NLD, φ = 0.299 (t = 2.61) for PRT and φ = 0.487 (t = 2.49) for SWE.
For GBR, the estimated value is negative whether there is a time trend in the regression or not and
thus we set φ to zero for the rest of the analysis for this country. Table 9 shows estimates for φ for
each country. All values are statistically significant at 10%. Overall, we find that φ ranges from a
low of 0.299 for PRT to a high of 1.417 for ESP.
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Table 9: Elasticity of Substitution between Tradables and Non-Tradables (φ)
























































Country fixed effects yes
Time dummies yes
Notes: a, b and c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics
are reported in parentheses.
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J.3 Estimates of σj: Empirical strategy
To estimate the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, σj , we draw on Antràs [2004].









where aj and bj denote the constant growth rate of labor- and capital-augmenting technical progress
and Aj0 and B
j
0 are initial levels of technology. Inserting first (156a) and (156b) into the demand
for labor and capital, taking logarithm and rearranging gives:
ln(Y jt /L
j
t ) = α1 +
(
1− σj) ajt + σj ln(W jt /P jt ), (157a)
ln(Y jt /K
j
t ) = α2 +
(
1− σj) bjt + σj ln(Rt/P jt ), (157b)
where α1 =
[




(1− σj) ln Bj0 − σj ln(1− γj)
]
are constants.
Above equations describe firms’ demand for labor and capital respectively.
We estimate the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in sector j = H, N from
first-order conditions (157a)-(157b) in panel format on annual data. Adding an error term and
controlling for country fixed effects, we explore empirically the following equations:
ln(Y jit/L
j






it) + uit, (158a)
ln(Y jit/K
j




it) + vit, (158b)
where i and t index country and time and uit and vit are i.i.d. error terms. Country fixed effects
are represented by dummies α1i and α2i, and country-specific trends are captured by λ1i and λ2i.
Since all variables display unit root process, we estimate cointegrating relationships by using the
fully modified OLS (FMOLS) procedure for cointegrated panel proposed by Pedroni [2000].
Estimation of (158a) and (158b) requires data for each sector j = H,N on sectoral value added
at constant prices Y j , sectoral hours worked Lj , sectoral capital stock Kj , sectoral value added
deflator P j , sectoral wage rate W j and capital rental cost R. Data for sectoral value added Y H
and Y N , hours worked LH and LN , value added price deflators PH and PN , and, nominal wages
WH and WN are taken form the EU KLEMS ([2011], [2017]) and OECD STAN ([2011], [2017])
databases. To construct the national stock of capital K, we use the perpetual inventory method with
a fixed depreciation rate taken from Table 6 and the time series of constant prices investment from the
OECD Economic Outlook [2017] Database. Next, following Garofalo and Yamarik [2002], the capital
stock is allocated to traded and non-traded industries by using sectoral output shares. Finally,
we measure the aggregate rental price of capital R as the ratio of capital income to capital stock.
Capital income is derived as nominal value added minus labor compensation. For all aforementioned
variables, the sample includes the 18 OECD countries over the period 1970-2015 (except for Japan:
1974-2015).
While we take the demand for labor as our baseline model (i.e. eq. (158a)), Table 10 provides
FMOLS estimates of σj for the demand of labor and capital. The bulk (32 out of 36) of the FMOLS
estimated coefficients from eq. (158a) are positive and statistically significant. One estimated
coefficient is negative (σH for IRL) while estimates of σH for Finland and Portugal and σN for
Japan are positive but not statistically significant. To deal with this issue, we run again the same
regression by dropping time dummies which gives consistent estimates for σH for Finland, Portugal
and for σN for Japan. However, the estimate for σH is still negative for Ireland. As in Antràs [2004],
we alternatively run the regression of the ratio of value added to capital stock at constant prices on
the real capital cost R/P j in sector j, i.e., eq. (158b). We then replace inconsistent estimates for
σj obtained from labor demand with those obtained from the demand of capital. Columns 19-20 of
Table 7 report estimates for σH and σN .
K Numerical Decomposition of Government Spending Mul-
tiplier on Non-Tradables
In this section, we calibrate the model to country-specific data and compute numerically
the government spending multiplier on non-traded value added and hours worked, and next
we detail the steps of the decomposition of the changes in the value added and labor share
of non-tradables in order to compute numerically the contribution of technology to their
responses.
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Countries 18 18 18 18 18 18
Observations 824 824 824 824 824 824
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes no yes yes no
Time trend yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: a, b and c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Data coverage: 1970-2015.
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K.1 Government Spending Multiplier on Non-Traded Value Added
A rise in government spending generates a deviation of sectoral value added relative to its
initial steady-state value in percentage by Ŷ j(t). Adding and subtracting the percentage de-





and multiplying both sides by νY,j allows us to decompose the change in sectoral value added
as follows:
νY,j Ŷ j(t) = νY,j ŶR(t) + dνY,j(t), (159)




is the change in the value added share of sector j.
According to the first term on the RHS of eq. (159), each sector receives a share νY,j of
the percentage deviation of real GDP relative to its initial steady-state. Because the value
added share of non-tradables is 64% on average across OECD countries, the non-traded
sector receives a higher fraction of real GDP growth. If the intensity of sector j in the
government spending shock is higher than its value added share, νY,j , then dνY,j(t) > 0
which further increases value added at constant prices. Conversely, if the TFP of sector j
falls relative to the TFP of the other sector, then the TFP differential exerts a negative
impact on dνY,j(t).
We have calibrated the open economy model with CES production functions and FBTC
to country-specific data and we have computed numerically the change in non-traded value
added at constant prices and the change in the value added share of non-tradables following
an exogenous and temporary increase in government consumption by 1% of GDP. When
we calibrate the open economy model to country-specific data, we shut-down the capital
utilization and technology utilization rate as point estimates from estimation of the VAR
model at a country level are not accurate enough to enable us to calibrate the capital
and technology utilization rate and thus to generate the dynamic path of sectoral TFP
we estimate empirically. We thus assume that sectoral TFP is governed by an exogenous
process and we generate a dynamic adjustment of sectoral TFP which matches empirical
responses. More specifically, we assume that labor- and capital-augmenting efficiency is
governed by the law of motion given by eq. (42a) and eq. (42b), respectively. To pin






B, we have to uncover the dynamic























where we abstract from the capital utilization rate. We plug country-specific estimates
of σj and country-specific estimated responses for sjL(t), k
j(t), TFPj(t) into the above
equations to recover the dynamics for Aj(t) and Bj(t). Impact estimates, i.e., setting t = 0
into (160a) and (160b), enable us to pin down the values for aj and bj since Âj(0) = aj







empirical IRFs (160a)-(160b). We also calibrate the endogenous response of government
consumption to an exogenous temporary increase in government consumption b 1% of GDP
by adopting the same procedure as in subsection 4.2 but for one country at a time. We
also calibrate the model to a representative OECD country. We assume that the process
of capital utilization-adjusted sectoral TFP is exogenous and allow for endogenous capital
utilization since our estimates are accurate enough to generate a dynamic adjustment of
sectoral TFP which matches what we estimate empirically.
We have computed numerically the responses of real GDP, non-traded value added,
value added share of non-tradables (at constant prices) to a temporary increase in gov-
ernment consumption by 1% of GDP and then calculate government spending multipliers.
Columns 1-4 of Table 11 show numerical results when we simulate the baseline model with
CES production functions and technological change. While column 5 shows the response
of the TFP differential between tradables and non-tradables to a shock to government con-
sumption, columns 6-7 show the excess of the government spending multiplier on real GDP
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and on non-traded value added in the baseline model over a model with Cobb-Douglas
production functions where technological change is shut down. Column 8 shows the excess
of the change in the value added share of non-tradables in the baseline model over the
restricted model. Column 9 shows the contribution of the excess of dνY,N (t) to the excess
of government spending multiplier on non-tradables νY,N Ŷ N (t).
The objective of our quantitative analysis is threefold:
• First, we compute numerically the government spending multiplier on real GDP and
on non-traded value added at constant prices in a model where production functions
are CES and sectoral TFP together with FBTC are time-varying. More specifically,
we calculate the government spending multiplier as the ratio of the present discounted
value of the cumulative change of value added to the present discounted of the cumu-
lative change of government consumption over a six-year horizon:



















Columns 1-2 of Table 11 show the government spending multiplier on real GDP and
on non-traded value added.
• Second, we compute numerically the change in the value added share of non-tradables:









Column 3 of Table 11 shows the change in the value added share of non-tradables.
Column 4 shows the contribution of dνY,N (t) to the government spending multiplier
on non-tradables νY,N Ŷ N (t). We calculate the contribution of dνY,N (t) to νY,N Ŷ N (t)
as follows:
Contribution of dνY,N (t): =
dνY,N (t)∣∣∣νY,N ŶR(t)
∣∣∣ + |dνY,N (t)|
. (163)
When we calculate the mean of the contribution of the change in the value added
share of non-tradables to the government spending multiplier on non-traded value





where 18 is the number of OECD countries in our sample.
• Third, we compute numerically the government spending multiplier on real GDP, i.e.,
eq. (161a), on non-traded value added, i.e., eq. (161b), and the change in the value
added share of non-tradables, i.e., eq. (162), in the baseline model and in a restricted
version of the baseline model where we consider Cobb-Douglas production functions
and we keep sectoral TFPs fixed. Columns 6-8 of Table 11 show the excess of the
government spending multiplier on real GDP and on non-traded value added in the
baseline model over a model with Cobb-Douglas production functions and shutting
down technological change. Column 8 shows the excess of the change in the value
added share of non-tradables in the baseline model over the restricted model. Column
9 shows the contribution of the excess of dνY,N (t) to the excess of government spending
multiplier on non-tradables νY,N Ŷ N (t).
Column 1 of Table 11 shows the average value of the government spending multiplier
on real GDP over a six-year period. The first eighteen rows show ŶR(t) for the eighteen
countries of our sample while the row ’OECD’ shows the value when we calibrate the model
to a representative OECD economy. The row ’Mean’ shows the average value across the
eighteen countries of our sample. Overall, the government spending multiplier averages
one the first six years. If the demand shock were evenly distributed across sectors and if
sectoral TFPs were fixed, then the non-traded sector should receive a fraction of the rise
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in real GDP equivalent to its share in real GDP equal to 64%. As shown in column 2 of
Table 11, the government spending multiplier on non-traded value added is equal to 0.6%
of GDP instead of 0.65% since as can be seen in column 3, the value added share of non-
tradables falls by 0.05% of GDP as a result of a TFP differential between tradables and
non-tradables of 0.12%, as displayed by column 5. However, the change in the value added
share of non-tradables is very small, if not insignificant following an increase in government
consumption by 1% if GDP. The rationale behind this result is that rise in traded TFP
relative to non-traded offsets the effect of the biasedness of the government spending shock
toward non-tradables.
Column 6 of Table 11 shows the excess of the government spending multiplier on real
GDP caused by technological change, i.e., we calculate the difference between the gov-
ernment spending multiplier in the baseline model with CES production functions and
technological change and the government spending multiplier in the restricted model with
no technological change. On average, technological change increases the government spend-
ing multiplier by 0.64% of GDP which in turn raises the size of the government spending
multiplier on non-traded value added. However, as can be seen in column 7, the non-traded
sector receives a fraction of the rise in real GDP which is smaller than its value added
share since government spending multiplier increases by 0.18% of GDP only. The reason to
this is that traded TFP increases relative to non-traded TFP which lowers the value added
share of non-tradable compared with a model keeping sectoral TFP fixed. As can be seen
in column 8, the value added share of non-tradables falls by 0.22% of GDP. On average,
the excess of the change (driven by technological change) in the value added share of non-
tradables contributes 41% to the excess (driven by technological change) of the government
spending multiplier on non-traded value added over a model shutting down technological
change.
The change in the value added share of non-tradables (at constant prices) in percentage





ˆ̃Y N (t)− ˆ̃YR(t)
)
. (164)
Plugging the log-linearized sectoral decomposition of real GDP, i.e., ˆ̃YR(t) = νY,H
ˆ̃Y H(t) +
νY,N ˆ̃Y N (t), given by eq. (59), into (164) allows us to rewrite the change in the value






ˆ̃Y N (t)− ˆ̃Y H(t)
)
. (165)







k̂j(t), given by eq. (69a), into (165) leads to the decomposition of the
change in the value added share of non-tradables into three components:





























Eq. (166) corresponds to eq. (55) in the main text. The first term on the RHS
of eq. (166) measures the change in νY,N (t) driven by the the TFP differential between
tradables and non-tradables. The second and third term on the RHS of eq. (166) captures
the contribution of labor and capital reallocation to the change in the value added share of
non-tradables.
K.2 Government Spending Multiplier on Non-Traded Hours Worked
A rise in government spending generates a deviation of sectoral hours worked relative to






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































, and multiplying both sides by
the labor compensation share of sector j, i.e., αjL, allows us to decompose the change in
sectoral hours worked as follows:
αjLL̂
j(t) = αjLL̂(t) + dν
L,j(t), (167)




is the change in the labor share of sector j. According
to (167), each sector receives a fraction αjL of the rise in total hours worked as captured
by the first term on the RHS of eq. (167). If the demand shock is biased toward non-
tradables and/or technological change is more biased toward labor in the non-traded than
in the traded sector, then labor shifts toward the non-traded sector, i.e., dνL,N (t) > 0, as
captured by the second term on the RHS of eq. (167), which further increases the response
of non-traded hours worked, i.e., αNL L̂
N (t).
We have computed numerically the responses of total hours worked, non-traded hours
worked, the labor share of non-tradables to a temporary increase in government consump-
tion by 1% of GDP and then we have calculated the government spending multiplier on
hours worked. Columns 1-4 of Table 12 show numerical results when we simulate the
baseline model with CES production functions and technological change. While column 5
shows the response of the FBTC differential between non-tradables and tradables (where
sectoral FBTC is scaled by the capital income share) to a shock to government consump-
tion, columns 6-7 show the excess of the government spending multiplier on total hours
worked and on non-traded hours worked in the baseline model over a model with Cobb-
Douglas production functions with time-varying sectoral TFP where technological change
is Hicks-neutral instead of being factor-biased. Column 8 shows the excess of the change in
the labor share of non-tradables in the baseline model over the restricted model. Column
9 shows the contribution of the excess of dνL,N (t) to the excess of government spending
multiplier on non-traded hours worked αNL L̂
N (t).
The objective of our quantitative analysis is threefold:
• First, we compute numerically the government spending multiplier on total hours
worked and on non-traded hours worked in a model where production functions are
CES and sectoral TFP together with FBTC are time-varying. More specifically, we
calculate the government spending multiplier as the ratio of the present discounted
value of the cumulative change of hours worked to the present discounted of the
cumulative change of government consumption over a six-year horizon:



















Columns 1-2 of Table 12 show the government spending multiplier on total and non-
traded hours worked.
• Second, we compute numerically the change in the labor share of non-tradables:









Column 3 of Table 12 shows the change in the labor share of non-tradables. Column
4 shows the contribution of dνL,N (t) to the government spending multiplier on non-
traded hours worked αNL L̂
N (t). We calculate the contribution of dνL,N (t) to αNL L̂
N (t)
as follows:
Contribution of dνL,N (t): =
dνL,N (t)∣∣∣αNL L̂(t)
∣∣∣ + |dνL,N (t)|
. (170)
When we calculate the mean of the contribution of the change in the labor share of
non-tradables to the government spending multiplier on non-traded hours worked, we
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|αNL L̂(t)|+|dνL,N (t)| where 18 is
the number of OECD countries in our sample.
• Third, we compute numerically the government spending on total hours worked, i.e.,
eq. (168a), non-traded hours worked, i.e., eq. (168b), and the change in the labor
share of non-tradables, i.e., eq. (169), in the baseline model and in a restricted
version of the baseline model where we consider Cobb-Douglas production functions
where we allow for time-varying sector TFPs with Hicks-neutral technological change
(no FBTC). Columns 6-8 of Table 12 show the excess of the government spending
multiplier on total hours worked and on non-traded hours worked in the baseline
model over a model with Cobb-Douglas production functions with no FBTC. Column
8 shows the excess of the change in the labor share of non-tradables in the baseline
model over the restricted model. Column 9 shows the contribution of the excess of
dνL,N (t) to the excess of government spending multiplier on non-tradables αNL L̂
N (t).
Column 1 of Table 12 shows the average value of the government spending multiplier
on total hours worked over a six-year period. The first eighteen rows show L̂(t) for the
eighteen countries of our sample while the row ’OECD’ shows the value when we calibrate
the model to a representative OECD economy. The row ’Mean’ shows the average value
across the eighteen countries of our sample. Overall, the government spending multiplier
on total hours worked averages 0.68 the first six years, i.e., an increase in government
consumption by 1% of GDP raises total hours worked by 0.68% per year on average. If the
demand shock were evenly distributed across sectors and if FBTC were unresponsive to the
government spending shock, then the non-traded sector should receive a fraction of the rise
in total hours worked equivalent to its share in labor compensation equal to 66%. A back
of the envelope calculation gives a rise in non-traded hours worked by 0.45% of total hours
worked. As shown in column 2 of Table 12, the government spending multiplier on non-
traded hours worked is equal to 0.55% of total hours worked instead of 0.43% since as can be
seen in column 3, the labor share of non-tradables increases by 0.10% of GDP as a result of a
FBTC differential between non-tradables and tradables of 0.08%, as displayed by column 5.
Intuitively, because technological change is biased toward labor in the non-traded sector and
biased toward capital in the traded sector, the shock to government consumption increases
labor demand in the non-traded sector which strengthens the impact of the biasedness of
the demand shock toward non-tradables on the labor share of non-tradables.
Column 6 of Table 12 shows the excess of the government spending multiplier on total
hours worked caused by FBTC, i.e., we calculate the difference between the government
spending multiplier in the baseline model with CES production functions and technological
change and the government spending multiplier in the restricted model with Cobb-Douglas
production functions and Hicks-neutral technological change. If we consider the cross-
country average, FBTC only slightly further increases total hours worked (i.e., by 0.02%)
while it somewhat amplifies the rise in in non-traded hours worked, i.e., by 0.05% of to-
tal hours worked (see columns 7 and 8). When we differentiate between countries with a
negative and a positive FBTC differential between non-tradables and tradables, the con-
clusion is different. For countries where technological change is more biased toward labor
in the non-traded than in the traded sector (i.e., as shown in the last row), the rise in total
hours worked is amplified by 0.24% (see column 6) compared with a model shutting down
FBTC. The government spending multiplier on non-traded hours worked is increased by
0.36% of total hours worked (see column 7) because the non-traded sector receives a fraction
αNL of L̂(t) and also experiences a labor inflow caused by the rise in labor demand in the
non-traded sector triggered by FBTC. More specifically, in countries where the FBTC dif-
ferential between non-tradables and tradables is positive, the labor share of non-tradables
rises by 0.19% (see column 8). For these economies, the rise in νL,N (t) accounts for 32%
(see column 9) of the amplification effect caused by FBTC on the government spending
multiplier on non-traded hours worked.
We detail below the steps of derivation of the decomposition of the change in the labor






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































supply decision to the non-traded sector by the labor supply decision to the traded sector













According to the definition of the LIS in sector j, labor compensation is a fraction sjL,t
of the value added at current prices of sector j = H, N , i.e., W̃ j(t)Lj(t) = sjL,tP
j(t)Ỹ j(t)
where a tilde indicates that the variable includes the technology utilization rate uZ,j(t).
Dividing traded by non-traded labor compensation, inserting (171) to eliminate the ratio




















Denoting the share of non-traded value added at current prices in GDP at current prices
by ω̃Y,N (t) = P
N Ỹ N (t)
Ỹ (t)
where Ỹ (t) is GDP at current prices and log-linearizing (172) in the
neighborhood of the steady-state leads to:
L̂N (t)− L̂H(t) = ε
1 + ε
(






1− ωY,N , (173)
where we omit the tilde when the variable is evaluated at the steady-state since the tech-
nology utilization rate collapses to one.
Plugging the log-linearized version of the sectoral decomposition of the response of total
hours worked (71), i.e., L̂(t) = αLL̂H(t) + (1− αL) L̂N (t), into the the change in the labor




, allows us to express
the change in the labor share of non-tradables in terms of the growth differential in hours
worked between non-tradables and tradables:





Plugging (173) into (174) allows us to break down the change in the labor share of non-
tradables into two components:









where αL = αHL and 1 − αL = αNL . Eq. (175) states the the change in νL,N (t) can be
driven by the change in the value added share of non-tradables ω̃Y,N (t) and the differential
in the responses of LIS between non-tradables and tradables as captured by the last term
in brackets. The last term impinges on νL,N (t) only if the production function is of the
CES type otherwise the LIS remains fixed.
Since we aim at quantifying the role of technology and the change in LIS can be driven by
the variation in the capital-labor ratio k̃j(t) = uK,j(t)kj(t) including the capital utilization
rate uK,j(t) on the one hand and capital-utilization adjusted FBTC in sector j on the other,
we turn to the decomposition of the change in the sectoral LIS. The starting point is the
















Log-linearizing (176) in the neighborhood of the steady-state and using the fact that ŝjL(t) =(
1− sjL
)


















Table 13: Impact and Cumulative Effects of an Increase in Government Consumption by
1% of GDP in Two Restricted Versions of the Model
LP t = 0 Impact Responses LP t = 0..5 Cumulative Responses
Data CES CD-PML Data CES CD-PML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A.Aggregate Multipliers
Gov. spending, dG(t) 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.51 5.46 5.46
Total hours worked, dL(t) 0.91 0.60 0.17 6.37 3.18 1.04
Real GDP, dYR(t) 1.18 0.40 0.11 7.74 2.04 0.74
B.Sectoral Labor
Traded labor, dLH(t) 0.21 0.06 -0.71 0.73 0.32 -3.77
Non-traded labor, dLN (t) 0.71 0.54 0.88 5.64 2.87 4.81
Labor share of non-tradables, dνL,N (t) 0.13 0.15 0.77 1.68 0.79 4.11
C.Sectoral Value Added
Traded VA, dY H(t) 0.33 -0.05 -0.75 2.86 -0.28 -3.96
Non-traded VA, dY N (t) 0.85 0.45 0.86 4.88 2.32 4.70
Non-traded VA share, dνY,N (t) 0.16 0.19 0.79 -0.01 1.03 -4.22
D.Technology
Traded technology utilization, duZ,H(t) 0.21 0.00 0.00 6.04 0.00 0.00
Non-Traded technology utilization, duZ,N (t) 0.37 0.00 0.00 2.15 0.00 0.00
Traded TFP, dTFPH(t) 0.66 0.00 0.00 7.82 0.00 0.00
Non-Traded TFP, dTFPN (t) 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.00
E.Redistributive effects
Traded LIS, dsHL (t) 0.14 -0.11 0.00 -2.23 -0.60 0.00
Non-traded LIS, dsNL (t) 0.25 -0.02 0.00 3.07 -0.12 0.00
Eq. (178) corresponds to eq. (53) in the main text. Note that when we calibrate
the model to country-specific data, we shut down the capital utilization rate and thus k̃j(t)
collapses to kj(t) since uK,j(t) = 1.






and plugging (177) into (175) enables us to decompose the change in the labor share of
non-tradables into three effects:
dνL,N (t) = αL (1− αL) ε1 + ε
ˆ̃ωY,N (t)
1− ωY,N























Eq. (178) corresponds to eq. (54) in the main text. According to (178), the change
in the labor share of non-tradables is driven by the variation in the value added share of
non-tradables at current prices as captured by ˆ̃ωY,N (t) (first term on the RHS of eq. (178),
by the shift of capital toward the non-traded sector as captured by the second term on
the RHS, and by the differential in utilization-adjusted FBTC between non-tradables and
tradables as captured by the last term on the RHS of eq. (178).
L More Numerical Results
Since in the text, we cannot show all scenarios for reasons of space, in this section, we show
more numerical results for two restricted versions of the model. Columns 3 and 6 of Table 13
display impact and cumulative effects (over a six-year horizon) for a model imposing Cobb-
Douglas production functions, abstracting form capital and utilization rates, and imposing
perfect mobility of labor and exogenous terms of trade. Columns 2 and 5 show results
for a restricted version of the baseline model where we shut down capital and technology
utilization rates by letting ξj2 and χ
j
2 tend toward infinity and we abstract from FBTC.
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M More Empirical Results and Robustness Checks
In this section, we conduct some robustness checks. Due to data availability, we use annual
data for eleven 1-digit ISIC-rev.3 industries that we classify as tradables or non-tradables.
At this level of disaggregation, the classification is somewhat ambiguous because some
broad sectors are made-up of heterogenous sub-industries, a fraction being tradables and
the remaining industries being non-tradables. Since we consider a sample of 18 OECD
countries and a period running from 1970 to 2015, the classification of some sectors may
vary across time and countries. Industries such as ’Transport and Communication’, ’Finance
Intermediation’ classified as tradables, ’Hotels and Restaurants’ classified as non-tradables
display intermediate levels of tradedness which may vary considerably across countries but
also across time. Subsection M.1 deals with this issue and conducts a robustness check
to investigate the sensitivity of our empirical results to the classification of industries as
tradables or non-tradables.
Another concern is related to the presence of anticipation effects. As argued by Ramey
[2011], Blanchard and Perotti’s [2002] approach to identifying government spending shocks
in VAR models may lead to incorrect timing of the identified fiscal shocks. If the fiscal
shock is anticipated in advance, agents may have modified their decisions before the rise in
government spending actually materializes. Consequently, when the fiscal shock is antici-
pated, and thus VAR approach captures the shocks too late, it misses the initial changes in
variables that occur as soon as the news is learned. Subsection M.2 conducts an investiga-
tion of the potential presence of anticipation effects by using a dataset constructed by Born,
Juessen and Müller [2013] which contains one year-ahead OECD forecasts for government
spending.
In the main text, we compute the labor income share in the lines of Gollin [2002], i.e.,
labor compensation is defined as the sum of compensation of employees plus compensation
of self-employed. Since there exists alternative ways in constructing labor compensation,
we explore empirically in subsection M.3 whether the results we document in the main text
are robust to alternative measures of the labor income share.
Our dataset covers eleven industries which are classified as tradables or non tradables.
The traded sector is made up of five industries and the non-traded sector of six industries.
In subsection M.4, we conduct our empirical analysis at a more disaggregate level. The
objective is twofold. First, we investigate whether all industries classified as tradables or
non-tradables behave homogeneously or heterogeneously. Second, we explore empirically
which industry drives the responses of broad sectors following a rise in government spending
by 1% of GDP.
A close empirical analysis to ours is that performed by Cardi, Restout and Claeys (CRC
henceforth) [2020] who investigate the sectoral and reallocation effects of an exogenous and
temporary increase in government consumption. We compare our empirical findings shown
in Fig. 2 with CRC [2020] estimates. In contrast to CRC [2020], we identify shocks to gov-
ernment consumption once for all by estimating one unique VAR model instead of different
VAR models which can potentially pickup different structural government spending shocks
and we trace the dynamic effects by adopting the local projection method, all variables
responding to the same government spending shock. We consider a sample of 18 OECD
countries over 1970-2015 instead of 16 OECD countries over 1970-2007. In subsection M.5,
we report significant differences between our own findings and estimates documented by
CRC [2020] and show that both the sample and the empirical strategy matters.44
M.1 Sectoral Classification
This section explores the robustness of our findings to the classification of the eleven 1-digit
ISIC-rev.3 industries as tradables or non tradables.
Following De Gregorio et al. [1994], we define the tradability of an industry by con-
44CRC [2020] document evidence pointing at a significant increase in the value added and the labor
share of non-tradables. We find that the value added share of non-tradables is unresponsive and show that
CRC’s [2020] finding stems from using a different sample and adopting a one step VAR approach which lead
technological change and labor income shares to be unresponsive.
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structing its openness to international trade given by the ratio of total trade (imports + ex-
ports) to gross output. Data for trade and output are provided by the World Input-Output
Databases ([2013], [2016]). Table 14 gives the openness ratio (averaged over 1995-2014)
for each industry in all countries of our sample. Unsurprisingly, ”Agriculture, Hunting,
Forestry and Fishing”, ”Mining and Quarrying”, ”Total Manufacturing” and ”Transport,
Storage and Communication” exhibit high openness ratios (0.54 in average if ”Mining and
Quarrying”, due to its relatively low weight in GDP, is not considered). These four sectors
are consequently classified as tradables. At the opposite, ”Electricity, Gas and Water Sup-
ply”, ”Construction”, ”Wholesale and Retail Trade” and ”Community Social and Personal
Services” are considered as non tradables since the openness ratio in this group of indus-
tries is low (0.07 in average). For the three remaining industries ”Hotels and Restaurants”,
”Financial Intermediation”, ”Real Estate, Renting and Business Services” the results are
less clearcut since the average openness ratio amounts to 0.18 which is halfway between
the two aforementioned averages. In the benchmark classification, we adopt the standard
classification of De Gregorio et al. [1994] by treating ”Real Estate, Renting and Business
Services” and ”Hotels and Restaurants” as non traded industry. Given the dramatic in-
crease in financial openness that OECD countries have experienced since the end of the
eighties, we allocate ”Financial Intermediation” to the traded sector. This choice is also
consistent with the classification of Jensen and Kletzer [2006] who categorize ”Finance and
Insurance” as tradable. They use locational Gini coefficients to measure the geographi-
cal concentration of different sectors and classify sectors with a Gini coefficient below 0.1
as non-tradable and all others as tradable (the authors classify activities that are traded
domestically as potentially tradable internationally).
Table 14: Openness Ratios for individual, average over period 1995-2014
Agri. Minig Manuf. Elect. Const. Trade Hotels Trans. Finance Real Est. Comm.
AUS 0.242 0.721 0.643 0.007 0.005 0.025 0.255 0.247 0.054 0.051 0.054
AUT 0.344 2.070 1.152 0.178 0.075 0.135 0.241 0.491 0.302 0.221 0.043
BEL 1.198 13.374 1.414 0.739 0.067 0.186 0.389 0.536 0.265 0.251 0.042
CAN 0.304 0.821 0.966 0.098 0.002 0.030 0.338 0.211 0.169 0.121 0.038
DNK 0.470 0.786 1.329 0.214 0.014 0.092 0.021 0.832 0.138 0.131 0.027
ESP 0.386 4.699 0.680 0.021 0.003 0.044 0.008 0.206 0.130 0.149 0.022
FIN 0.228 2.899 0.796 0.117 0.006 0.094 0.131 0.280 0.153 0.256 0.021
FRA 0.280 3.632 0.815 0.049 0.004 0.048 0.001 0.224 0.068 0.070 0.014
GBR 0.360 0.853 0.958 0.017 0.010 0.024 0.148 0.209 0.233 0.147 0.041
IRL 0.298 1.384 1.127 0.154 0.013 0.652 0.772 0.285 1.014 0.988 0.049
ITA 0.300 4.130 0.603 0.041 0.013 0.087 0.035 0.150 0.095 0.082 0.012
JPN 0.158 3.923 0.293 0.004 0.000 0.067 0.021 0.159 0.034 0.020 0.005
KOR 0.175 18.603 0.507 0.012 0.003 0.213 0.029 0.388 0.071 0.114 0.052
NLD 0.988 1.496 1.259 0.082 0.076 0.106 0.011 0.562 0.245 0.405 0.114
NOR 0.391 0.837 0.995 0.146 0.024 0.097 0.009 0.354 0.146 0.143 0.058
PRT 0.351 2.954 0.880 0.050 0.005 0.067 0.105 0.378 0.125 0.114 0.026
SWE 0.294 2.263 0.969 0.119 0.020 0.163 0.019 0.392 0.274 0.256 0.026
USA 0.207 0.541 0.428 0.012 0.001 0.055 0.003 0.109 0.066 0.052 0.008
OECD 0.388 3.666 0.879 0.114 0.019 0.121 0.141 0.334 0.199 0.198 0.036
H/N H H H N N N N H H N N
Notes: the complete designations for each industry are as follows (EU KLEMS codes are given in parentheses). ”Agri.”:
”Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing” (AtB), ”Minig”: ”Mining and Quarrying” (C), ”Manuf.”: ”Total Manufac-
turing” (D), ”Elect.”: ”Electricity, Gas and Water Supply” (E), ”Const.”: ”Construction” (F), ”Trade”: ”Wholesale and
Retail Trade” (G), ”Hotels”: ”Hotels and Restaurants” (H), ”Trans.”: ”Transport, Storage and Communication” (I),
”Finance”: ”Financial Intermediation” (J), ”Real Est.”: ”Real Estate, Renting and Business Services” (K), ”Comm.”:
”Community Social and Personal Services” (LtQ). The openness ratio is the ratio of total trade (imports + exports) to
gross output (source: World Input-Output Databases ([2013], [2016]).
We conduct below a sensitivity analysis with respect to the three industries (”Real
Estate, Renting and Business Services”, ”Hotels and Restaurants” and ”Financial Interme-
diation”) which display some ambiguity in terms of tradedness to ensure that the benchmark
classification does not drive the results. In order to address this issue, we re-estimate the
dynamic responses to a government spending shock for the main variables of interest using
local projections for different classifications in which one of the three above industries ini-
tially marked as tradable (non tradable resp.) is classified as non tradable (tradable resp.),
all other industries staying in their original sector. In doing so, the classification of only
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one industry is altered, allowing us to see if the results are sensitive to the inclusion of a
particular industry in the traded or the non traded sector.
As an additional robustness check, we also exclude the industry ”Community Social and
Personal Services” from the non-tradable industries’ set. This robustness analysis is based
on the presumption that among the industries provided by the EU KLEMS and STAN
databases, this industry is government-dominated. While this exercise is interesting on its
own as it allows us to explore the size of the impact of a government spending shock on
the business sector, we also purge for the potential and automatic link between non-traded
value added and public spending because government purchases (to the extent that the
government is the primary purchaser of goods from this industry) account for a significant
part of non-traded value added.45 The baseline and the four alternative classifications
considered in this exercise are shown in Table 15. The last line provides the matching
between the color line (when displaying IRFs below) and the classification between tradables
and non tradables.
Table 15: Robustness check: Classification of Industries as Tradables or Non Tradables
KLEMS Classification
code Baseline #1 #2 #3 #4
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing AtB H H H H H
Mining and Quarrying C H H H H H
Total Manufacturing D H H H H H
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply E N N N N N
Construction F N N N N N
Wholesale and Retail Trade G N N N N N
Hotels and Restaurants H N N N H N
Transport, Storage and Communication I H H H H H
Financial Intermediation J H N H H H
Real Estate, Renting and Business Services K N N H N N
Community Social and Personal Services LtQ N N N N neither H or N
Color line in Figure 12 blue red black green yellow
Notes: H stands for the Traded sector and N for the Non traded sector.
Fig. 12 shows the responses of variables of interest to an exogenous increase in govern-
ment consumption by one percent of GDP. The solid blue line shows results for the baseline
classification while the responses for the alternative classifications are shown in the four
colored lines. In each panel, the shaded area corresponds to the 90% confidence bounds for
the baseline.
The first row of Fig. 12 reports the effects of an exogenous increase in government
consumption by 1% of GDP on the main aggregate variables, namely, government spending,
total hours, real GDP and TFP. For government spending and TFP, the responses are
remarkably similar a cross the baseline and alternative classifications. We can notice that
the expansionary effect of an exogenous increase in government consumption on total hours
is mitigated when the public sector is excluded (classification #4 and the yellow line) but
the shape of the dynamic adjustment of the two variables is similar to the benchmark
classification and the alternative IRFs lie within the confidence bounds of the baseline
classification. The second and third row of Fig. 12 contrast the responses of sectoral hours
worked (Lj), sectoral value added (Y j), the value added share of non-tradables (νY,N ), the
labor share of non-tradables (νL,N ), the ratio of non-traded to traded LIS, i.e., sNL /s
H
L , the
ratio of traded to non-traded TFP, i.e., TFPH/TFPN for the baseline classification with
those obtained for alternative classifications of industries as tradables or non-tradables.
Alternative responses are fairly close to those estimated for the baseline classification as
they lie within the confidence interval (for the baseline classification) for all the selected
horizons (8 years). With regard to the responses of utilization-adjusted TFPs shown in the
fourth row, the dynamic adjustment of Zj(t) displays a similar pattern across the baseline
and alternative classifications: utilization-adjusted TFP increases in the traded sector while
it is essentially unchanged in the non-traded sector. The response of utilization-adjusted
FBTC in sector N is similar across all classifications. The dynamic adjustment of the
45This exercise has been conducted by Cardi et al. [2020] and Beetsma and Giuliodori [2008], among
others, in order to deal with the potential endogeneity of government purchases with respect to output.
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Figure 12: Sensitivity of the Effects of a Government Spending Shock to the Classification
of Industries as Tradable or Non-Tradable. Notes: Effects of an exogenous increase in government
consumption by 1% of GDP obtained by means of local projections à la Jordà [2005]. Results for the baseline
specification are displayed by the blue line with shaded area indicating 90 percent confidence bounds. The green line
and the black line show results when ”Hotels and Restaurants” and ”Real Estate, Renting and Business Services”
are treated as tradables, respectively. The red line shows results when ”Financial Intermediation” is classified as
non-tradables. The yellow line displays results when ”Community Social and Personal Services” is not considered.
Sample: 18 OECD countries, 1970-2015, annual data.
utilization-adjusted FBTC in sector H displays some differences across the baseline and
the four alternative classifications: the decline is less pronounced when the industry ”Real
Estate, Renting and Business Services” is treated as tradables (classification #2 and the
black line) and the IRF is more erratic when the public sector is excluded (classification
#4 and the yellow line). However, in both cases, the IRF lies well within the confidence
interval for almost all the selected horizons. In addition, in the last row of Fig. 12, we
investigate whether our conclusion for redistributive effects (i.e., for sectoral labor income
101
shares) is robust to the classification of industries. Across all scenarios, LISs in both sectors
exhibit a similar dynamic adjustment following an increase in government spending. One
can notice that the discrepancy in the estimated effect between the benchmark and the
alternative classifications is not statistically significant. In conclusion, our main findings
hold and remain unsensitive to the classification of one specific industry as tradable or
non-tradable. In this regard, the specific treatment of ”Hotels and Restaurants”, ”Real
Estate, Renting and Business Services”, ”Financial Intermediation” or ”Community Social
and Personal Services” does not drive the results.
M.2 Controlling for Potential Anticipation Effects
We now address concern one potential issue related to the anticipation effects. When
the fiscal shock is anticipated, and the VAR approach captures the shocks too late, it
misses the initial changes in variables that occur as soon as the news is learned. We
conduct below an investigation of the potential presence of anticipation effects, using two
alternative measures of forecasts for government spending. We also re-estimate the effects
of a government spending shock by controlling for anticipation effects. The first measure
is provided by Born, Juessen and Müller [2013] and stems from the OECD forecasts, while
the second is taken from a dataset constructed by Fioramanti et al. [2016] where forecasts
are performed by the European Commission. We use two alternative datasets as the former
contains observations from 1986 to 2014 for all countries, while the latter provides a longer
time horizon but for a restricted set of countries.
Drawing on previous studies, we conduct three robustness exercises to explore the po-
tential implications of anticipations effects:
• First, we replace in the local-projection regressions the SVAR identified government
spending shock εGit with the forecast error FE
G
it computed as the difference between
actual series and forecast series of the government spending growth rate: FEGit =
∆git − forGit , where ∆git is the actual government consumption growth and forGit
is the previous period’s forecast. The idea is simply to purge actual government
spending growth of what professional forecasters project spending growth to be.
• A second way to deal with the potentially anticipated government spending shocks
is to augment the SVAR specification we used to estimate the identified government
spending shock εGit with the forecasts for government spending growth for
G
it . This
allows us to identify the unanticipated shock to government spending in the pres-
ence of fiscal foresight. Drawing on Beetsma and Giuliodori [2008], we estimate two
VAR models: 1) we extend our baseline model with government spending growth
forecast forGit we used earlier and the vector of variables in the VAR now reads
[git, forGit , yR,it, lit, wC,it, TFPit] implying that for
G
it is treated as an endogenous vari-
able and 2) we augment the baseline VAR model with forGit as an exogenous variable,
i.e. εGit is identified in a VARX model in which the vector of endogenous variables is
[git, yR,it, lit, wC,it, TFPit] and forGit is an exogenous variable. The first approach is
attractive because it accounts automatically for any effects that expectations might
have on the others aggregate variables and for the determinants of the expectations
themselves. However, this method increases the number of estimated parameters
within the VAR structure. Given the data limitations on the variable forGit , we com-
plement the first approach 1) with the second exercise to get more parsimonious VAR
models.
• The third robustness test repeats the previous exercise by considering an alternative
measure of forecasts: the forecast for the budget balance-GDP ratio which we denote
by forbbrit . The year-ahead forecasts are taken from the Commission’s Fall forecasts,
see Fioramanti et al. [2016] for details of construction of forbbrit .
In the following, we conduct an investigation of the potential presence of anticipation
effects by performing the three robustness exercises mentioned above. To perform the first
two robustness tests, we use a dataset constructed by Born, Juessen and Müller [2013]
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that contains time series for forecasts for government spending growth from the OECD.46.
The data availability for the variable forGit is: AUS (1997-2014), BEL (1999-2014), CAN
(1986-2014), DNK (1997-2010), ESP (1997-2014), FIN (1997-2014), FRA (1986-2014), GBR
(1986-2014), IRL (1997-2014), ITA (1986-2014), JPN (1986-2014), KOR (1998-2014), NLD
(1997-2014), NOR (1997-2014), PRT (1997-2014), SWE (1997-2014) and USA (1986-2014).
No data are available for Austria. Regarding the general government balance to GDP
ratio forecast (one year ahead) used in the third exercise, time series are available for AUT
(1995-2014), BEL (1971-2014), DNK (1977-2014), ESP (1987-2014), FIN (1995-2014), FRA
(1970-2014), GBR (1974-2014), IRL (1974-2014), ITA (1970-2014), NLD (1970-2014), PRT
(1987-2014) and SWE (1995-2014). Note that, the European Commission provide forecasts
for the budget balance-GDP ratio only for European countries. Accordingly, non-European
countries of our panel (AUS, CAN, JPN, KOR, NOR and USA) are not considered in the
third robustness test.
Figure 13 shows IRFs when the SVAR identified government spending shock εGit is
replaced by the forecast error FEGit in the local-projection regressions. The blue line reports
the results for the baseline case (i.e. the fiscal shock is εGit), while the red line displays
the results when the fiscal shock considered is FEGit . In both cases, the local-projection
regressions are estimated over the period running from 1986 to 2014 to obtain comparable
results. Overall, we find that the response of the vast majority of variables, with the
notable exception of the utilization-adjusted TFP in the non-traded sector, is consistent
with the baseline. We can notice some quantitative differences however. When using the
forecast error FEGit as a fiscal shock, the rise in both total hours worked and non-traded
hours worked is more pronounced. The response of the labor share of non-tradables, νL,N ,
positive and statistically significant, also increases more than in the baseline case. Thus
the larger increase in non-traded hours worked in driven by the greater rise in total hours
worked and also the higher reallocation of labor toward the non-traded sector. Like in the
baseline, the value added share of non-tradables, νY,N , remains unresponsive to the fiscal
shock whether it is measured with εGit or FE
G
it . One may be concerned with the negative
response at impact of the utilization-adjusted TFP in the non-traded sector when we use
the forecast error FEGit as a measure of the fiscal shock (-0.98), however this fall is not
statistically significant. Finally, we may also note that, for utilization-adjusted TFP in
the traded sector and also for traded and non-traded FBTC, the responses lie within the
confidence interval for almost all horizons.
As mentioned above, in the second exercise, the forecasts for government spending
growth forGit are used directly to control for anticipations effects. For that purpose, the
baseline VAR model that allows us to identify structural fiscal shocks is modified by allowing
the latter variable to enter the vector of variables as an endogenous variable (the VAR case
in the sequel) or as an exogenous variable (the VARX case). Fig. 14 shows results for the
baseline (forGit is not considered) together with the VAR and VARX cases to control for
potential fiscal foresight. Overall, it turns out that differences are moderate and anticipation
effects thus play a limited quantitative role in the dynamic adjustment to a government
spending shock. The impulse response functions for the two alternatives are, qualitatively,
similar to those under the baseline shown in the blue line. Quantitatively, despite some
differences, for almost all variables and all horizons considered, the IRFs are within the
confidence interval.
The final exercise we consider amounts to repeating the previous analysis by replacing
the forecast variable forGit with the forecast of the budget balance-GDP ratio for
bbr
it . Fig.
15 plots the estimated impulse response for this robustness test. Overall, the results are
qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those obtained in the baseline and thus do not
deserve further comments.
46We thank Gernot Müller for providing this dataset to us.
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Figure 13: Effects of an Unanticipated Government Spending Shock: Controlling for An-
ticipation Effects with Forecast Errors (FEGit ). Notes: Effects of an exogenous increase in government
consumption by 1% of GDP obtained by means of local projections à la Jordà [2005]. Results for the baseline spec-
ification (i.e. the government spending shock εGit is identified in a SVAR model) are displayed by the blue line with
shaded area indicating 90 percent confidence bounds. The red line shows results when the forecast error FEGit is used
as a measure of the government spending shock in local projections. Sample: 17 OECD countries (AUS, BEL, CAN,
DNK, ESP, FIN, FRA, GBR, IRL, ITA, JPN, KOR, NLD, NOR, PRT, SWE and USA), 1986-2014, annual data (367
observations).
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Figure 14: Effects of an Unanticipated Government Spending Shock: Controlling for Antic-
ipation Effects with the Forecast for Government Spending Growth (forGit ). Notes: Effects of
an exogenous increase in government consumption by 1% of GDP obtained by means of local projections à la Jordà
[2005]. Results for the baseline specification are displayed by the blue line with shaded area indicating 90 percent
confidence bounds. The red line shows results when the identified spending shock εGit is estimated in the baseline
VAR model augmented with the forecast for government spending growth forGit . The black line shows results when
the identified spending shock εGit is estimated in a VARX model that includes the forecast for government spending
growth forGit as an exogenous variable. Sample: 17 OECD countries (AUS, BEL, CAN, DNK, ESP, FIN, FRA, GBR,
IRL, ITA, JPN, KOR, NLD, NOR, PRT, SWE and USA), 1986-2014, annual data (367 observations).
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Figure 15: Effects of an Unanticipated Government Spending Shock: Controlling for An-
ticipation Effects with the Budget Balance-GDP Ratio (forbbrit ). Notes: Effects of an exogenous
increase in government consumption by 1% of GDP obtained by means of local projections à la Jordà [2005]. Results
for the baseline specification are displayed by the blue line with shaded area indicating 90 percent confidence bounds.
The red line shows results when the identified spending shock εGit is estimated in the baseline VAR model augmented
with the forecast for the budget balance-GDP ratio forbbrit . The black line shows results when the identified spending
shock εGit is estimated in a VARX model that includes the forecast for the budget balance-GDP ratio for
bbr
it as an
exogenous variable. Sample: 12 OECD countries (AUT, BEL, DNK, ESP, FIN, FRA, GBR, IRL, ITA, NLD, PRT
and SWE), 1970-2014, annual data (415 observations).
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M.3 Alternative Measures of the Labor Income Share
When exploring empirically the effects of an exogenous increase in government spending on
the labor income share, an issue is the way the share of labor in total income is constructed.
Gollin [2002] pointed out that the treatment of self-employment income affects the measure-
ment of the LIS. In particular, it is unclear how the income of proprietors (self-employed)
should be allocated to labor income or to capital revenue. In the main text, our preferred
measure (called benchmark bench hereafter) is to treat all the income of self-employed as
labor income. Although this choice overstates the measure of the LIS, it has the virtue of
being simple and transparent. Moreover data involved in the construction of this calcula-
tion of the LIS are comparable across industries and directly available for all countries of











empl is the labor compensation of employees, Incself is total income of self-
employed and P jY j is the valued added at current prices in sector j. Note that labor
compensation of employees includes total labor costs: wages, salaries and all other costs
of employing labor which are born by the employer whilst Incself comprises both labor
















As a first alternative measure of the LIS, we use only employees compensation as a







The measure described by eq. (180) omits the income of the self-employed, i.e. this income
being entirely counted as capital income.
As a second alternative measure, we split self-employed income into capital and labor
income based on the assumption that the labor income of the self-employed has the same
mix of labor and capital income as the rest of the economy. In other words, total labor com-
pensation comprises labor compensation of employees, W jemplL
j
empl, and the self-employed
income scaled by the LIS of employees only, i.e. Incjself × sj,1L . With this adjustment, the









The third alternative to compute the LIS relies upon the assumption that self-employed
earn the same hourly compensation as employees. Thus, we use the hourly wage earned by
employees W jempl as a shadow price of labor of self-employed workers. The LIS, denoted by
sj,3L , is constructed as follows:
sj,3L =
W jempl × (Ljempl + Ljself )
P jY j
. (182)
Finally, and following Bridgman [2018], the labor income share is adjusted for capital





P jY j − CFCj (183)
where CFCj is the Consumption of Fixed Capital (current prices) in sector j. In the bench-
mark and the first three alternatives, the ”gross” labor income share treats depreciation
as a return to capital. By contrast, the construction sj,4L is a ”net” income distribution
indicator as it adjusts value added for depreciation.
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In Fig. 16 we display the results of this sensitivity analysis with respect to the con-
struction of the labor income share. We measure the effects to an exogenous increase in
government spending by one percent of GDP on aggregate and sectoral variables of interest
by contrasting the impulse response functions of the variables when the LIS is measured as
either sj,benchL (blue line), or s
j,1
L (red line), or s
j,2
L (black line), or s
j,3
L (green line), or s
j,4
L
(yellow line). In addition, the last row of the figure presents the IRFs of the labor income
share j = H, N . Fig. 16 demonstrates that all the measures of sjL being compared imply
essentially identical IRFs to an increase in government spending. For a large set of variables
(G, L, TFP , YR, LH , LN , Y H , Y N , LN/L, Y N/Y , sNL /s
H
L and TFP
H/TFPN ) the IRFs
for the five specifications are qualitatively and quantitatively similar, if not identical. With
regard to the responses of utilization-adjusted TFP and FBTC, the IRFs obtained from
the use of four alternative measures of sjL display the same dynamic adjustment and are
well within the confidence interval (for the benchmark specification sj,benchL ) for all horizons.
Finally, the responses of the labor income share sjL in both sectors for the four specifications
are also very close to the IRF obtained in the benchmark. Overall, our main findings are
robust and unsensitive to the method adopted to construct the labor income share.
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Figure 16: Sensitivity of the Effects of an Unanticipated Government Spending Shock to
the Construction of the LIS. Notes: Effects of an exogenous increase in government consumption by 1% of
GDP obtained by means of local projections à la Jordà [2005]. Results for the baseline specification (sjL = s
j,bench
L )
are displayed by the blue line with shaded area indicating 90 percent confidence bounds. The red (black, green and














L resp.). Sample: 18 OECD
countries, 1970-2015, annual data.
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M.4 Effects of Exogenous Government Spending Shock on Sub-Sectors
Empirical analysis at a disaggregate sectoral level. Our dataset covers eleven in-
dustries which are classified as tradables or non-tradables. The traded sector is made up
of five industries and the non-traded sector of six industries. To conduct a decomposition
of the sectoral effects at a sub-sector level, we estimate the responses of sub-sectors to the
same identified government spending shock by adopting the two-step approach detailed in
the main text. More specifically, indexing countries with i, time with t, sectors with j, and
sub-sectors with k, we first identify the shock to government consumption by estimating









case letters indicate that the variable is logged (all quantities are divided by the working
age population) and next we estimate the dynamic effects by using the Jordà’s [2005] single-
equation method. The local projection method amounts to running a series of regression







i,h .t + ψ
k,j







where xk,j = Lk,j , Lk,j/L, Y k,j , Y k,j/YR, TFPk,j (variables are logged). To express the
results in meaningful units, i.e., in GDP units or total hours worked units, we multiply the
responses of value added at constant prices and value added share at constant prices of
sub-sector k by its share in GDP (at current prices), i.e., ωY,k = P
k,jY k,j
PYR
where YR is real
GDP, and we multiply the responses of hours worked and labor share of sub-sector k by
its labor compensation share, i.e., αL,k = W
k,jLk,j
WL . We detail below the mapping between
the responses of broad sector’s variables and responses of variables in sub-sector k of one
broad sector j.
The response of lnLk,j to a shock to government consumption is the percentage deviation






k,j is the initial steady-state. We assume that hours worked of the broad sector
is an aggregate of sub-sector hours worked which are imperfect substitutes. Therefore, the







is the share of labor compensation of sub-sector
























L,k = 1. Above equation breaks down the response of hours worked in broad
sector j into the responses of hours worked in sub-sectors k ∈ j weighted by their labor
compensation share αL,k = W
k,jLk,j




we express the response of hours worked in sub-sector k ∈ j in percentage point of total
hours worked.
We turn to the normalization of the response of value added at constant prices in sub-
sector k. The value added at constant prices of sector j is a weighted average of value
added of sub-sector k ∈ j, i.e., P jY jt =
∑
k∈j P
k,jY k,jt where prices are those at the base
year. Log-linearizing P jY jt =
∑
k∈j P





















ωY,j Ŷ jt =
∑
k∈j
ωY,kŶ k,jt , (186)
where ωY,k = P
k,jY k,j
PYR
averaged over 1970-2015 is the value added share at current prices
of sub-sector k ∈ j which collapses (at the initial steady-state) to the value added share






Y,k = 1. In multiplying the response of value added at constant prices in
sub-sector k ∈ j by its value added share ωY,k,j , we express the response of value added at
constant prices in sub-sector k ∈ j in percentage point of GDP.
The response of TFP in the broad sector j is a weighted average of responses TFPk,jt of






























Empirical results. The first and third columns of Fig. 17 show results for sub-sectors
classified in the traded sector. Overall, all traded industries behave as the broad traded
sector. More specifically, as shown in Fig. 17(a), hours worked increase slightly in the short-
run in traded sub-sectors. As can be seen in Fig. 17(c), the labor share falls in all traded
industries, except in Mining, while Manufacturing contributes the most to the decline in
the traded goods-sector share of total hours worked. As shown in Fig. 17(e), value added
at constant prices increase in all traded industries in the short-run. Fig. 17(g) shows that
Manufacturing experiences the greatest decline in its value added share which somewhat
balance out with the increase experienced by industries such as Finance, Mining, Transport
and Communication. Importantly, Fig. 17(i) shows that all traded industries experience
an increase in their TFP. This result lends some credence to our our classification of traded
industries and also reveals that the rise in TFP in the traded sector is driven by a rise in
TFP within each sub-sector.
The second and fourth columns show results for sub-sectors classified in the non-traded
sector. As shown in Fig. 17(b), except for ’Hotels and Restaurants’, ’Electricity, Gas,
Water Supply’, all non-traded sub-sectors experience a significant rise in hours worked.
As can be seen in Fig. 17(d), the significant rise in the labor share of non-tradables is
driven by the ’Community Social and Personal Services’ (i.e., the public sector which also
includes health and education services) and next by ’Construction’ together with ’Real
Estate, Renting and Business Services’. Fig. 17(f) reveals that value added at constant
prices increases in most of non-traded industries although the responses are somewhat
muted in ’Hotels and Restaurants’ and ’Electricity, Gas, Water Supply’. Fig. 17(h) shows
that the value added share of non-tradables increases in the public sector and Construction
while it declines in all remaining non-traded industries, especially in ’Wholesale and Retail
Trade’. Fig. 17(j) reveals that the responses of non-traded TFP are muted across all non-
traded industries, in accordance with its response at the broad sector level. Finally, Fig.
17(k) shows that the responses of the LIS in traded sub-sectors are fairly muted except for
the LIS of ’Manufacturing’ which declines significantly. When we turn to the non-traded
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Figure 17: Effects of Exogenous Government Spending Shock on Sub-SectorsNotes: Because
the traded and non-traded sector are made up of industries, we conduct a decomposition of the sectoral effects at a
sub-sector level following a an exogenous increase in government consumption final expenditure by 1% of GDP. To
quantify the contribution of each industry to the change in the sectoral variable of the corresponding broad sector, we
estimate the responses of each sub-sector variable to the identified government spending shock by using the Jordà’s
[2005] single-equation method. To express the results in meaningful units, i.e., in GDP units or total hours worked
units, we multiply the responses of value added at constant prices and value added share at constant prices of sub-
sector k by its share in GDP (at current prices), and we multiply the responses of hours worked and labor share of
sub-sector k by its labor compensation share. The first/third columns show results for sub-sectors classified in the
traded sector. The black line shows results for ’Agriculture’, the blue line with triangles for ’Mining and Quarrying’,
the red line with circles for ’Manufacturing’, the green line with a plus for ’Transport and Communication’, and
the cyan line with a circle for ’Financial Intermediation’. The second/fourth columns show results for sub-sectors
classified in the non-traded sector. The black line shows results for ’Electricity, Gas and Water Supply’, the blue line
with triangles for ’Construction’, the red line with circles for ’Wholesale and Retail Trade’, the green line with a plus
for ’Hotels and Restaurants’, the cyan line with a circle for ’Real Estate, Renting, and Business Services’, and the
line in magenta with diamond for ’Community Social and Personal Services’. Horizontal axes indicate years. Vertical
axes measure percentage deviation from trend in GDP units (sectoral value added, sectoral value added share, labor
income share), percentage deviation from trend in total hours worked units (sectoral hours worked, labor share),
percentage deviation from trend (sectoral TFPs). Sample: 18 OECD countries, 1970-2015, annual data.
sector, Fig. 17(l) shows that the rise in the non-traded LIS is driven by increases of the
LIS in ’Community Social and Personal Services’ (i.e., the public sector which also includes
health and education services), ’Construction’ together with ’Real Estate, Renting and
Business Services’.
M.5 Comparison with CRC’s [2020] Empirical Findings: Sample and
Empirical Strategy
In this subsection, we run a robustness check with regard to the sample/period and the
empirical strategy. A close empirical analysis to ours is that performed by Cardi, Restout
and Claeys (henceforth CRC) [2020]. Like CRC [2020], we estimate a panel VAR on annual
data and investigate the effects of a government spending shock (identified by adopting
Blanchard and Perotti’s [2002] method) on both traded and non-traded value added and
hours worked. Yet, our empirical analysis differs in three major respects:
• Sample. First, regarding the sample, we use a panel of 18 OECD economies over
1970-2015 while CRC [2020] consider a sample of 16 OECD economies over 1970-
2007. Note that we consider the sixteen OECD countries included in the CRC’s
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[2020] sample plus Korea and Portugal.
• Empirical strategy. Second, our empirical strategy differs along one major di-
mension. CRC [2020] estimate the effects of a shock to government consumption on
sectoral variables by estimating a VAR model including government consumption (or-
dered first), sectoral value added at constant prices, sectoral hours worked, sectoral
wage rate or a VAR model where sectoral variables are divided by their aggregate
counterpart. In contrast to CRC [2020], we adopt a two-step approach where we
identify the structural shock by using a Cholesky decomposition in which government
spending is ordered before the other variables and trace out the dynamic effects by
using Jordà’s [2005] projection method. The advantage of our two-step approach is
twofold. First, we estimate one unique VAR model and thus identify one unique
structural shock. Second, the local project method has the advantage that it does not
impose the dynamic restrictions implicitly embedded in VARs and can accommodate
non-linearities in the response function.
• Variables. Third, CRC [2020] restrict their attention to the effects of a govern-
ment spending shock on hours worked and value added while in the present paper,
we explore empirically the impact of a rise in government consumption on both la-
bor income shares and technological change as measured by TFP, capital-utilization
adjusted TFP, capital-utilization adjusted FBTC. Importantly, we show that the en-
dogenous response of technological change to a shock to government consumption can
rationalize the differences in sectoral fiscal multipliers.
CRC [2020] estimate different VAR models while we estimate one unique VAR model
which includes government consumption, real GDP, total hours worked, the real consump-
tion wage and aggregate TFP where all quantities are divided by the working age popula-
tion and all variables are logged. CRC [2020] explore the size of sectoral fiscal multipliers










, which includes government con-
sumption, value added at constant prices in sector j, hours worked in sector j, the real
consumption wage in sector j, where all sectoral quantities are divided by population and
all variables are logged. To estimate the change in the value added share of sector j and the
response of the labor share in sector j, CRC [2020] estimate a VAR model where sectoral
quantities are divided by their aggregate counterpart. While CRC [2020] do not estimate
the effects of a rise in government spending on sectoral TFP, we also run a VAR model
which includes government consumption (ordered first), traded TFP, non-traded TFP to
investigate the extent to which the sample and the method matter in determining the re-
sponse of technology. As mentioned above, our two-step method has the advantage to
estimate the dynamic adjustment of sectoral variables to one unique government spending
shock by adopting the local projection method which imposes fewer dynamic restrictions
that those implicitly embedded in VARs.
In Fig. 18, we compare our empirical findings with those obtained when using the same
sample (i.e., 16 OECD countries over 1970-2007) and/or adopting the same methodology as
CRC [2020]. In the black line with squares, we report the results obtained in the main text;
more specifically, we adopt the two-step approach detailed in length in the main text (i.e.,
we identify one unique government spending shock and trace out the dynamic responses of
variables by using the local projection method) and consider a sample of 18 OECD countries
over 1970-2015. The dashed black line with stars shows results when we re-estimate the
effects of a shock to government consumption by considering 16 OECD countries over the
period 1970-2007, as considered by CRC [2020], and still adopt the two-step approach. Our
conclusions remain unchanged. The most notable quantitative difference is the response of
the non-traded LIS shown in Fig. 18(l) which reveals that the increase in sNL is twice as
less as in the baseline scenario.
The solid blue line shows results of [2020] when we consider a sample of 16 OECD
countries over the period 1970-2007 and estimate the government spending shock and the
response of sectoral variables by considering different VAR models and thus potentially
identifying different structural shocks, i.e., some VAR models could potentially identify a
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Figure 18: Sectoral Effects of a Shock to Government Consumption: Robustness CheckNotes:
The solid black line with squares shows the response of sectoral variables to an exogenous increase in government
final consumption expenditure by 1% of GDP. Shaded areas indicate the 90 percent confidence bounds. While in
the baseline scenario shown in the black line with squares, the period is running from 1970 to 2015 and the sample
includes 18 OECD countries, the dashed black line shows the effects before the Great Recession, i.e., over the period
1970-2007 and for 16 OECD countries. In both cases, we estimate the dynamic responses to a shock to government
consumption by adopting a two-step method. In the first step, the government spending shock is identified by
estimating a VAR model that includes real government final consumption expenditure, real GDP, total hours worked,
the real consumption wage, and aggregate TFP. In the second step, we estimate the effects by using Jordà’s [2005]
single-equation method. Horizontal axes indicate years. Vertical axes measure percentage deviation from trend in
GDP units (sectoral value added, sectoral value added share, labor income share), percentage deviation from trend in
total hours worked units (sectoral hours worked, labor share), percentage deviation from trend (sectoral TFPs, relative
prices). The blue lines show the effects of shock to government consumption when we identify and generate empirical
IRFs by running a VAR model which includes sectoral variables. The solid blue line shows the sectoral effects when
estimating the VAR model over 1970-2007 for 16 OECD countries while the dashed blue line with triangles shows
estimates when we estimate the same VAR model over 1970-2015 for 18 OECD countries. The solid blue line shows
results obtained by Cardi, Restout and Claeys [2020]. Sample: 18 OECD countries, 1970-2015, annual data.
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shock to government spending which is more biased toward non-tradables. To investigate
the extent of the role of the sample in driving the empirical findings, we show results in
the dashed blue line with triangles when we consider a sample of 18 OECD countries over
1970-2015. As shown in the first row of Fig. 18, adopting a VAR methodology instead
of local projection method tends to mitigate the rise in hours worked and in value added
at constant prices. As shown in the solid blue line in Fig. 18(f), a shock to government
consumption has a strong and significant impact on the value added share which suggests
that the shock is strongly biased toward non-tradables. We can notice that traded TFP
remains unchanged while non-traded TFP declines as can be seen in Fig. 18(i) and Fig.
18(j), respectively, when considering 16 OECD countries over 1970-2007 (see the solid blue
line). The fall in non-traded TFP is not large enough to overturn the positive impact on
νY,N (t) driven by the biasedness of the government spending shock toward non-tradables.
In contrast, when we consider the sample of 18 OECD countries over 1970-2015, the rise
in the value added share of non-tradables vanishes, as shown in the dashed blue line. The
reason is that as shown in Fig. 18(i), traded TFP increases which neutralizes the impact of
the biasedness of the spending shock toward non-tradables. Because traded TFP increases
less when adopting the VAR methodology (see both the solid and dashed blue lines in Fig.
18(i)), the terms of trade appreciate more in the short-run as can be seen in Fig. 18(h).
As displayed by the blue lines in Fig. 18(g) the relative price of non-tradables appreciates
more when we estimate the dynamic effects by using a VAR instead of local projection
which suggests that the VAR methodology picks up government spending shocks which are
more strongly biased toward non-tradables.
The labor share of non-tradables increases significantly in the VAR approach, regardless
of the sample, as can be seen in the blue lines in Fig. 18(e). We can notice that the rise
in νL,N (t) is more pronounced when we consider the sample of 18 OECD countries over
1970-2015, as can be seen in the dashed blue line. The reason is that the responses of LISs
in the traded and non-traded sector shown in Fig. 18(k) and Fig. 18(l) are muted at any
horizon when considering 16 OECD countries over 1970-2007 (see the slid blue line) while
considering a sample of 18 OECD countries over 1970-2015 leads sHL to decline and s
N
L to
increase significantly, thus amplifying the rise in the demand for labor in the non-traded
relative to the traded sector.
In conclusion, we can notice some important differences with the empirical findings
reported by CRC [2020]. First, we find that the empirical strategy adopted by CRC [2020]
tends to lead the authors to pick up a shock to government consumption which is more
strongly biased toward non-tradables, thus leading the value added share of non-tradables
to increase more. Second, the sample also plays a role. It appears that both traded TFP
and the non-traded labor income share increase less when we consider a sample of 16 OECD
countries over period 1970-2007 than in a sample of 18 OECD countries over 1970-2015.
Third, both the VAR method and the sample tend to generate a fall in non-traded TFP and
understate the rise in traded TFP which can rationalize the smaller increase in both traded
and non-traded value added. Fourth, it stands out that the non-traded LIS increases much
less when we consider a sample of 16 OECD countries over 1970-2007 instead of a sample
of 18 OECD countries over 1970-2015. Because non-traded firms do not bias technological
change toward labor, non-traded hours worked increase much less in CRC [2020].
N Semi-Small Open Economy Model
This Appendix puts forward an open economy version of the neoclassical model with trad-
ables and non-tradables, imperfect mobility of labor across sectors, capital adjustment costs
and endogenous terms of trade. This section illustrates in detail the steps we follow in solv-
ing this model. We assume that production functions take a Cobb-Douglas form since this
economy is the reference model for our calibration as we normalize CES productions by
assuming that the initial steady state of the Cobb-Douglas economy is the normalization
point.
Households supply labor, L, and must decide on the allocation of total hours worked
between the traded sector, LH , and the non-traded sector, LN . They consume both traded,
115
CT , and non-traded goods, CN . Traded goods are a composite of home-produced traded
goods, CH , and foreign-produced foreign (i.e., imported) goods, CF . Households also
choose investment which is produced using inputs of the traded, JT , and the non-traded
good, JN . As for consumption, input of the traded good is a composite of home-produced
traded goods, JH , and foreign imported goods, JF . The numeraire is the foreign good
whose price, PF , is thus normalized to one. While households choose the utilization of the
stock of physical and intangible capital, firms decide about the mix of labor- and capital-
augmenting productivity.
N.1 Households
At each instant of time, the representative household consumes traded and non-traded
















where 0 < ϕ < 1 is the weight of the traded good in the overall consumption bundle and φ
corresponds to the elasticity of substitution between traded goods and non-traded goods.
The index CT is defined as a CES aggregator of home-produced traded goods, CH , and



















where 0 < ϕH < 1 is the weight of the home-produced traded good in the overall traded
consumption bundle and ρ corresponds to the elasticity of substitution between home-
produced traded goods goods and foreign-produced traded goods.
As in De Cordoba and Kehoe [2000], the investment good is produced using inputs of
the traded good and the non-traded good according to a constant-returns-to-scale function



















where ι is the weight of the investment traded input (0 < ι < 1) and φJ corresponds to
the elasticity of substitution in investment between traded and non-traded inputs. The
index JT is defined as a CES aggregator of home-produced traded inputs, JH , and foreign-



















where 0 < ιH < 1 is the weight of the home-produced traded in input in the overall traded
investment bundle and ρJ corresponds to the elasticity of substitution between home- and
foreign-produced traded inputs.
Following Horvath [2000], we assume that hours worked in the traded and the non-













where 0 < ϑ < 1 is the weight of labor supply to the traded sector in the labor index L(.)
and ε measures the ease with which hours worked can be substituted for each other and
thereby captures the degree of labor mobility across sectors.
The representative agent is endowed with one unit of time, supplies a fraction L(t) as
labor, and consumes the remainder 1− L(t) as leisure. At any instant of time, households
derive utility from their consumption and experience disutility from working. Assuming that
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the felicity function is additively separable in consumption and labor, the representative
















where β > 0 is the discount rate, σC > 0 the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for
consumption, and σL > 0 the Frisch elasticity of (aggregate) labor supply.
We assume that the households own the physical capital stock and choose the level of
capital utilization uK,j(t). The households also own the intangible stock of capital Z̄j(t)
and choose the level of utilization of existing technology uZ,j(t), i.e., Zj(t) = uZ,j(t)Z̄j .
We further assume that the technology utilization rate is Hicks-neutral. In the sequel,
we normalize the stock of knowledge, Z̄j , to one as we abstract from endogenous choices
on the stock of knowledge. Households lease capital services (the product of utilization
and physical capital) to firms in sector j at rental rate R(t) augmented with the technol-
ogy utilization rate, i.e., R(t)uZ,j(t). Thus capital income received by households reads∑
j u
Z,j(t)R(t)uK,j(t)Kj(t). Households supply labor services to firms in sector j at a




Z,j(t)W j(t)Lj(t). In addition, households accumulate internationally
traded bonds, N(t), that yield net interest rate earnings of r?N(t). Denoting lump-sum
taxes by T (t), households’ flow budget constraint states that real disposable income can be
saved by accumulating traded bonds, consumed, PC(t)C(t), invested, PJ(t)J(t), and covers
the capital and technology utilization costs:
Ṅ(t) = r?N(t) +
[





αL(t)uZ,H(t) + (1− αL(t))uZ,N (t)
]
W (t)L(t)− T (t)− PC(t)C(t)− PJ(t)J(t)
− PH(t)CK,H(t)αK(t)K(t)− PN (t)CK,N (t) (1− αK(t))K(t)
− PH(t)CZ,H(t)− PN (t)CZ,N (t), (194)
where we denote the share of traded capital in the aggregate capital stock by αK(t) =




The role of the capital utilization rate is to mitigate the effect of a rise in the capital
cost. Symmetrically, the role of the technology utilization rate is to dampen the effects of
increased costs of factors of production. We let the function CK,j(t) and CZ,j(t) denote
the adjustment costs associated with the choice of capital and technology utilization rates
which are increasing and convex functions of utilization rates uK,j(t) and uZ,j(t):
CK,j(t) = ξj1
(





uK,j(t)− 1)2 , (195a)
CZ,j(t) = χj1
(





uZ,j(t)− 1)2 , (195b)
where ξj2 > 0, χ
j
2 are free parameters; as ξ2 →∞, χ2 →∞, utilization is fixed at unity; ξj1,
χj1 must be restricted so that the optimality conditions are consistent with the normalization
of steady state utilization of 1.
Capital accumulation evolves as follows:
K̇(t) = I(t)− δKK(t), (196)
where I is investment and 0 ≤ δK < 1 is a fixed depreciation rate. We assume that capital
accumulation is subject to increasing and convex cost of net investment:
J(t) = I(t) + Ψ (I(t),K(t))K(t), (197)
where Ψ (.) is increasing (i.e., Ψ′(.) > 0), convex (i.e., Ψ′′(.) > 0), is equal to zero at δK (i.e.,
Ψ(δK) = 0), and has first partial derivative equal to zero as well at δK (i.e., Ψ′(δK) = 0).











Using (198), partial derivatives of total investment expenditure are:
∂J(t)
∂I(t)





















Denoting the co-state variables associated with (194) and (196) by λ and Q′, respectively,
the first-order conditions characterizing the representative household’s optimal plans are:
(C(t))−
1

















λ̇(t) = λ (β − r?) , (200d)
Q̇(t) = (r? + δK) Q(t)−
{ [
αK(t)uK,H(t)uZ,H(t) + (1− αK(t))uK,N (t)uZ,N (t)
]


















uK,H(t)− 1)] , (200f)






uK,N (t)− 1)] , (200g)






uZ,H(t)− 1)] , (200h)






uZ,N (t)− 1)] , (200i)
and the transversality conditions limt→∞ λ̄N(t)e−βt = 0 and limt→∞Q(t)K(t)e−βt = 0; to
derive (200c) and (200e), we used the fact that Q(t) = Q′(t)/λ(t).
Given the above consumption indices, we can derive appropriate price indices. With























Given the consumption-based price index (201), the representative household has the













Given the price indices (201) and (202), the representative household has the following























As will be useful later, the percentage change in the consumption price index is a
weighted average of percentage changes in the price of traded and non-traded goods in
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terms of foreign goods:
P̂C = αC P̂ T + (1− αC) P̂N , (205a)
P̂ T = αH P̂H , (205b)
where αC is the tradable content of overall consumption expenditure and αH is the home-

























Given the CES aggregator functions above, we can derive the appropriate price indices
for investment. With respect to the general investment index, we obtain the investment-






)1−φJ + (1− ι) (PN)1−φJ
] 1
1−φJ , (207)






)1−ρJ + (1− ιH)
] 1
1−ρJ . (208)
Given the investment-based price index (207), we can derive the demand for inputs of













Given the price indices (207) and (208), we can derive the demand for inputs of home-























As will be useful later, the percentage change in the investment price index is a weighted
average of percentage changes in the price of traded and non-traded inputs in terms of
foreign inputs:
P̂J = αJ P̂ TJ + (1− αJ) P̂N , (211a)




where αJ is the tradable content of overall investment expenditure and αHJ is the home-
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Before deriving the allocation of hours worked across sectors, it is convenient to rewrite
the optimal decision for aggregate labor supply described by eq. (200b). As shall be
useful, we denote sectoral wages including technology utilization rates with a tilde, i.e.,
W̃ j(t) = uZ,j(t)W j(t). Multiplying both sides of (200b) by L(t) and denoting by W̃ (t) the






















W̃H(t)LH(t) + W̃N (t)LN (t)
]
,
where we used the definition of the labor compensation share of tradables and non-tradables,
i.e., αL(t)W (t)L(t) = WH(t)LH(t) and (1− αL(t))W (t)L(t) = WN (t)LN (t). Dividing
both sides of the above equation by L(t) and using the definition of the aggregate wage
index which includes technology utilization rates enables us to rewrite eq. (200b) as follows:
γ (L(t))
1
σL = λ(t)W̃ (t). (213)













where W̃H(t) = uZ,H(t)WH(t) and WN = uZ,N (t)WN (t) are wages paid in the traded and
the non-traded sectors, respectively.
Given the aggregate wage index, we can derive the allocation of aggregate labor supply













As will be useful later, log-linearizing the aggregate wage index in the neighborhood of
the initial steady-state leads to:
ˆ̃W (t) = αL
ˆ̃WH(t) + (1− αL) ˆ̃WN (t), (216)













Note that because we log-linearize in the neighborhood of the steady-state, the labor com-
pensation share, α̃L, inclusive of the technology utilization rate collapses to the technology
utilization adjusted labor compensation share, αL.
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N.2 Firms
We denote the value added in sector j = H, N by Y j . When we add a tilde, it means that
value added is inclusive of the technology utilization rate. Both the traded and non-traded
sectors use physical capital inclusive of capital utilization, K̃j(t) = uK,j(t)Kj(t), and labor,
Lj , according to constant returns to scale production functions which are assumed to take
a Cobb-Douglas form. We allow for labor- and capital-augmenting productivity denoted
by Ãj(t) and B̃j(t). We assume that factor-augmenting productivity has a symmetric
time-varying component denoted by uZ,j(t) such that Ãj(t) = uZ,j(t)Aj(t) and B̃j(t) =
uZ,j(t)Bj(t). Since factor-augmenting productivity has no impact when considering Cobb-





)1−θj and as mentioned above,
we normalize Z̄j to one. The production function of sector j reads as follows:








where θj is the labor income share in sector j.
Firms face two cost components: a capital rental cost equal to R̃j(t) = R(t)uZ,j(t), and
a labor cost equal to the wage rate W̃ j(t) = W j(t)uZ,j(t), both inclusive of technology
utilization. Both sectors are assumed to be perfectly competitive and thus choose capital






P j(t)Ỹ j(t)− W̃ j(t)Lj(t)− R̃j(t)K̃j(t)
}
. (219)













where k̃j(t) = K̃
j(t)
Lj(t)
is the capital-labor ratio in sector j. By using the definition of W̃ j(t)
and R̃j(t), the technology utilization rate vanishes from first-order conditions. Since capital
can move freely between the two sectors, the value of marginal products in the traded and


















)1−θN ≡ WN (t). (221c)
The resource constraint for capital is:
KH(t) + KN (t) = K(t). (222)
N.3 Solving the Model
Consumption and Labor
Before linearizing, we have to determine short-run solutions. First-order conditions
(200a) and (200b) can be solved for consumption and aggregate labor supply which of
course must hold at any point of time:
C = C
(
λ̄, PN , PH
)
, L = L
(
λ̄, W̃H , W̃N
)
, (223)
with partial derivatives given by
Ĉ = −σC ˆ̄λ− σCαCαH P̂H − σC (1− αC) P̂N , (224a)
L̂ = σL ˆ̄λ + σL (1− αL) ˆ̃WN + σLαL ˆ̃WH , (224b)
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where we have used (205) and (216).
Inserting first the solution for consumption (223) into (203b), (204a), (204b) enables us
to solve for CN , CH , and CF :
CN = CN
(
λ̄, PN , PH
)
, CH = CH
(
λ̄, PN , PH
)
, CF = CF
(
λ̄, PN , PH
)
, (225)
with partial derivatives given by
ĈN = −φP̂N + (φ− σC) P̂C − σC ˆ̄λ,
= − [αCφ + (1− αC) σC ] P̂N + (φ− σC) αCαH P̂H − σC ˆ̄λ, (226a)
ĈH = − [ρ (1− αH) + φ (1− αC) αH + σCαCαH
]
P̂H + (1− αC) (φ− σC) P̂N − σC ˆ̄λ,(226b)
ĈF = αH [ρ− φ (1− αC)− σCαC ] P̂H + (1− αC) (φ− σC) P̂N − σC ˆ̄λ. (226c)




λ̄,WH ,WN , uZ,H , uZ,N
)
, LN = LN
(
λ̄,WH ,WN , uZ,H , uZ,N
)
, (227)
with partial derivatives given by:


















Sectoral Wages and Capital-Labor Ratios
Plugging the short-run solutions for LH and LN given by (227) into the resource con-
straint for capital (222), the system of four equations consisting of (221a)-(221c) together
with (222) can be solved for sectoral wages W j and sectoral capital-labor ratios kj . Log-
differentiating (221a)-(221c) together with (222) yields in matrix form:


−θH θN 0 0(
1− θH) 0 −1 0
0
(
1− θN) 0 −1














P̂N − P̂H + θH ûK,H − θN ûK,N
−P̂H − (1− θH) ûK,H
































Ψλ̄λ̄ = αKσL + (1− αK)σL = σL. (230c)
where uZ,j = 1 at αK ≡ KH/K stands for the share of traded capital in the aggregate
stock of physical capital.
The short-run solutions for sectoral wages and capital-labor ratios are:
W j = W j
(









Inserting first sectoral wages (231a), sectoral hours worked (227) can be solved as functions
of the shadow value of wealth, the capital stock, the price of non-traded goods in terms of
foreign goods, PN , the terms of trade, capital and technology utilization rates:
Lj = Lj
(
λ̄,K, PN , PH , uK,H , uK,N , uZ,H , uZ,N
)
. (232)







uK,jKj , using the fact that kj = Kj/Lj , leads to:







Plugging solutions for sectoral hours worked (232) and sectoral capital-labor ratios (231b)
enables us to solve for technology utilization adjusted sectoral value added:
Y j = Y j
(
λ̄,K, PN , PH , uK,H , uK,N , uZ,H , uZ,N
)
. (234)
By using the fact that Kj = kjLj and inserting solutions for kj and Lj described by (231b)
and (232) enables us to solve for the sectoral capital stocks:
Kj = Kj
(
λ̄,K, PN , PH , uK,H , uK,N , uZ,H , uZ,N
)
. (235)
Capital and Technology Utilization Rates, uK,j(t) and uZ,j(t)







R(t)uZ,j(t) into optimal choices for capital utilization (200f)-(200g), and invoking the Eu-
ler theorem which leads to WHLH + RuK,HKH = PHY H to rewrite optimal choices for








uK,H(t)− 1) , (236a)






uK,N (t)− 1)] , (236b)









uZ,N (t)− 1) , (236d)
Log-linearizing optimal decisions on capital and technology utilization rates described





































































































































































The short-run solutions for capital and technology utilization rates are:
uK,j = uK,j
(





λ̄,K, PN , PH
)
. (238b)
Intermediate Solutions for kj ,W j , Lj , Y j ,Kj
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Plugging back solutions for capital and technology utilization rates (238a)-(238b) into
(231a), (231b), (232), (234), (235) leads to intermediate solutions for sectoral wages, sectoral
capital-labor ratios, sectoral hours worked, sectoral value added, and sectoral capital stocks:
W j , kj , Lj , Y j ,Kj
(
λ̄,K, PN , PH
)
. (239)
Optimal Investment Decision, I/K






PI (P T , PN )
)


































































Eq. (243) can be solved for investment including capital installation costs:
J = J
(














= KvX (1 + κv(.)) > 0, (245b)
with X = Q,PH , PN .
Substituting (244) into (209b), (217a), and (217b) allows us to solve for the demand for
non-traded, home-produced traded, and foreign-produced traded inputs:
JN = JN
(
K, Q,PN , PH
)
, JH = JH
(
K,Q, PN , PH
)
, JF = JF
(





with partial derivatives given by























P̂H + K̂, (247a)




+ αHJ φJ (1− αJ)
]




























Q̂ + K̂, (247b)
ĴF = αHJ [ρJ − φJ (1− αJ)] P̂H + φJ (1− αJ) P̂N + Ĵ ,
= αHJ
{


















Q̂ + K̂, (247c)
where use has been made of (245), i.e.,
















N.4 Market Clearing Conditions
Finally, we have to solve for the relative price of non-traded goods and the terms of trade.
Market Clearing Condition for Non-Tradables
The role of the price of non-tradables in terms of foreign-produced traded goods is to
clear the non-traded goods market:
uZ,N (t)Y N (t) = CN (t) + GN (t) + JN (t) + CK,N (t)KN (t) + CZ,N (t). (248)
Inserting solutions for CN , JN , Y N given by (225), (226a), (221), respectively, the non-
traded goods market clearing condition (248) can be rewritten as follows:
uZ,N
(





























λ̄,K, PN , PH
)]
. (249)
Linearizing (249) leads to:
Y NduZ,N (t)+dY N (t) = dCN (t)+dGN (t)+dJN (t)+KNξN1 du
K,N (t)+χN1 du
Z,N (t), (250)
where the terms Y NduZ,N (t) and χN1 du
Z,N (t) cancel out because eq. (236d) evaluated at
the steady-state implies Y N = χN1 .
Market Clearing Condition for Home-Produced Traded Goods
The role of the price of home-produced goods in terms of foreign-produced goods or the
terms of trade is to clear the home-produced traded goods market:
uZ,H(t)Y H(t) = CH(t) + GH(t) + JH(t) + XH(t) + CK,H(t)KH(t) + CZ,H(t), (251)





where φX is the elasticity of exports with respect to the terms of trade.
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Inserting solutions for CH , JH , Y H given by (225), (226a), (221), respectively, the
traded goods market clearing condition (251) can be rewritten as follows:
uZ,H
(





























λ̄,K, PN , PH
)]
. (253)
Linearizing (253) leads to:




where the terms Y HduZ,H(t) and χH1 du
Z,H(t) cancel out because eq. (236c) evaluated at
the steady-state implies Y H = χH1 .
Sectoral Government Spending
We assume that the rise in government consumption is broken into non-traded and
traded goods, and into home- and foreign-produced traded goods in accordance with their
respective shares, ωGN = PNGN/G and ωGH =
P HGH
G . Formally, we have:
dG(t) = ωGN dG(t) + ωGH dG(t) + ωGF dG(t). (255)
Linearizing the allocation of total government consumption across sectoral goods (measured
at constant prices) leads to:
dG(t) = PNdGN (t) + PHdGH(t) + dGF (t). (256)
Eqs. (255)-(256) can be solved for sectoral government consumption:
GN , GH , GF (G(t)), (257)


















= ωGF . (258c)
Solving for Relative Prices
As shall be useful below, we write out a number of useful notations:
ΨNP N = Y
N
P N − CNP N − JNP N −KNξN1 uK,NP N , (259a)
ΨNP H = Y
N
P H − CNP H − JNP H −KNξN1 uK,NP H , (259b)
ΨNK = Y
N
K − JNK −KNξN1 uK,NK , (259c)
ΨNλ = Y
N
λ − CNλ −KNξN1 uK,Nλ , (259d)
ΨHP N = Y
H
P N − CHP N − JHP N −KHξH1 uK,HP N , (259e)
ΨHP H = Y
H
P H − CHP H − JHP H −XHP H −KHξH1 uK,HP H , (259f)
ΨHK = Y
H
K − JHK −KHξH1 uK,HK , (259g)
ΨHλ = Y
H
λ − CHλ −KHξH1 uK,Hλ . (259h)
Linearized versions of market clearing conditions described by eq. (250) and eq. (254)














( −ΨNKdK + JNQ dQ + GNGdG−ΨNλ dλ̄
−ΨHKdK + JHQ dQ + GHGdG−ΨHλ dλ̄
)
. (260)












N.5 Solving the Model
In our model, there is one state variable, namely the capital stock K, and one control
variable, namely the shadow price of the capital stock Q. To solve the model, we have to
express all variables in terms of state and control variables. Plugging back solutions for
the relative price of non-tradables (261a) and the terms of trade (261b) into (225), (246),
(239), capital and technology utilization rates (238a)-(238b) leads to solutions for sectoral
consumption, sectoral inputs for capital goods, sectoral wages, sectoral capital-labor ratios,
sectoral hours worked, sectoral value added, sectoral capital stocks:











Log-linearizing (263) in the neighborhood of the initial steady-state leads to:





Inserting the solution for the terms of trade, PH , the capital utilization rate, uK,H , and







Remembering that the non-traded input JN used to produce the capital good is de-










K, using the fact
that JN = Y N − CN − GN and inserting I = K̇ + δK , the capital accumulation equation
reads as follows:
K̇(t) =















We drop the time index below so as to write equations in a more compact form. Inserting
first solutions for non-traded output, consumption in non-tradables, demand for non-traded
input, non-traded capital and technology utilization rates described by eq. (262) together
with optimal investment decision (245a) into the physical capital accumulation equation
(266), and plugging the short-run solution for the return on domestic capital (265) into the
dynamic equation for the shadow value of capital stock (200e), the dynamic system reads
as follows:
K̇ ≡ Υ(K, Q,G) ,
=













Q̇ ≡ Σ(K, Q, G)










P j (K,Q, G) CK,j
[
uK,j (K, Q, G)




PH (.) , PN (.)
] κ
2




To ease the linearization, it is useful to break down the capital accumulation into two
components:













)−φJ and log-linearizing gives:
Ĵ = ĴN + φJαJ P̂N − φJαJαHJ P̂H (269)
where we used the fact that P̂J = αJαHJ P̂
H + (1− αJ) P̂N . Using (268) and the fact that



















where J = I = δKK in the long-run and we used the fact that Y NduZ,N (t) and χN1 du
Z,N (t)
cancel out.
Let us denote by ΥK , ΥQ, and ΥG the partial derivatives evaluated at the steady-state
of the capital accumulation equation w.r.t. K, Q, and G, respectively. Using (262) and




















































where J = δKK in the long run.
Let us denote by ΣK , ΣQ, and ΣG the partial derivatives evaluated at the steady-state
of the dynamic equation for the marginal value of an additional unit of capital w.r.t. K,

































































































Assuming that the saddle-path stability condition is fulfilled, and denoting the negative
eigenvalue by ν1 and the positive eigenvalue by ν2, the general solutions for K and Q are:
K(t)−K = D1eν1t + D2eν2t, Q(t)−Q = ω12D1eν1t + ω22D2eν2t, (273)
where K0 is the initial capital stock and
(
1, ωi2






Because ν1 < 0, ΥK > 0 and ΥQ > 0, we have ω12 < 0, regardless of sectoral capital
intensities, which implies that the shadow value of investment and the stock physical capital
move in opposite direction along a stable path (i.e., D2 = 0).
N.6 Current Account Equation and Intertemporal Solvency Condition
To determine the current account equation, we use the following identities and properties:
PC(t)C(t) = PH(t)CH(t) + CF (t) + PN (t)CN (t), (275a)
PJ(t)J(t) = PH(t)JH(t) + JF (t) + PN (t)JN (t), (275b)
T (t) = G(t) = PH(t)GH(t) + GF (t) + PN (t)GN (t), (275c)












where (275d) follows from Euler theorem. Using (275d), inserting (275a)-(275c) into (194)
and invoking market clearing conditions for non-traded goods (248) and home-produced
traded goods (251) yields:
Ṅ(t) = r?N(t) + PH(t)
(
Ỹ H(t)− CH(t)−GH(t)− JH(t)− CK,H(t)KH(t)− CZ,H(t)
)
− (CF (t) + JF (t) + GF (t)) ,
= r?N(t) + PH(t)XH(t)−MF (t), (276)
where XH = Y H−CH−GH−JH−CK,HKH−CZ,H stands for exports of home-produced
traded goods and we denote imports of foreign consumption and investment goods by MF :
MF (t) = CF (t) + GF (t) + JF (t). (277)






Ṅ(t) ≡ r?N(t) + Ξ (K(t), Q(t), G(t)) ,
= r?N(t) + PH (K(t), Q(t), G(t))XH
[
PH (K(t), Q(t), G(t))
]−MF (K(t), Q(t), G(t)) .(278)
Let us denote by ΞK , ΞQ, and ΞZj the partial derivatives evaluated at the steady-state of
the dynamic equation for the current account w.r.t. K, Q, and Zj , respectively:
ΞK ≡ ∂Ṅ
∂K
= (1− φX) XHPHK −MFK , (279a)
ΞQ ≡ ∂Ṅ
∂Q
= (1− φX) XHPHQ −MFQ , (279b)
ΞG ≡ ∂Ṅ
∂G
= (1− φX) XHPHG −MFG . (279c)
where we used the fact that PHXH = ϕX
(
PH
)1−φX (see eq. (252)).
Linearizing (278) in the neighborhood of the steady-state, making use of (279a) and
(279b), inserting solutions for K(t) and Q(t) given by (273) and solving yields the general
solution for the net foreign asset position:
N(t) = N + [(N0 −N)−Ψ1D1 −Ψ2D2] er?t + Ψ1D1eν1t + Ψ2D2eν2t, (280)
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where N0 is the initial stock of traded bonds and we set
Ei = ΞK + ΞQωi2, (281a)
Ψi =
Ei
νi − r? . (281b)
Invoking the transversality condition leads to the linearized version of the nations’s
intertemporal solvency condition:
N −N0 = Ψ1 (K −K0) , (282)
where K0 is the initial stock of physical capital.
N.7 Derivation of the Accumulation Equation of Non Human Wealth
The stock of financial wealth A(t) is equal to N(t) + Q(t)K(t); differentiating w.r.t. time,
i.e., Ȧ(t) = Ṅ(t) + Q̇(t)K(t) + Q(t)K̇(t), plugging the dynamic equation for the marginal
value of capital (200e), inserting the accumulation equations for physical capital (196) and
for traded bonds (194), yields the accumulation equation for the stock of financial wealth
or the dynamic equation for private savings:
Ȧ(t) = r?A(t) +
∑
j=H,N




where we assume that the government levies lump-sum taxes, T , to finance purchases
of foreign-produced, home-produced traded goods and non-traded goods, i.e., T = G =
GF + PHGH + PNGN .
Inserting short-run solutions for the relative price of non-tradables (261a) and the terms
of trade (261b) into G = GF + PHGH + PNGN and (201) allows us to solve government











where partial derivatives are GX = PHX G
H + PNX G










where X = K, Q, G.
Inserting first short-run solutions for consumption and labor together with solutions
for technology utilization rates given by eq. (262), substituting solutions for government
spending and the consumption price index described by (284a)-(284b) leads to:




uZ,j (K,Q, G) W j (K, Q,G) Lj (K,Q, G)−G (K, Q,G)
− PC (K, Q, G)C (K, Q, G)−
∑
j=H,N
P j (K, Q,G) CZ,j (K, Q, G) . (286)
Let us denote by ΛK , ΛQ, and ΛG the partial derivatives evaluated at the steady-state





































































Linearizing (286) in the neighborhood of the steady-state, making use of (287a) and
(287b), inserting solutions for K(t) and Q(t) given by (273) and solving yields the general
solution for the stock of non human wealth:
A(t) = A + [(A0 −A)−∆1D1 −∆2D2] er?t + ∆1D1eν1t + ∆2D2eν2t, (288)
where A0 is the initial stock of financial wealth and we set
Mi = ΛK + ΛQωi2, (289a)
∆i =
Mi
νi − r? . (289b)
The linearized version of the representative household’s intertemporal solvency condition
is:
A−A0 = ∆1 (K −K0) , (290)
where A0 is the initial stock of non human wealth.
O Semi-Small Open Economy Model with CES Production
Functions
This section extends the model laid out in section N to CES production functions and factor
biased technological change. Since first order conditions from households’ maximization
problem detailed in subsection N.1 remain identical, we do not repeat them and emphasize
the main changes caused by the assumption of CES production functions.
O.1 Firms
We denote technology adjusted value added in sector j = H,N by Y j . When we add a
tilde, it means that value added is inclusive of the technology utilization rate, i.e., Ỹ j(t) =
uZ(t)Y j(t). We allow for labor- and capital-augmenting productivity denoted by Ãj(t) and
B̃j(t). We allow for labor- and capital-augmenting efficiency denoted by Ãj(t) and B̃j(t).
We assume that factor-augmenting productivity has a symmetric time-varying component
denoted by uZ,j(t) such that Ãj(t) = uZ,j(t)Aj(t) and B̃j(t) = uZ,j(t)Bj(t). Both the
traded and non-traded sectors use physical capital inclusive of capital utilization, K̃j(t) =
uK,j(t)Kj(t), and labor, Lj , according to constant returns to scale production functions


















where γj and 1 − γj are the weight of labor and capital in the production technology,
σj is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in sector j = H, N . Firms
lease the capital from households and hire workers. They face two cost components: a
capital rental cost equal to R̃j(t) = R(t)uZ,j(t), and a labor cost equal to the wage rate
W̃ j(t) = W j(t)uZ,j(t), both inclusive of technology utilization.
First-Order Conditions
Firms lease the capital from households and hire workers. They face two cost compo-
nents: a capital rental cost equal to R̃j(t) = R(t)uZ,j(t), and a labor cost equal to the
wage rate W̃ j(t) = W j(t)uZ,j(t), both inclusive of technology utilization. Both sectors are





































Since capital can move freely between the two sectors, the value of marginal products





















































σN ≡ WN , (294c)
where we denote by kj ≡ Kj/Lj the capital-labor ratio for sector j = H, N , and yj ≡ Y j/Lj















The resource constraint for capital is:
KH + KN = K. (296)
Some Useful Results
Multiplying both sides of (294b)-(294c) by Lj and dividing by sectoral value added leads




















Dividing eq. (297) by eq. (298), the ratio of the labor to the capital income share denoted















Unit Cost for Producing
Dividing (294b)-(294c) by (294a) leads to a positive relationship between the wage-to-

















































































































































where Xj is given by (303).
Eq. (304) can be solved for the conditional demand for labor and eq. (302) can be
solved for the conditional demand for capital (inclusive of capital utilization):


















where Xj is given by (302).
Total cost is equal to the sum of the labor and capital cost:
Costj = W jLj + RK̃j . (306)
Inserting conditional demand for inputs (318) into total cost (306) leads to:



























The above equation shows that Costj is homogenous of degree one with respect to the level
of production






















When we include technology utilization, eqs. (306)-(307) can be rewritten as follows:
˜Cost
j
= W̃ jLj + R̃jK̃j ,
= cj Ỹ j , (309)






















where W̃ j = uZ,jW j , R̃j = uZ,jR, Ãj = uZ,jAj , B̃j = uZ,jBj . Because the unit cost for
producing is homogeneous of degree one, denoting the technology-utilization-adjusted unit




























Using the fact that
(
cj
)1−σj = Xj , conditional demand for labor (318) can be rewritten


































where we used the fact that P j = cj .
O.2 Short-Run Solutions
Sectoral Wages and Capital-Labor Ratios
Plugging the short-run solutions for LH and LN given by (227) into the resource con-
straint for capital (296), the system of four equations consisting of (294a)-(294c) together
with (296) can be solved for sectoral wages W j and sectoral capital-labor ratios kj . Log-












































































































































σL = σL. (315c)
The short-run solutions for sectoral wages and capital-labor ratios are:
W j = W j
(





λ̄,K, PN , PH , AH , AN , BH , BN , uK,H , uK,N
)
. (316b)
Inserting first sectoral wages (316), sectoral hours worked (313a) can be solved as functions
of the shadow value of wealth, the capital stock, the price of non-traded goods in terms of
foreign goods, PN , and the terms of trade:
Lj = Lj
(
λ̄,K, PN , PH , AH , AN , BH , BN , uK,H , uK,N
)
. (317)






B̂j + ûK,j + k̂j
]
, (318)
where sjL and 1− sjL are the labor and capital income share, respectively, described by eqs.
(297)-(298). Plugging solutions for sectoral capital-labor ratios (316) into (318) allows us
to solve for sectoral value added per hours worked:
yj = yj
(
λ̄,K, PN , PH , AH , AN , BH , BN , uK,H , uK,N
)
, (319)
where for example the change in technology utilization adjusted value added per hour















































Using the fact that Y j = yjLj , inserting solutions for yj (319) and Lj (317), and differen-
tiating, one obtains the solutions for sectoral value added:
Y j = Y j
(
λ̄, K, PN , PH , AH , AN , BH , BN , uK,H , uK,N
)
. (320)
Using the fact that Kj = kjLj , inserting solutions for kj (316b) and Lj (317), differentiat-
ing, one obtains the solutions for the sectoral capital stock:
Kj = Kj
(
λ̄,K, PN , PH , AH , AN , BH , BN , uK,H , uK,N
)
. (321)
Capital and Technology Utilization Rates, uK,j(t) and uZ,j(t)













R into optimal choices for capital utilization (200f)-(200g), and invoking the Euler theorem
which leads to WHLH + RuK,HKH = PHY H to rewrite optimal choices for technology
135









































uK,N (t)− 1)] ,
(322b)









uZ,N (t)− 1) . (322d)
Log-linearizing optimal decisions on capital and technology utilization rates described





















































































































































































































where XH = PH , PN ,K, λ̄, AN , BN and XN = PH , PN ,K, λ̄, AH , BH .









λ̄, K, PN , PH , AH , AN , BH , BN
)
. (324b)
Intermediate Solutions for kj ,W j , Lj , Y j ,Kj
Plugging back solutions for capital and technology utilization rates (324a)-(324b) into
(316a), (316b), (317), (319), (320), (321) leads to intermediate solutions for sectoral wages,
sectoral capital-labor ratios, sectoral hours worked, sectoral value added, and sectoral cap-
ital stocks:
W j , kj , Lj , Y j ,Kj
(
λ̄,K, PN , PH , AH , AN , BH , BN
)
. (325)
Market Clearing Condition for Non-Tradables
The role of the price of non-tradables in terms of foreign-produced traded goods is to
clear the non-traded goods market:
uZ,N (t)Y N (t) = CN (t) + GN (t) + JN (t) + CK,N (t)KN (t) + CZ,N (t). (326)
Inserting solutions for CN , JN , Y N given by (225), i.e., CN
(





K,Q, PN , PH
)
, (325), i.e., Y N = Y N
(
λ̄,K, PN , PH , AH , AN , BH , BN
)
, the
non-traded goods market clearing condition (326) can be rewritten as follows:
uZ,NY N
(




λ̄, PN , PH
)
+ GN + JN
(


















Linearizing (327) leads to:
Y NduZ,N (t)+dY N (t) = dCN (t)+dGN (t)+dJN (t)+KNξN1 du
K,N (t)+χN1 du
Z,N (t), (328)
where the terms Y NduZ,N (t) and χN1 du
Z,N (t) cancel out because eq. (236d) evaluated at
the steady-state implies Y N = χN1 .
Market Clearing Condition for Home-Produced Traded Goods
The role of the price of home-produced traded goods in terms of foreign-produced traded
goods or the terms of trade is to clear the home-produced traded goods market:
uZ,H(t)Y H(t) = CH(t) + GH(t) + JH(t) + XH(t) + PH(t)CK,H(t)KH(t) + PH(t)CZ,H(t),
(329)






where φX is the elasticity of exports with respect to the terms of trade.
Inserting solutions for CH , JH , Y H given by (225), (226a), (325), respectively, the
traded goods market clearing condition (329) can be rewritten as follows:
uZ,HY H
(




λ̄, PN , PH
)
+ GH + JH
(


















Linearizing (331) leads to:




where the terms Y HduZ,H(t) and χH1 du
Z,H(t) cancel out because eq. (236c) evaluated at
the steady-state implies Y H = χH1 .
Solving for Relative Prices
As shall be useful below, we write out a number of useful notations:
ΨNP N = Y
N
P N − CNP N − JNP N −KNξN1 uK,NP N , (333a)
ΨNP H = Y
N
P H − CNP H − JNP H −KNξN1 uK,NP H , (333b)
ΨNK = Y
N
K − JNK −KNξN1 uK,NK , (333c)
ΨNAj = Y
N
Aj −KNξN1 uK,NAj , (333d)
ΨNBj = Y
N
Bj −KNξN1 uK,NBj , (333e)
ΨNλ = Y
N
λ − CNλ −−KNξN1 uK,Nλ , (333f)
ΨHP N = Y
H
P N − CHP N − JHP N −KHξH1 uK,HP N , (333g)
ΨHP H = Y
H
P H − CHP H − JHP H −XHP H −−KHξH1 uK,HP H , (333h)
ΨHK = Y
H
K − JHK −KHξH1 uK,HK , (333i)
ΨHAj = Y
H
Aj −KHξH1 uK,HAj , (333j)
ΨHBj = Y
H
Bj −KHξH1 uK,HBj , (333k)
ΨHλ = Y
H
λ − CHλ −KHξH1 uK,Hλ . (333l)
Linearized versions of market clearing conditions described by eq. (328) and eq. (332)




















dAj −−∑Nj=H ΨNBjdBj −ΨNλ dλ̄





dAj −∑Nj=H ΨHBjdBj −ΨHλ dλ̄
)
.(334)
The short-run solutions for capital and technology utilization rates are:
PN = PN
(









O.3 Solving the Model
In our model, there is five state variables, namely the capital stock K, labor-augmenting
productivity, AH , AN , Capital-augmenting productivity, BH , BN , and one control variable,
namely the shadow price of the capital stock Q. To solve the model, we have to express all
variables in terms of state and control variables. Plugging back solutions for the relative
price of non-tradables (335a) and the terms of trade (335b) into consumption in sectoral
goods (225), investment inputs (246), sectoral output (325), capital and technology utiliza-
tion rates (324a )-(324b) leads to solutions for sectoral consumption, sectoral inputs for
capital goods, sectoral wages, sectoral capital-labor ratios, sectoral hours worked, sectoral
value added, sectoral capital stocks:
Cj , J j ,W j , kj , Lj , Y j ,Kj , v, uK,j , uZ,j
(
λ̄,K, Q,G, AH , AN , BH , BN
)
. (336)














Differentiating (337) and making use of (318) leads to:
















Inserting the short-run static solutions for the capital-labor ratio kH and the capital uti-
lization rate (336), eq. (337) can be solved for the return on domestic capital:
R = R
(
λ̄, K, PN , PH , AH , AN , BH , BN
)
. (339)
Remembering that the non-traded input JN used to produce the capital good is de-










K, using the fact
that JN = Y N − CN − GN and inserting I = K̇ + δK , the capital accumulation equation
reads as follows:
K̇ =














Inserting first solutions for non-traded output, consumption in non-tradables, demand
for non-traded input, non-traded capital and technology utilization rates described by eq.
(336) together with optimal investment decision (245a) into the physical capital accumula-
tion equation (340), and plugging the short-run solution for the return on domestic capital
(339) into the dynamic equation for the shadow value of capital stock (200e), the dynamic
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system reads as follows:




K, Q, G,Aj , Bj
)− CN (K, Q, G,Aj , Bj)−GN (G)
(1− ι)
[
P N (K,Q,G,Aj ,Bj)
PJ (K,Q,G,Aj ,Bj)
]−φJ
−CK,N [uK,N (K, Q, G,Aj , Bj)]KN − CZ,N [uZ,N (K,Q, G, Aj , Bj)]
(1− ι)
[










Q̇ ≡ Σ (K, Q, G,Aj , Bj) ,

































K, Q, G,Aj , Bj





PH (.) , PN (.)
] κ
2
v(.) (v(.) + 2δK)
]
. (341c)
Let us denote by ΥX , the partial derivative evaluated at the steady-state of the capital
accumulation equation w.r.t. X = K,Q, G, Aj , Bj . Partial derivatives evaluated at the









































Let us denote by ΣX , the partial derivative evaluated at the steady-state of the dynamic
equation for the marginal value of an additional unit of capital w.r.t. X = K,Q, G, Aj , Bj .






































































O.4 Current Account Equation and Intertemporal Solvency Condition
Following the same steps as in subsection N.6, the current account reads as:
Ṅ(t) = r?N(t) + PH(t)XH(t)−MF (t), (344)
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where XH = Y H − CH −GH − JH − CK,HKH − CZ,H stands for exports of home goods
and we denote by MF imports of foreign consumption and investment goods:
MF (t) = CF (t) + GF (t) + JF (t). (345)






Ṅ ≡ r?N + Ξ (K,Q, G, AH , AN , BH , BN) ,
= r?N + PH
(




K,Q, G, AH , AN , BH , BN
)
−MF (K, Q, G,AH , AN , BH , BN) . (346)
Let us denote by ΞX the partial derivative evaluated at the steady-state of the dynamic
equation for the current account w.r.t. to X = K, Q,G, Aj , Bj . Partial derivatives evalu-








= (1− φX) XHPHBj −MFBj . (347b)
O.5 The Technology Frontier
Since we relax the assumption of Hicks-neutral technological change, we have to relate
changes in labor- and capital-augmenting efficiency, i.e., ˆ̃Aj(t) and ˆ̃Bj(t), respectively, to
the percentage deviation of capital-utilization-adjusted TFP in sector j, i.e., Ẑj(t), in order
to be consistent with our empirical strategy. A natural way to map Ãj and B̃j into Zj
is to assume that besides optimally choosing factor inputs, firms also optimally choose
the technology of production function. Following Caselli and Coleman [2006] and Caselli
[2016], the menu of possible choices of production functions is represented by a set of
possible (Ãj , B̃j) pairs. We assume that firms in sector j choose labor and capital efficiency

































where Zj > 0 is the height of the technology frontier, 0 < γjZ < 1 is the weight of labor
efficiency in TFP and σjZ > 0 corresponds to the elasticity of substitution between labor




































Eq. (349) measures the number of capital-augmenting efficiency units the firm must give
up to increase labor-augmenting productivity by one unit.
Firms choose Aj and Bj along the technology frontier so as to minimize the unit cost


















subject to (348) which holds as an equality. Differentiating (133) w.r.t. Aj(t) and Bj(t)
(while keeping W j and R fixed) and setting the expression to zero leads to:































Eq. (351) measures the number of capital-augmenting efficiency units the firm must give
up following an increase in labor-augmenting productivity by one unit to keep the unit cost
for producing unchanged.
Performing the cost minimization of (350) subject to (348) amounts to equating (349)






















































Eq. (352) states that it is optimal for firms to bias factor efficiency toward the most




< 1− σj .







)σj−1 = sjL(t) (see eq. (313a)), eq. (351)




B̂j(t) = −ĉj(t). Setting this equality to zero and





















































where we made use of (348) to obtain the last line and we used the fact that Zj(t) =
uZ,j(t)Z̄j .
Log-linearizing (348) in the neighborhood of the initial steady-state and making use of























where we used the fact that Z̄j is constant.












The system which comprises eq. (355) and eq. (356) can be solved for the percentage


















Eq. (357a) and eq. (357b) correspond to eq. (52a) and eq. (52b) in the main
text.
P Solving for Temporary Government Spending Shocks
P.1 Setting the Dynamics of Government Shock and Factor-Augmenting
Efficiency
Because the endogenous response of government spending to an exogenous fiscal shock is
hump-shaped, we assume that government consumption as a percentage of GDP evolves
according to the following dynamic equation:
dG(t)
Y
= e−ξt − (1− g) e−χt, (358)
where dG(t) = G(t)−G is the deviation of government consumption relative to the initial
steady-state, g > 0 parametrizes the magnitude of the exogenous fiscal shock, ξ > 0 and
χ > 0 are (positive) parameters which are set in order to capture the non-monotonic
endogenous response of G(t). We assume that the rise in government consumption is split
between non-traded and traded goods and government consumption in traded goods is split
between government consumption in home-produced traded goods and foreign-produced
traded goods. Denoting the non-tradable content of government spending by ωGN and the
home traded goods content of government spending by ωGH =
P HGH















G is the import content of government spending. In line with the evi-
dence we document in Appendix E, ωGN refers to the non-tradable content of government
consumption as well as the intensity of the government spending shock in non-traded goods.










Bt − (1− bj) e−χjBt, (360b)
where aj (bj) parameterizes the impact response of labor- (capital-) augmenting technolog-
ical change; ξjA > 0 (ξ
j
B > 0) and χ
j
A > 0 (χ
j
B > 0) are (positive) parameters which are set
in order to reproduce the dynamic adjustment of labor-augmenting (capital-augmenting)
technological change.
P.2 Solving for Temporary Government Spending Shocks
































where the coefficients of the Jacobian matrix are partial derivatives evaluated at the steady-
state, e.g., ΥX = ∂Υ∂X with X = K, Q, and the direct effects of an exogenous change in
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government spending on K and Q are described by ΥG = ∂Υ∂G and ΣG =
∂Σ
∂G , also evaluated
at the steady-state.
As shall be useful below to write the solutions in a compact form, let us define the
following terms:
ΦG1 = [(ΥK − ν2)ΥG + ΥQΣG] , (362a)
ΦG2 = [(ΥK − ν1)ΥG + ΥQΣG] , (362b)
ΦA
j
1 = [(ΥK − ν2)ΥAj + ΥQΣAj ] , (362c)
ΦA
j
2 = [(ΥK − ν1)ΥAj + ΥQΣAj ] , (362d)
ΦB
j
1 = [(ΥK − ν2)ΥBj + ΥQΣBj ] , (362e)
ΦB
j
2 = [(ΥK − ν1)ΥBj + ΥQΣBj ] . (362f)
We denote by V =
(
V 1, V 2
)


















































































































































where xj = aj , bj .
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where ΓG1 and Θ
G





by (366a) and (366c), respectively.





















Because ν2 > 0, for the solution to converge to the steady-state, the term in brackets must






































where ΓG2 and Θ
G





by (366b) and (366d), respectively.
Inserting first X2(0), the ’stable’ solution for X2(t), i.e., consistent with convergence
















































Using the definition of Xi(t) (with i = 1, 2) given by (363), we can recover the solutions
for K(t) and Q(t):
K(t)− K̃ = X1(t) + X2(t), (371a)
Q(t)− Q̃ = ω12X1(t) + ω22X2(t). (371b)
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Setting t = 0 into (371a) gives X1(0) = (K(0)−K) −X2(0) where X2(0) is described














































Linearizing the current account equation (344) around the steady-state:

























X t − (1− xj) e−χjX t
]
. (373)
Setting N1 = ΞK + ΞQω12, N2 = ΞK + ΞQω
2
2, inserting solutions for K(t) and Q(t) given
by (371), solving and invoking the transversality condition, yields the solution for traded
bonds:
dN(t) = er



























































































































































































































































































Invoking the transversality condition, to ultimately remain solvent, the open economy must
satisfy the following condition:
(N0 −N) + ω
1
N











































The convergent path for the net foreign asset position is:
dN(t) =
ω1N
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